(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(a) Tort actions, including but not limited to actions for negligence, trespass, malicious abuse of process, malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, interference with relationships, and tortious breach of contract; except that this paragraph (a) does not apply to any tort action arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle as set forth in section 13-80-101 (1) (n);
(b) All actions for strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to instruct or warn;
(c) All actions, regardless of the theory asserted, against any veterinarian;
(d) All actions for wrongful death, except as described in subsection (2) of this section;
(f) All actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity for which insurance coverage is provided pursuant to article 14 of title 24, C.R.S.;
(g) All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute;
(h) All actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity, except as otherwise provided in this section or section 13-80-103;
(i) All other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided;
(j) All actions brought under section 42-6-204, C.R.S.;
(k) All actions brought under section 13-21-109 (2).
(2) A civil action for a wrongful death against a defendant who committed vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106, C.R.S., and, as part of the same criminal episode, committed the offense of leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in the death of a person, as described in section 42-4-1601 (2) (c), C.R.S., regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.
Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 696, 1, effective July 1; (1)(j) added, p. 707, 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(b) amended and (1)(e) repealed, pp. 567, 569, 2, 8, effective July 1. L. 88: (1)(c) amended, p. 627, 2, effective July 1. L. 89: (1)(k) added, p. 757, 4, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(a) amended, p. 2824, 2, effective July 1; (1)(j) amended, p. 2549, 33, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2014: IP(1) and (1)(d) amended and (2) added, (SB 14-213), ch. 344, p. 1536, 3, effective July 1.
Editor's note: The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1986. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration stating the purpose of and the provision directing legislative staff agencies to conduct a post-enactment review pursuant to 2-2-1201 scheduled in 2019, see sections 1 and 6 of chapter 344, Session Laws of Colorado 2014. To obtain a copy of the review, once completed, view Colorado Legislative Council's web site.
I. General Consideration.
II. Paragraph (a).
III. Paragraph (c).
IV. Paragraph (d).
V. Paragraph (g).
VI. Paragraph (h).
VII. Paragraph (i).
Law reviews. For note, "Medical Products and Services Liability: Public Policy Requires Legislative Innovation and Judicial Restraint", see 53 Den. L. J. 387 (1976). For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", see 56 Den. L.J. 491 (1979). For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", see 58 Den. L.J. 371 (1981).
Annotator's note. For cases concerning when a cause of action accrues under this section, see the annotations to 13-80-108.
Applicability of amendment. In order to determine whether an amendment, which required discovery of negligence and the seriousness and character of injuries, applied to a case, it was necessary to determine whether a cause of action had accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment. Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 521 P.2d 1287 (1974).
Cause of action barred by effect of amendment. Where a plaintiff did not file her action within one year of the effective date of an amendment, her cause of action was barred, even though under the statute in effect at the time of the incident would have allowed her to bring the action until 1985. Licano v. Krausnick, 663 P.2d 1066 (Colo. App. 1983).
Statute of limitations not violative of due process unless time fixed amounts to denial of justice. The general rule is that a statute of limitations, including a statute which is to be applied retroactively, does not violate due process unless the time fixed by the statute is manifestly so limited as to amount to a denial of justice. Mishek v. Stanton, 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (1980).
The statute of limitations was not tolled by the pendency of a prior action commenced in another state which was dismissed and transferred to Colorado. Cook v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1985).
Existence of statute which prohibited filing of claim did not toll statute of limitations under doctrine of equitable tolling although statute was eventually held unconstitutional. Overheiser v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 814 P.2d 12 (Colo. App. 1991).
Where plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrated that some, although not all, of defendants' acts complained of occurred within limitation period, but complaint did not identify them, trial court should have permitted filing of amended complaint because original complaint put defendant sufficiently on notice of ongoing nature of claims. Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1991).
Because statutes of limitation are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitations should prevail if two statutes are arguably applicable. Amco Ins. Co. v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1997).
A claim that is accompanied by an insufficient funds check for payment of fees is not considered filed for purposes of this statute. The claim is not considered filed for purposes of the statute of limitations until the filing fee is actually paid. Broker House Int'l, Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1998).
Applied in Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981); Weedin v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1052 (D. Colo. 1981); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); Banks v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Center, 558 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1983); State v. Young, 665 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1983); Marriott v. Goldstein, 662 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1983); Jones v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 776 F.2d 1458 (1985); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Samora, 2013 COA 81, 321 P.3d 590.
Law reviews. For article, "New Role for Nonparties in Tort Actions -- The Empty Chair", see 15 Colo. Law. 1650 (1986). For article, "Tort Reform's Impact on Contract Law", see 15 Colo. Law. 2206 (1986). For article, "Tortious Interference With Inheritance", see 42 Colo. Law. 59 (May 2013).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-102 (1)(a) is similar to former 13-80-110 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (a).
Two-year limitation period is not unconstitutional. As applied to automobile accident case, period is not unreasonably short and does not deny litigants access to courts; nor did reduction from former six-year limitation period violate equal protection guarantees. Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1991).
The state cannot claim exemption from the statute of limitations by relying on the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi (time does not run against the king). Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200 (Colo. 1996).
Injuries caused by defendant's reckless disregard of plaintiff's safety. If the evidence establishes that the injuries were the result of acts of the defendant which were in reckless disregard of plaintiff's safety, it can be said that plaintiff has established a claim which is subject to the statute of limitations. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 275, 62 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1979).
Infringing contractual rights covered by former 13-80-110. Statutory claim alleging a tortious discriminatory wrong, infringing contractual rights, was covered by the provisions of former 13-80-110. Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
Claim for bad-faith breach of an insurance contract is subject to two-year limitation period set forth in this section. Harmon v. Fred S. James & Co., 899 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1994).
Claim for violation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is subject to the two-year limitation period set forth in subsection (1)(a). Wrongful discharge is the most appropriate analogue to ERISA claims. In this state wrongful discharge is characterized as a tort. Tort claims are subject to the two-year limitations period found in subsection (1)(a). Therefore, a two-year limitations period is appropriate for an ERISA claim. Kennedy v. Colo. RS, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Colo. 2012).
No tolling under course-of-treatment exception or "continuing violation" doctrine in a bad-faith breach of workers' compensation insurance case, because insurer's failure to pay benefits when due puts claimant on notice of the fact of injury and its cause even if there is only a single episode of unreasonable behavior. Harmon v. Fred S. James & Co., 899 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1994).
Irrigation pipeline constituted a continuing trespass. Accordingly, plaintiff's trespass claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Sanderson v. Heath Mesa Homeowners Ass'n, 183 P.3d 679 (Colo. App. 2008).
Day of the act or event from which period runs not to be included in computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included, but the last day of the period is to be included. Cade v. Regensberger, 804 P.2d 238 (Colo. App. 1990).
A cause of action must be filed on or before the specified anniversary date following the accrual of the action. The rules of statutory construction preclude a method of computation of years that would require counting of days. Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 2015 COA 64, 361 P.3d 1075.
The procedural computation of time for Colorado state courts' civil proceedings specified in C.R.C.P 6(a)(1) does not govern the computation of time periods provided in this section. Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 2015 COA 64, 361 P.3d 1075.
Claims arising before July 1, 1986, covered by former 13-80-110. Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1991).
"Discovery rule" did not apply to claims for negligence and outrageous conduct arising from alleged sexual assault on minors. Despite therapists' and plaintiffs' statements that plaintiffs did not realize the full import of defendant's actions until plaintiffs sought counseling years after the assaults, plaintiffs' admissions of emotional upset at time of assaults and knowledge that defendant's actions were improper and illegal indicated that plaintiffs were on adequate notice of the essential elements of the tort. Therefore, cause of action accrued when plaintiffs reached the age of majority and statutory limitation would apply to their claims. Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1991).
If a plaintiff files a motion to amend accompanied by an amended complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 15(a), and if the motion, amended complaint, and summons are served on a defendant before expiration of the statute of limitations, then the statute of limitations is tolled until the trial court rules on plaintiff's motions. Moore v. Grossman, 824 P.2d 7 (Colo. App. 1991) (decided under law in effect prior to amendment of this subsection (3)(c)).
Claim against title company did not arise when conduct occurred but when plaintiffs discovered injury and could tie the actions by the title company to the injury. Plaintiffs were not entitled to six-year statute of limitations pursuant to former 13-80-110, but were limited to two years by this section. Callaham v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 837 P.2d 769 (Colo. App. 1992).
Plaintiff knew, or should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the injury to his reputation and the cause of that injury; consequently, because the complaint was filed more than two years after plaintiff learned of the statements, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for libel, slander, and outrageous conduct as barred by subsection (1)(a) of this section and 13-80-103 (1)(a). Taylor v. Goldsmith, 870 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1994).
Because record established that plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of the alleged negligence and outrageous conduct by defendant over three years prior to filing her claim for negligence and outrageous conduct, the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's claims. Colburn v. Kopit, 59 P.3d 295 (Colo. App. 2002).
The statute of limitations for an action against an attorney for legal malpractice begins to run at the time the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the negligent act of the attorney. Once a client becomes aware of her attorney's negligence, and damages in the form of legal fees are incurred to ameliorate the impact of that negligence, she has suffered injury for purposes of the accrual of a legal claim. Client need not await the outcome of her appeal before being charged with knowledge of attorney's negligence. Jacobson v. Shine, 859 P.2d 911 (Colo. App. 1993).
A pending appeal in the underlying litigation that is the basis for a legal malpractice claim does not toll the statute of limitations. Thus, where plaintiff's attorney admitted, during a pretrial hearing held in the underlying litigation, that he may have committed malpractice, the statute of limitations began to run even though the plaintiff's attorney filed a subsequent appeal in the underlying litigation. Broker House Int'l, Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1998).
Statute of limitations not equitably tolled. Malpractice claim against an accountant was not equitably tolled when the accountant was a witness in a case before the internal revenue service. Noel v. Hoover, 12 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2000).
Statute of limitation not tolled on a legal malpractice claim while a criminal defendant either pursues a direct appeal or seeks postconviction relief. Defendant must file and preserve his claim within the limitations period, but may seek a stay in the civil action until the criminal case is resolved. Morrison v. Goff, 74 P.3d 409 (Colo. App. 2003), aff'd, 91 P.3d 1050 (Colo. 2004).
Holding is consistent with the doctrine of equitable tolling which permits tolling of statute of limitations only where the defendant's wrongful conduct prevented the plaintiff from asserting the claim in a timely manner or truly exceptional circumstances prevented the plaintiff from filing the claim despite diligent efforts. Morrison v. Goff, 74 P.3d 409 (Colo. App. 2003), aff'd, 91 P.3d 1050 (Colo. 2004).
Approach furthers the statute of limitations' goals of promoting justice, preventing unnecessary delay, and avoiding the litigation of stale claims. Approach also protects attorneys from being forced to defend stale malpractice claims and furthers judicial economy by expediting the litigation of claims. Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050 (Colo. 2004).
Wife's legal malpractice claim that attorney negligently stipulated to a modification of a temporary order to allow a trustee in liquidation to take possession and sell stock held as marital property to satisfy a judgment against husband arose when federal bankruptcy court denied wife's claim to interest in the stock proceeds and not when the federal district court affirmed the denial on appeal. Jacobson v. Shine, 859 P.2d 911 (Colo. App. 1993).
Actions against home inspectors must be brought within two years after the buyer discovers or should have discovered a problem arising from a faulty inspection. Gleason v. Becker-Johnson Assocs., Inc., 916 P.2d 662 (Colo. App. 1996).
Outrageous conduct is a separate tort, even though it may be premised on conduct amounting to a battery. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations under this section is two years from the date of accrual for outrageous conduct, rather than the one year limit under 13-80-103 for battery. Winkler v. Rocky Mtn. Conference, 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. App. 1995).
Further, where a claim may be pursued on two theories having different limitations, the longer limitation applies. Winkler v. Rocky Mtn. Conference, 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. App. 1995).
The statute of limitations in this section, and not that in 16-5-401 (1)(a) applies to a theft claim brought under 18-4-405. Michaelson v. Michaelson, 923 P.2d 237 (Colo. App. 1995).
Neither subsection (1)(a) nor subsection (1)(g) applies to a claim under 43 (a) of the federal Lanham Act. Instead, Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and deceit, 13-80-101 (1)(c), governs such claims. Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Colo. 2000).
Plaintiff's claim was intertwined with the no fault act and subject to the three-year statute of limitations in 13-80-101 (1)(j), rather than the general two-year limitation under subsection (1)(a), where plaintiff was obligated to pay and did pay benefits required under the act, the plaintiff's action was specifically authorized by the act, and the action was brought because the vehicle driven by the defendant was not insured as required under the act. Amco Ins. Co. v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1997).
Where injury to plaintiff arose out of his own operation of motorcycle, plaintiff's tort action arose out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle and three-year statute of limitation under 13-80-101 (1)(n) applies rather than two-year limit under subsection (1)(a). Gonzales v. City & County of Denver, 998 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 17 P.3d 137 (Colo. 2001).
Law reviews. For note, "Pleading a Claim Barred by Statute of Limitations by Way of Recoupment", see 7 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 204 (1935). For article, "Torts", see 31 Dicta 456 (1954). For article, "Medical Malpractice in Colorado", see 36 Dicta 339 (1959). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 38 Dicta 133 (1961). For comment on McCarty v. Goldstein, appearing below, see 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 606 (1963).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-102 (1)(c) is similar to former 13-80-105 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (c).
This provision is not "special legislation" prohibited by 25 of art. V, Colo. Const. McCarty v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962).
It is general and uniform in operation. This section providing that no action shall be maintained to recover damages from persons licensed to practice certain of the healing professions, including dentistry, unless such action be instituted within two years after the action accrued, is not special legislation prohibited by 25 of art. V, Colo. Const., it being general and uniform in its operation upon all in like situation. McCarty v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962).
It is not discriminatory and does not deny equal protection of the law to attorneys, scientists, engineers, nurses, x-ray technicians, and other professional persons who should be entitled to equal protection of the law. McCarty v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962).
This statute is enacted for the purpose of promoting justice, discouraging unnecessary delay, and forestalling the prosecution of stale claims, not for the benefit of the negligent. It should not be construed to defeat justice. The negligence is equally damaging and the victim equally helpless regardless of the motive for concealment. Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
This statute has exactly the same effect as would a contract of employment which provided that no action could be maintained against the doctors unless brought within two years from the date of the performance of the operation. Any excuse which would defeat such express contract is equally effective to toll the statute and impossible to give notice as such. Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
An action for malpractice is neither a purely tortious nor a contractual action, but a hybrid, for which a specific limitation has been prescribed by this section. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
Limitation statutes relating to assault, assault and battery, malicious injury, and fraud have no application to actions for malpractice based on negligence of a physician or surgeon. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
Where express contract exists between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff's action thereon is not barred by two-year statute of limitations, but six-year statute dealing with express contracts is applicable. Adams v. Poudre Valley Hosp. Dist., 31 Colo. App. 252, 502 P.2d 1127 (1972).
If there is an express contract, patient must prove it. In an action against physicians and surgeons for damages for alleged malpractice, if the patient made a contract with the physician and a surgeon, the terms of the contract must be disclosed and proven. The burden of proof hereof rests upon plaintiff. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
A hospital's general duty of nursing is not an express contract. Where admission document mentions only general duty nursing and does not refer to conditions of hospital or fitness of premises for plaintiff, there may be implied warranty that hospital is fit for intended use by patient, but no implied warranty arises from terms of admission document. Therefore, general statute of limitation relating to express contracts is inapplicable. Adams v. Poudre Valley Hosp. Dist., 31 Colo. App. 252, 502 P.2d 1127 (1972).
This section is aimed solely at the maintaining of an action. Wyatt v. Burnett, 95 Colo. 414, 36 P.2d 768 (1934).
Patient may use claim as a defense against doctor's suit. The defense of reduction of recoupment, which arises out of the same transaction as the claim, survives as long as the cause of action upon the claim exists, although an affirmative action on the subject of it may be barred by the statute of limitations. A counterclaim, if barred by the statute, is available only for recoupment although for that purpose it may be used as long as plaintiff's cause of action exists. Wyatt v. Burnett, 95 Colo. 414, 36 P.2d 768 (1934).
Discovery rule is applicable to wrongful death actions. Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).
Applied in Aberkalns v. Blake, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Colo. 2009).
Law reviews. For article, "Civil Rights", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with the applicable statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 67 (1985).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-102 (1)(g) is similar to former 13-80-106 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (g).
Applicability to actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983. All civil rights claims are to be generally, uniformly characterized, regardless of discrete facts involved, as actions for injury to personal rights. Wilson v. Garcia, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985). (For previous cases dealing with the statute of limitations in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, see Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982) and McKay v. Hammond, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).)
Former section unconstitutionally discriminatory. The special two-year statute of limitations made applicable to actions upon a liability created by a federal statute for which actions no period of limitations is provided in such statute would seem to be, on its face, an unconstitutional discrimination against a multitude of federal claims to which a shorter statute of limitations was purportedly applied for no other reason than that they were federal claims, leaving a three-year statute of limitations for residuary state claims. Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
Residuary statute should be used. The residuary three-year statute of limitations in former 13-80-108(1)(b) (now subsection (1)(i)) must take precedence over the two-year statute of limitations in former 13-80-106. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
Nothing in the Occupational Safety and Health Act suggests congressional intention to adopt state statutes of limitations. Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1980).
Absence of public interest may involve state statutes. An action which, although brought in the name of the United States, involves no public rights or interests may be subject to a state statute of limitations. Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1980).
Where action is brought by government to enforce private as well as public rights, state statutes of limitations do not apply to bar the action even though no federal period of limitations is provided. However, unlike the rule relating to actions brought exclusively for the benefit of the federal government, the doctrine of laches may be applied in these hybrid cases to limit relief. Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1980).
Federal law may control tolling of limitations when state statute applicable. Though the limitations period for an action brought in federal district court based on claims arising under section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is supplied by the law of Colorado, the circumstances which will toll the running of the statute are matters of federal law. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S. Ct. 392, 70 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1981).
Action based on federal gasoline controls. This section applies to an action based on violations of federal regulation of gasoline prices and allocation control. Siegel Oil Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 556 F. Supp. 302 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 149 (Temp. Em. Ct. App. 1983).
Former 13-80-106 held to apply to federal discrimination action. McKinney v. Armco Recreational Prods., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976).
In an action based on federal civil rights law, court applied period of limitations of this section. Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966); Merrigan v. Affiliated Bankshares of Colo., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1408 (D. Colo. 1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823, 113 S. Ct. 76, 121 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1992); Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir. 1994).
The applicable statute of limitations for a 1983 action, even one asserted against a law enforcement officer, is the two-year limitation period established under subsection (1)(g). Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
Two-year statute of limitations applies to actions arising under title II of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. Hughes v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2009).
Former 13-80-108 applied to actions under section 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act since there is no federal statute of limitations on these actions. Laymon v. McComb, 524 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Colo. 1981).
There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to provisions of sections 10(b) and 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir, 1980).
Former 13-80-108 applied to civil claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429 (D. Colo. 1984).
Statute of limitations questions may be appropriately resolved on rule 12 (b), F.R.C.P. motion. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
Continuing violation of civil rights statute not barred. Alleged discrimination in writing physical damage insurance, a violation of the civil rights statute, was a continuing violation when the policy was renewed in 1971 and 1972, and the statute of limitations contained in this section did not bar the claim based on such discrimination. Ben v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974).
Neither subsection (1)(a) nor subsection (1)(g) applies to a claim under 43 (a) of the federal Lanham Act. Instead, Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and deceit, 13-80-101 (1)(c), governs such claims. Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Colo. 2000).
Subsection (1)(h) applies to all actions against governmental entities, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought. Bad Boys of Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. City of Cripple Creek, 996 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 2000).
A claim for inverse condemnation against a city is a civil action against a governmental entity and is governed by subsection (1)(h). Bad Boys of Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. City of Cripple Creek, 996 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 2000).
The two-year limitation period of subsection (1)(h) for claims to be brought against a governmental entity is not applicable to the contract claims brought by employees and former employees against a city. To do so would allow a governmental entity to bring a contract claim against a nongovernmental entity within a three-year or longer period while a nongovernmental entity would be required to bring a similar claim against a governmental entity within a two-year period. Fishburn v. City of Colo. Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1995).
The six-year limitation period of 13-80-103.5 (1)(a) applies even against a governmental entity to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money due. Fishburn v. City of Colo. Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1995).
Negligence action against a city based on respondeat superior is not barred under subsection (1)(h) even though the underlying negligence action against the city's employee is barred under 13-80-103 (1)(c). Gallegos v. City of Monte Vista, 976 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1998).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-102 (1)(i) is similar to 13-80-108 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this paragraph (i).
This section is the general statute of limitations applying to all actions or proceedings for which a special period is not provided. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Koman, 133 Colo. 598, 298 P.2d 737 (1956).
When damages being apportioned under the Workers' Compensation Act arise from settlement of a tort case, and the apportionment case is a separate cause of action, the act does not govern the time frame and conditions under which the offset must be determined. Accordingly, the two-year catch-all statute of limitations, pursuant to subsection (1)(i), applies. Harrison v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 969 (Colo. App. 2004).
Claims for disability retirement benefits. The statute of limitations in former 13-80-108 (1)(b) (now this paragraph (i)) governed cases involving claims for disability retirement benefits from the public employees' retirement association in the absence of a special statute of limitations in the act which provided for such claims. Flanigan v. Pub. Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 191 Colo. 198, 551 P.2d 702 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1068, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1977).
This section governs time period in which to file for pensions. The general assembly has not enacted a special limitation on the time for filing pension claims, hence, this section governs. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Koman, 133 Colo. 598, 298 P.2d 737 (1956).
The right to receive a pension may be barred by this section. The right to receive a pension is a very different right from the right to receive payment once the basic right to receive the pension itself has been determined. Once the right to receive a pension has been determined, then the receipt of the pension is a continuing one. The basic or primary right (to receive the pension) is not a continuing one and may be barred by laches or by a statute of limitations. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Koman, 133 Colo. 598, 298 P.2d 737 (1956).
This paragraph governs 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions. The two-year residual statute is best suited to govern actions that confer a general remedy for injuries to personal rights, and, therefore, this paragraph applies to civil rights actions under 1983. Arvia v. Black, 722 F. Supp. 644 (D. Colo. 1989); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1993); Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir. 1994).
This section applies to personal actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as such claims are subject to this state's residual statute of limitation. Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1989); Riel v. Reed, 760 F. Supp. 852 (D. Colo. 1990); Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1991); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1993).
The two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Colo. 1995).
Malicious prosecution claims under 1983 do not accrue until the underlying criminal convictions are terminated in the plaintiff's favor because a plaintiff neither knows nor has reason to know of an injury that constitutes the basis of a claim until such termination. Allen v. City of Aurora, 892 P.2d 333 (Colo. App. 1994).
Action for partnership accounting falls under two-year period of limitations. No statute of limitations specifically addresses an action for partnership accounting. Tafoya v. Perkins, 932 P.2d 836 (Colo. App. 1996).
Recording of a spurious lien does not automatically constitute the accrual of the property owner's action against the holder of the lien. Reasonable diligence for purposes of the statute of limitations does not require property owners to check the public records each year to ascertain whether anyone has forged a deed. Fiscus v. Liberty Mortgage Corp., 2014 COA 79, __ P.3d __.