(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(a) All contract actions, including personal contracts and actions under the "Uniform Commercial Code", except as otherwise provided in section 13-80-103.5;
(c) All actions for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit except those in section 13-80-102 (1)(j);
(d) and (e) Repealed.
(f) All actions for breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty;
(g) All claims under the "Uniform Consumer Credit Code", except section 5-5-201 (5), C.R.S.;
(h) All actions of replevin or for taking, detaining, or converting goods or chattels, except as otherwise provided in section 13-80-103.5;
(i) All actions under the "Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act", article 7 of title 42, C.R.S.;
(j) All actions under part 6 of article 4 of title 10, C.R.S.;
(k) All actions accruing outside this state if the limitation of actions of the place where the cause of action accrued is greater than that of this state;
(l) All actions of debt under section 40-30-102, C.R.S.;
(m) All actions for recovery of erroneous or excessive refunds of any tax under section 39-21-102, C.R.S.;
(n) (I) All tort actions for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle including all actions pursuant to paragraph (j) of this subsection (1).
(II) The provisions of this paragraph (n) do not apply to any action for strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to instruct or warn governed by the provisions of section 13-80-102 (1)(b) or section 13-80-106.
(o) and (p) Repealed.
Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 695, 1, effective July 1; (1)(b) repealed and (1)(c) amended, pp. 708, 707, 4, 1, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(a) and (1)(c) amended and (1)(l) and (1)(m) added, p. 567, 1, effective July 1; (1)(c) amended, p. 538, 10, effective July 1; (1)(e) repealed, p. 600, 38, effective July 10. L. 91: (1)(a) amended, p. 270, 7, effective July 1. L. 92: (1)(d) repealed, p. 244, 3, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(n) added, p. 2824, 1, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(o) added, p. 215, 3, effective July 1; (1)(p) added, p. 593, 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(g) amended, p. 1872, 108, effective August 2; (1)(c) amended, p. 3, 4, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2003: (1)(j) amended, p. 1572, 8, effective July 1. L. 2011: (1)(o)(I), (1)(o)(II)(C), and (1)(p) repealed, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1153, 21, effective August 10. L. 2013: (1)(o)(II) repealed, (HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1674, 34, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(c) amended, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1390, 27, effective May 25.
Editor's note: The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1986. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
Cross references: For the "Uniform Commercial Code", see title 4.
I. General Consideration.
II. Paragraph (a).
III. Paragraph (c).
A. In General.
IV. Paragraph (d).
V. Paragraph (f).
VI. Paragraph (h).
VII. Paragraph (j).
VIII. Paragraph (k).
IX. Paragraph (n).
Law reviews. For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", see 56 Den. L.J. 491 (1979). For article, "Securities", see 59 Den. L.J. 367 (1982). For article, "Will Contests -- Some Procedural Aspects", see 15 Colo. Law. 787 (1986). For article, "Tort Reform's Impact on Contract Law", see 15 Colo. Law. 2206 (1986).
Annotator's note. For cases concerning when a cause of action accrues under this section, see the annotations to 13-80-108.
Purpose of statute of limitations is to promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay and forestall the prosecution of stale claims. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, 599 P.2d 869 (1979).
Uncertainty as to the precise extent of damage neither precludes the filing of a suit nor delays the accrual of a claim for purposes of the statute of limitations. Palisades Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 816 P.2d 961 (Colo. App. 1991); Broker House Int'l, Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1998); Grant v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 314 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 2002).
Uninsured driver's cause of action for reimbursement of medical expenses paid to such uninsured driver's passenger against insurer of vehicle which caused accident pursuant to 10-4-713 does not accrue until actual payment of medical expenses. Sakala v. Safeco Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1992).
Coverage for underinsured motorist benefits accrues under the terms of the policy when settlement under the tortfeasor's liability policy is obtained, not on the date of the accident. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Springle, 870 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1993).
The statute of limitations does not run against the state unless the law expressly states otherwise. Grogan v. Taylor, 877 P.2d 1374 (Colo. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 900 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1995).
Applied in Kanarado Mining & Dev. Co. v. Sutton, 36 Colo. App. 375, 539 P.2d 1325 (1975); D'Amico v. Smith, 42 Colo. App. 369, 600 P.2d 84 (1979); Lucas v. Abbott, 198 Colo. 477, 601 P.2d 1376 (1979); Soehner v. Soehner, 642 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1981); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S. Ct. 92, 78 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1983); Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Colo. App. 1984); Brown v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 989 P.2d 196 (Colo. App. 1999); Oaster v. Robertson, 173 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (D. Colo. 2016).
Law reviews. For article, "State Statutes of Limitation Contrasted and Compared", see 3 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 106 (1931).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-101 (1)(a) is similar to former 13-80-107 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (a).
This provision applies only to personal actions. Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924).
This provision applies only to actions on contract. Bonfils v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920); People ex rel. Fed. Land Bank v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479 (1940).
Such as where a breach of the covenant of seisin, if any, occurred at the time of the giving of the deed in 1921, and action thereon was not commenced until 1926, the right of action was barred by this section. Stone v. Rozich, 88 Colo. 399, 297 P. 999 (1931).
Covenant of seisin is broken, if at all, when made. The general rule is that a covenant of seisin is broken, if at all, when it is made, hence a counterclaim for breach of the covenant of seisin asserted in a foreclosure action more than three years after delivery of the conveyance in which the alleged breach occurred is barred by this section. Bernklau v. Stevens, 150 Colo. 187, 371 P.2d 765 (1962).
Mandamus to enforce a private right is barred by lapse of time only where an ordinary action upon such right is barred by statute. Berkey v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 48 Colo. 104, 110 P. 197 (1910).
It bars action three years after it accrues. Since a covenant is a personal action, it seems, therefore, to come within the class of actions described in this provision and is barred in three years from the date the cause of action accrues. Hayden v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15, 88 P. 437 (1906).
Infringing contractual rights covered by former 13-80-110. Statutory claim alleging a tortious discriminatory wrong, infringing contractual rights, was covered by the provisions of former 13-80-110 (now 13-80-102 (1)(a)). Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
A purchase and sale contract for corporate stock is governed by this provision. An action against executors of a deceased stockholder on alleged contract for the purchase and transfer of corporate stock, brought more than eight years after right of transfer accrued, was barred by this provision. Goeddel v. Aircraft Fin., Inc., 152 Colo. 419, 382 P.2d 812 (1963).
As is a claim based on a contract filed in an estate more than seven years after the breach thereof, was barred by the statute of limitations. Koon v. Barmettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d 713 (1956).
Where a contract contains a continuing duty to perform, generally a new claim accrues for each separate breach of the contract, and the plaintiff may assert a claim for damages from the date of the first breach within the period of limitation. Neuromonitoring Assocs. v. Centura Health, 2012 COA 136, 351 P.3d 486.
Although defendants' breaching conduct began more than three years before plaintiffs commenced their action, the entire action was not barred by the three-year breach of contract limitation period but instead was timely as to breaches occurring within the three-year period preceding the filing of the action. Neuromonitoring Assocs. v. Centura Health, 2012 COA 136, 351 P.3d 486.
Promissory estoppel claims arising from the failure of a retiree's health insurance policy to cover a heart transplant were contract claims and, accordingly, were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996).
Contractor's claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, rescission, and restitution for mistake are governed by the provisions of this section rather than the two-year limitation provision for tort claims in 13-80-102. CAMAS Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135 (Colo. App. 2001).
This provision is sufficiently broad to encompass an action on an implied warranty of fitness of a house. F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963); Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501 (D. Colo. 1969).
The implied warranty must arise from an express contract. Where admission document mentions only general duty nursing and does not refer to conditions of hospital or fitness of premises for plaintiff, there may be implied warranty that hospital is fit for intended use by patient, but no implied warranty arises from terms of admission document. Therefore, general statute of limitations relating to express contracts is inapplicable. Adams v. Poudre Valley Hosp. Dist., 31 Colo. App. 252, 502 P.2d 1127 (1972).
A suit for specific performance based on contract is governed by this provision. Notwithstanding plaintiff's use of the term specific performance, when the action, from the facts as pled, is on a breach of contract wherein the plaintiff seeks a liquidated, determinable amount of money due him from the defendant, this action is governed by the statute permitting an action to be commenced within six years for actions of debt founded upon any contract and is not governed by the three-year statute of limitations. Uhl v. Fox, 31 Colo. App. 13, 498 P.2d 1177 (1972).
If the contractual shortening of a statute of limitations is prohibited, the contractual and statutory limitations periods are incompatible and, therefore, in conflict. Grant Family Farms, Inc. v. Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 537 (Colo. App. 2006).
Subsection (1)(a) contains no language prohibiting the contractual shortening of the three-year limitations period; therefore, a contractual period shorter than the three-year period is not in conflict with subsection (1)(a). Grant Family Farms, Inc. v. Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 537 (Colo. App. 2006).
Under statute of limitations applicable to actions for trespass, cause of action in seepage cases accrues when damaged land is first visibly affected. Hickman v. N. Sterling Irrig. Dist., 748 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1987).
It was not until a judgment was rendered against insured that the insured or its assignee could have brought a failure to indemnify action against the insurer since that assignee had not sustained any damage until it had obtained a judgment against the insured from whom it was unable to collect. Flatiron Paving v. Great Sw. Fire, 812 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990).
Action was within the three-year period following the accrual of claims where judgment against insured was dated November 19, 1984, and insured's assignee's action against insurer was commenced May 14, 1987. Flatiron Paving v. Great Sw. Fire, 812 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990).
This provision applies to a claim for breach of express warranty to repair or replace even if the party against whom the claim is asserted is protected by the "contractor's statute", 18-80-104. Hersh Cos. v. Highline Vill. Assocs., 30 P.3d 221 (Colo. 2001).
Statute of limitations under this section for action in breach of warranty did not start to run until plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the government's adverse possession of the property. Upton v. Griffitts, 831 P.2d 504 (Colo. App. 1992).
"Liquidated debt" and "unliquidated, determinable amount" construed. For purposes of determining whether this section or 13-80-103.5 applies, a debt is deemed "liquidated" if the amount due is capable of ascertainment by reference to an agreement or by simple computation. A debtor's dispute of or defenses against such claim, or any setoff or counterclaim interposed, does not affect this result. Similarly, if a contract fixes a price per unit of performance, a claim based thereon is "determinable" even though the number of units performed must be proven and is subject to dispute. Rotenberg v. Richards, 899 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1995).
A claim based on quantum meruit is not liquidated or determinable, because it seeks only reasonable compensation for services rendered, in an amount to be determined by the fact-finder. Rotenberg v. Richards, 899 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1995).
Where a statute requires presentment of a claim to a county and prohibits suit until the claim has been rejected, the statute of limitations is tolled between the time the claim is filed and the time it is acted upon by the county where there is no suggestion that contractor failed to prosecute its claims in good faith and with diligence. CAMAS Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135 (Colo. App. 2001).
This provision does not apply to an action against a stockholder for an assessment upon his stock. Sweet v. Barnard, 66 Colo. 526, 182 P. 22 (1919).
Nor to a proceeding before the utilities commission to recover excessive charges. This provision has no application to a proceeding before the utilities commission demanding reparation for an excessive charge by a common carrier. The proceeding is not an action within the meaning of the statute. Bonfils v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920).
A claim of divorced wife for support money for minor child held not barred under this provision. Burke v. Burke, 127 Colo. 257, 255 P.2d 740 (1953).
This provision is not applicable to action on debt founded upon a contract. Notwithstanding plaintiff's use of the term specific performance, when the action, from the facts as pled, is on a breach of contract wherein the plaintiff seeks a liquidated, determinable amount of money due him from the defendant, this action is governed by the statute permitting an action to be commenced within six years for actions of debt founded upon any contract and is not governed by the three-year statute of limitations. Uhl v. Fox, 31 Colo. App. 13, 498 P.2d 1177 (1972).
Nor an action alleging negligence and implied warranty. Under Colorado law, actions alleging negligence and implied warranty were subject to six-year statute of limitations, rather than three-year statute. Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501 (D. Colo. 1969).
This provision nonapplicable to an action on the official bond of a county clerk and recorder founded upon his alleged negligence in erroneously transcribing the legal description of real property contained in a deed of trust on the records in his office was an ex delicto action, hence this section did not apply. People ex rel. Fed. Land Bank v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479 (1940).
Nor any action where the state is a party or considerably interested. The statute may not be invoked against the state, and even though the state as such was not a party to this action, it is unquestionably true that a considerable part of the money stolen belonged to the state. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 100 Colo. 398, 68 P.2d 555 (1937).
The specific statute of limitations provision in 38-26-105 controls over the general civil action provision in this section, because the provisions of 38-26-105 specifically apply to the construction project that is the subject of the plaintiff's action. Pat's Constr. Serv., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the W., 141 P.3d 885 (Colo. App. 2005).
The statute of limitations does not apply to an action to quiet title brought by a person in possession of real property. Martinez v. Archuleta-Padia, 143 P.3d 1112 (Colo. App. 2006).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-101 (1)(c) is similar to former 13-80-108 (1)(a) and 13-80-109 as said sections existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (c).
Within limit of this provision doctrine of laches applies. This provision fixes a limitation beyond which the courts cannot extend the time, but within this limit the peculiar doctrine of courts of equity should prevail as to laches. Great W. Mining Co. v. Woodmas, 14 Colo. 90, 23 P. 908 (1890).
Federal courts apply doctrine in analogy to statutes of limitations. The federal courts, sitting in equity, are not bound by the statutes of limitations of the states, but they apply the doctrine of laches in analogy to them. If a suit discloses no extraordinary facts or circumstances, they apply the bar of laches at the expiration of the time prescribed by the statute of the state for the limitation of an action at law of like character, but if unusual conditions of extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit after a briefer, or to forbid its maintenance after a longer period than that fixed by the statute, the chancellor will not be bound by the statute, but will determine the extraordinary case in accordance with the equities which condition it. Redd v. Brun, 157 F. 190 (8th Cir. 1907); Martin v. Brown, 294 F. 436 (8th Cir. 1923).
In federal diversity suits this provision applies at law and equity. When jurisdiction of the federal court is based solely on the diversity of citizenship of the parties, this provision is applicable to equitable as well as to legal actions. Under such circumstances recovery cannot be had in the federal court if the law of the forum would bar recovery had the action been brought in the state court. Cont'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Tri-State Gen. Agency, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 208 (D. Colo. 1960).
This section in no way bars the admission of evidence. The rule in Colorado is that parties who rely upon fraud and upon failure to discover it in order to avoid the bar must allege and prove not only when the fraud was discovered, but the facts and circumstances under which it was obtained. Defendant could not be liable for fraudulent acts discovered over three years from the date on which the action was begun. The statute of limitations goes to the cause of action and not to the evidence in support of it. The statute does not bar the admission of evidence of continuing representations as in this case. J. F. White Eng'r Corp. v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 351 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1965).
It was the intent of the general assembly in enacting this section to control all actions brought by a patient arising out of the patient-physician relationship. Koch v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1988).
The statute of limitations for a lawsuit brought under 38-10-117 is three years. In re Walden, 207 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
This provision applies only to personal actions. Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924).
This section applies to actions under section 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act. An action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arising from alleged violation of rule 10b-5(1) and (3) might, on certain facts, more accurately be deemed similar to an action "based upon implied or constructive fraud", for which subsection (1) provides a three-year statute of limitations. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
Either because violation is constructive fraud. Most acts violative of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act would be readily cognizable in Colorado as "constructive fraud", or indeed, as traditional common-law fraud. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
Or is subject to the residuary clause. Subsequent to this enactment the three-year residuary statute of limitations might arguably have applied to an action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
This provision applies to private suits under section 10 (b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act. There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The limitations statute of the forum state in which the alleged prohibited acts occurred applies to a private suit for damages under section 10(b), the Colorado statute of limitation for fraud, which requires that suit be brought within three years after discovery of fraud by the aggrieved party, applies. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
Former 13-80-108 applied to actions under section 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act since there is no federal statute of limitations on these actions. Laymon v. McComb, 524 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Colo. 1981).
There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to provisions of sections 10(b) and 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
Federal law may control tolling of limitations when state statute applicable. Though the limitations period for an action brought in federal district court based on claims arising under section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is supplied by the law of Colorado, the circumstances which will toll the running of the statute are matters of federal law. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S. Ct. 392, 70 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1981).
Federal law governs tolling of the statute. Although the limitation period is supplied by the forum state of Colorado, it is a matter of federal law as to the circumstances that will toll a state statute applied to private actions under the securities laws. Under the federal doctrine of tolling as applied to fraud actions where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
Former 13-80-108 applied to civil claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429 (D. Colo. 1984).
Statute of limitations questions may be appropriately resolved by a F.R.C.P. 12 (b) motion. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
This provision is applicable to transfers of land obtained by undue influence. If a grantee obtains transfers of land by exerting undue influence over the grantor, and the transfers were due to no other cause, this section of the statute of limitations would apply. James v. James, 75 Colo. 164, 225 P. 208 (1924); Blizzard v. Penley, 186 F. Supp. 746 (D. Colo. 1960).
Action for damages for fraudulent conspiracy is barred after three years by this section. Pipe v. Smith, 5 Colo. 146 (1879); Farncomb v. City & County of Denver, 64 Colo. 13, 171 P. 66 (1917); Littlejohn v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 92 Colo. 275, 20 P.2d 311 (1933).
An action to set aside a decree obtained without notice, which to the prejudice of the plaintiff substantially modifies and changes the rights of the parties as set forth in a former decree entered in an adjudication of priorities to the use of water, is not brought for the purpose of determining the priority of appropriation to water but is purely one for relief on the ground of fraud, and if any statute of limitation is applicable it is this provision. Peck Lateral Ditch Co. v. Pella Irrigating Ditch Co., 19 Colo. 222, 34 P. 988 (1893).
An action upon a promissory note to recover a personal judgment, and, incidentally, to foreclose a lien on shares of stock, although involving the sufficiency of the assignment of such stock, is not an action for relief on the ground of fraud and so barred by this section. Murto v. Lemon, 19 Colo. App. 314, 75 P. 160 (1904); Equitable Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 36 Colo. 377, 85 P. 840 (1906).
This provision applies to frauds perpetrated by those not bearing a fiduciary relation to the party defrauded. Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 P. 416 (1900).
This provision does not apply to an action to have the foreclosure of a trust deed set aside for fraud. Barlow v. Hitzler, 40 Colo. 109, 90 P. 90 (1907).
Real estate statutes of limitations are elsewhere. The subsequent passage of specific limitation statutes to real estate actions contained in 38-41-101 et seq. seems conclusive that these sections do not, and never were intended to, apply as limitations upon actions of that kind. Munson v. Marks, 52 Colo. 553, 124 P. 187 (1912).
Thus where a plaintiff asked for a money judgment for damages resulting from fraud in a real estate transaction, it is held that this provision did not apply. Ahart v. Sutton, 79 Colo. 145, 244 P. 306 (1926).
This provision has no application to a bill to remove a cloud upon title. Elder v. Richmond Gold & Silver Mining Co., 58 F. 536 (8th Cir. 1893); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 P. 416 (1900); Ballard v. Golob, 34 Colo. 417, 83 P. 376 (1905); Munson v. Marks, 52 Colo. 553, 124 P. 187 (1912); Munson v. Keim, 53 Colo. 576, 127 P. 1026 (1912).
Section possibly applicable to 11-51-123. It is apparent that, under one or another of three statutes, a three-year statute of limitations was provided by Colorado law for civil actions arising out of 11-51-123. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S. Ct. 392, 70 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1981).
Former 13-80-108 inapplicable to breach of fiduciary duties. Former 13-80-108 was not applicable to claims premised on breach of fiduciary duties, or constructive trust, or negligence. Morgan v. Dain Bosworth, 545 F. Supp. 953 (D. Colo. 1982); Elk River Assocs. v. Huskin, 691 P.2d 1148 (Colo. App. 1984).
Paragraph (c) applies to cases brought under the federal Commodity Exchange Act. Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1988).
Neither 13-80-102 (a) nor 13-80-102 (g) applies to a claim brought under 43 (a) of the federal Lanham Act. Instead, Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and deceit, paragraph (c) of this section, governs such claims. Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Colo. 2000).
Paragraph (c) applies to fraudulent conveyance actions, and the action accrues on the date that such fraud is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. In re Munoz, 111 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
Paragraph (c) does not apply to motions for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2). In re Adoption of P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345 (Colo. App. 1995).
Mere knowledge that product was defective is not knowledge which would enable plaintiff to discover fraud in connection with transaction. Balistreri Greenhouses v. Roper Corp., 767 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 773 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1989).
Whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is normally a jury fact question, but if the complaint shows the action was brought after the statute of limitations period and the defendant has pled the statute of limitations, the plaintiff has the burden to show tolling of the statute of limitations. First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993).
Discovery rule is applicable to wrongful death actions. Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).
This section, and not the California statute of limitations for tort actions, through operation of the borrowing statute, 13-80-110, applies to action filed by Colorado resident against a Colorado resident that resulted from an accident that took place in California, if the action is within the scope of the Colorado No Fault Act. Grulke v. Erickson, 920 P.2d 845 (Colo. App. 1995).
Law reviews. For article, "Conclusiveness of United States Oil Shale Placer Mining Claim Patents", see 43 Den. L. Ctr. J. 24 (1966).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-101 (1)(f) is similar to former 13-80-114 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (f).
This provision applies only to personal actions. Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924).
This provision is applicable in a suit to enforce a trust, constructive or otherwise. Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 P. 416 (1900); James v. James, 75 Colo. 164, 225 P. 208 (1924); Vandewiele v. Vandewiele, 110 Colo. 556, 136 P.2d 523 (1943).
To suit against purchaser from trustee who conveyed in contravention of trust. One who purchases property from a trustee who conveys in contravention of his trust is a trustee by construction of law, and in no sense the trustee of an express trust. He holds in hostility to all the world, and whoever would assert the fiduciary character of his holding must bring his action within the limitation prescribed by this provision. Harding v. Burris, 52 Colo. 132, 119 P. 1063 (1911).
In suit to compel specific performance by trustees, this provision is applicable. Farris v. Wirt, 16 Colo. App. 1, 63 P. 946 (1901).
When the action is leased on an existing trust, this provision applies. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Smith, 101 Colo. 61, 70 P.2d 109 (1930).
For applicability to guardian's handling of a minor's estate, see Parsons v. Shackleford, 117 Colo. 545, 188 P.2d 437 (1948).
The existence of a fiduciary relationship between directors and stockholders makes this provision applicable. Hall v. Swan, 117 Colo. 349, 188 P.2d 437 (1947); Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co., 5 P.3d 402 (Colo. App. 2000).
This provision applies to an action to foreclose a deed of trust. See Rowe v. Mulvane, 25 Colo. App. 502, 139 P. 1041 (1914).
Daughter's claim for breach of fiduciary duty alleging that she was rightful owner of winning lottery ticket taken by mother was proper under this provision but time-barred due to three-year statute of limitations. Curtis v. Counce, 32 P.3d 585 (Colo. App. 2001).
This provision does not apply to action to remove cloud of title. Manson v. Marks, 52 Colo. 553, 124 P. 187 (1912); Empire Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Zehr, 54 Colo. 185, 129 P. 828 (1913).
Nor to an action against a stockholder for an assessment. Sweet v. Barnard, 66 Colo. 526, 182 P. 22 (1919).
This section does not apply in a case where partnership property is held in trust, the trust being partly discharged and never denied. Heuschkel v. Wagner, 78 Colo. 61, 239 P. 873 (1925).
The existence of a fiduciary relationship of a financial planner or investment adviser is a material fact that must be determined before the limitation on a breach of fiduciary duty can be determined. Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 916 P.2d 643 (Colo. App. 1996).
A claim for relief under (f) accrues when the breach is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Anderson v. Somatogen, Inc., 940 P.2d 1079 (Colo. App. 1996).
Because record established that plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by defendant over three years prior to filing her claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's claims. Colburn v. Kopit, 59 P.3d 295 (Colo. App. 2002).
Under paragraph (h), actions for replevin or for taking, detaining, or converting goods or chattels must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. A cause of action for wrongful possession of personal property, goods, or chattels accrues at the time the wrongful possession is discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. In re Estate of Krotiuk, 12 P.3d 302 (Colo. App. 2000).
Trial court found that, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, claimant should have discovered alleged wrongful possession of rugs in 1992 when they were not returned with paintings. Because claimant did not file return of the rugs until 1997, two years after the statute of limitations had run, no error by trial court in granting partial summary judgment for estate as to that part of claim. In re Estate of Krotiuk, 12 P.3d 302 (Colo. App. 2000).
Reference in paragraph (h) to 13-80-103.5 does not pertain to the phrase "all actions to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money due to the person bringing the action"; such language pertains to actions for breach of contract. Curtis v. Counce, 32 P.3d 585 (Colo. App. 2001).
Paragraph (j) applies to tort action brought by automobile accident victim against driver of another vehicle under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act. Applicability of paragraph (j) is not limited to actions brought by insured against insurer and the more specific language of paragraph (j) controls over the more general two-year statute of limitations. Cox v. Jones, 802 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1990), aff'd, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992).
Plaintiff's claim was intertwined with the no fault act and subject to the three-year statute of limitations in subsection (1)(j), rather than the general two-year limitation, where plaintiff was obligated to pay and did pay benefits required under the act, the plaintiff's action was specifically authorized by the act, and the action was brought because the vehicle driven by the defendant was not insured as required under the act. Amco Ins. Co. v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1997).
Statute of limitations for personal injury action arising under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act begins to run on the date that both the physical injury and its cause are known or should have been known by exercise of reasonable diligence, even though action may not be filed until it is reasonably expected that medical expenses will exceed $2,500. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992).
Three-year statute of limitation applies to personal injury actions filed by an insured motorist against an insured motorist involved in an automobile accident and such statute of limitation begins to run from the date the plaintiff knows or should know of the physical injury and its cause. Lee v. Bettale, 829 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1992).
Where actual payment was an element of plaintiff's claim under 10-4-713 (2)(a), the plaintiff's right to bring a direct action for reimbursement did not accrue until the benefits were actually paid. The statute of limitations began to run on the date of payment and not on the date of the accident. Sakala v. Safeco Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1992).
Paragraph (j) applies to tort actions brought against a sheriff's department arising from an alleged automobile accident involving a departmental vehicle. Because statutes of limitation are in derogation of a valid claim, the longer period of limitations in paragraph (j) should prevail over the shorter period in 13-80-103 (1)(c) which could arguably be applicable in this situation. Reider v. Dawson, 856 P.2d 31 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994).
When a claim under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act involves a public entity the time limit for filing an action is governed by this section rather than 13-80-102, the governmental immunity section. Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995).
Law reviews. For article, "Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws Borrowing Statutes", see 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 287 (1960).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-101 (1)(k) is similar to former 13-80-119 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (k).
This provision does not violate full faith and credit clause of constitution. The constitutional provision requiring full faith and credit to be given the judgments of other states is not violated by a statute imposing a reasonable period of limitation upon the bringing of suits on such judgments. A six-year period of limitation is not unreasonable. Kelly v. Heller, 74 Colo. 470, 222 P. 648 (1924).
This provision does not bar a cause of action which accrued without the state more than six years before the commencement of the action, but only that it shall be lawful to plead the same in bar of the action. Smith v. Kent Oil Co., 128 Colo. 80, 261 P.2d 149 (1953).
This provision and former 13-80-118 (now 13-80-110) should be construed together as an entirety. Simon v. Wilnes, 97 Colo. 78, 47 P.2d 406 (1935).
The statute of limitation in former 13-80-119 was not applicable to filings under the uniform enforcement of foreign judgments act, 13-53-101 et seq. Hunter Tech., Inc. v. Scott, 701 P.2d 645 (Colo. App. 1985).
This provision does not preclude plaintiff from collecting on a previously obtained judgment. The applicable statute is 13-52-102 (1), which gives the plaintiff six years from the date of judgment to foreclose on the judgment lien. Indep. Bank v. Pandy, 2015 COA 3, 383 P.3d 64, aff'd, 2016 CO 49, 372 P.3d 1047.
Motorcycle is a motor vehicle for purposes of the phrase "arises out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle" in subsection (1)(n). Gonzales v. City & County of Denver, 998 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 17 P.3d 137 (Colo. 2001).
Where injury to plaintiff arose out of his own operation of motorcycle, plaintiff's tort action arose out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle and three-year statute of limitation under subsection (1)(n) applies rather than two-year limit under 13-80-102 (1)(a). Court declined to read a limitation into the statute that subsection (1)(n) of this section only applied to injuries arising out of the alleged tortfeasor's use or operation of a motor vehicle. Gonzales v. City & County of Denver, 998 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 17 P.3d 137 (Colo. 2001).