24-10-106. Immunity and partial waiver.

Statute text

(1) A public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section. Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from:

(a) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public entity, by a public employee while in the course of employment, except emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108 (2) and (3), C.R.S.;

(b) The operation of any public hospital, correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1-102, C.R.S., or jail by such public entity;

(c) A dangerous condition of any public building;

(d) (I) A dangerous condition of a public highway, road, or street which physically interferes with the movement of traffic on the paved portion, if paved, or on the portion customarily used for travel by motor vehicles, if unpaved, of any public highway, road, street, or sidewalk within the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any highway which is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the federal primary highway system, or of any highway which is a part of the federal secondary highway system, or of any highway which is a part of the state highway system on that portion of such highway, road, street, or sidewalk which was designed and intended for public travel or parking thereon. As used in this section, the phrase "physically interferes with the movement of traffic" shall not include traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof. Nothing in this subparagraph (I) shall preclude a particular dangerous accumulation of snow, ice, sand, or gravel from being found to constitute a dangerous condition in the surface of a public roadway when the entity fails to use existing means available to it for removal or mitigation of such accumulation and when the public entity had actual notice through the proper public official responsible for the roadway and had a reasonable time to act.

(II) A dangerous condition caused by the failure to realign a stop sign or yield sign which was turned, without authorization of the public entity, in a manner which reassigned the right-of-way upon intersecting public highways, roads, or streets, or the failure to repair a traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed;

(III) A dangerous condition caused by an accumulation of snow and ice which physically interferes with public access on walks leading to a public building open for public business when a public entity fails to use existing means available to it for removal or mitigation of such accumulation and when the public entity had actual notice of such condition and a reasonable time to act.

(e) A dangerous condition of any public hospital, jail, public facility located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility. Nothing in this paragraph (e) or in paragraph (d) of this subsection (1) shall be construed to prevent a public entity from asserting sovereign immunity for an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property, whether or not such property is located in a park or recreation area or on a highway, road, or street right-of-way.

(f) The operation and maintenance of any public water facility, gas facility, sanitation facility, electrical facility, power facility, or swimming facility by such public entity;

(g) The operation and maintenance of a qualified state capital asset that is the subject of a leveraged leasing agreement pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of article 82 of this title;

(h) Failure to perform an education employment required background check as described in section 13-80-103.9, C.R.S.;

(i) An action brought pursuant to section 13-21-128; or

(j) An action brought pursuant to part 12 of article 20 of title 13, whether the conduct alleged occurred before, on, or after January 1, 2022.

(1.5) (a) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraphs (b) and (e) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to claimants who have been convicted of a crime and incarcerated in a correctional facility or jail pursuant to such conviction, and such correctional facility or jail shall be immune from liability as set forth in subsection (1) of this section.

(b) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraphs (b) and (e) of subsection (1) of this section does apply to claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted of the crime for which such claimants are being incarcerated if such claimants can show injury due to negligence.

(c) The waiver of sovereign immunity created in paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to any backcountry landing facility located in whole or in part within any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity. For purposes of this paragraph (c), "backcountry landing facility" means any area of land or water that is unpaved, unlighted, and in a primitive condition and is used or intended for the landing and takeoff of aircraft, and includes any land or water appurtenant to such area.

(2) Nothing in this section or in section 24-10-104 shall be construed to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity where the injury arises from the act, or failure to act, of a public employee where the act is the type of act for which the public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.

(3) In addition to the immunity provided in subsection (1) of this section, a public entity shall also have the same immunity as a public employee for any act or failure to act for which a public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune from liability.

(4) No rule of law imposing absolute or strict liability shall be applied in any action against a public entity or a public employee for an injury resulting from a dangerous condition of, or the operation and maintenance of, a public water facility or public sanitation facility. No liability shall be imposed in any such action unless negligence is proven.

(5) The immunity from liability granted in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to the university of Colorado hospital authority except for any hospital, clinic, surgery center, department, or other facility owned or operated by the authority that is located on the Anschutz medical campus or that is a facility operating under the hospital license issued to the university hospital pursuant to part 1 of article 3 of title 25, including off-campus locations. The "Health Care Availability Act", article 64 of title 13, is applicable to health-care institutions as defined in section 13-64-202 (3) that are not immune from liability under this section because of this section.

(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in subsections (4) or (5) of this section shall be construed to grant any additional immunity from liability beyond that which is otherwise provided in this article 10.

History

Source: L. 71: p. 1206, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 130-11-6. L. 79: (1)(b) amended, p. 702, 76, effective June 21. L. 86: IP(1), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended and (3) added, p. 875, 5, effective July 1. L. 87: (4) added, p. 931, 1, effective May 13. L. 92: (1)(d) amended, p. 1116, 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (1.5) added, p. 2087, 1, effective July 1; (1)(a) amended, p. 2556, 53, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2002: (1.5)(c) added, p. 63, 1, effective March 22. L. 2004: (1)(g) added, p. 1056, 1, effective May 21. L. 2008: (1)(h) added, p. 2226, 4, effective June 5. L. 2015: (1)(i) added, (HB 15-1290), ch. 212, p. 776, 3, effective May 20, 2016. L. 2020: (5) and (6) added, (HB 20-1330), ch. 230, p. 1119, 2, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(i) amended and (1)(j) added, (SB 21-088), ch. 442, p. 2927, 3, effective January 1, 2022.

Annotations

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 21-088, see section 1 of chapter 442, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

 

Analysis

 

I. General Consideration.
II. Subsection (1).
A. Paragraph (a).
B. Paragraph (b).
C. Paragraph (c).
D. Paragraph (d).
1. Subparagraph (I).
2. Subparagraph (II).
3. Subparagraph (III).
E. Paragraph (e).
F. Paragraph (f).
III. Subsection (1.5).
IV. Subsection (2).
V. Subsection (3).
VI. Subsection (4).

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For note, "Prisoners' Rights: Personal Security", see 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 305 (1970). For article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation -- Part II", see 17 Colo. Law. 1949 (1988). For article, "The Public Building Exception to Governmental Immunity", see 24 Colo. Law. 1059 (1995). For article, "Health Care Litigation in Colorado: A Survey of Recent Decisions", see 30 Colo. Law. 91 (Aug. 2001).

Constitutionality upheld. Subsection (1)(d) does not violate the equal protection or due process clause of the state or federal constitution nor the prohibition against special legislation contained in 25 of article V of the state constitution. Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990).

Subsection (1.5) is rationally related to the legitimate state interests of fiscal solvency and provision of essential services while minimizing taxpayer burdens. Davis v. Paolino, 21 P.3d 870 (Colo. App. 2001).

Subsection (1.5)(a) is rationally related to legitimate state interests; therefore, it does not violate the equal protection clause or the due process clause. Sealock v. Colo., 218 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2000).

Immunity strictly construed. The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) is in derogation of the common law, and the legislative grants of immunity must be strictly construed. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983); Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), overruled in Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990); Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992), overruled in Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993); Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993); Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998); Tunget v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. App. 1999); State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000); Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).

Because governmental immunity is in derogation of Colorado's common law, the grant of immunity is to be strictly construed, and the waiver is to be liberally or deferentially construed. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 1092 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005); L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280; Lopez v. City of Grand Junction, 2018 COA 97, 488 P.3d 364.

Since grant of immunity to public entities must be strictly construed, waiver of that immunity may not be. Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).

Exceptions to waivers of immunity are to be construed strictly because the ultimate effect of the exceptions is to grant immunity. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).

If review of exceptions to waivers of immunity is based on analysis of legislative intent, those interpretations are still valid under the Corsentino standard. Montoya v. Trinidad State Nursing Home, 109 P.3d 1051 (Colo. App. 2005).

Exceptions to waivers of immunity are to be construed narrowly, but the waiver provisions themselves are to be construed deferentially in favor of injured persons. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193 (Colo. App. 2002).

The issue of sovereign immunity is one of subject matter jurisdiction, and, under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), plaintiff has the burden to prove jurisdiction. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995); Denmark v. State, 954 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1997); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1 P.3d 256 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001); Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage & Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941 (Colo. App. 2003); Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005); Ferrel v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007); Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 603 (Colo. App. 2008).

When the jurisdictional issue involves a factual dispute, reviewing court employs the clearly erroneous standard of review in considering the trial court's findings of jurisdictional fact. If, however, the alleged facts are undisputed and the issue is purely one of law, the appellate court reviews the jurisdictional matter de novo. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005); Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.

Fact that a question of subject matter jurisdiction under the CGIA is intertwined with the merits of the case does not require a court to treat a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56. Summary judgment standards do not apply when determining issues of immunity. Ferrel v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007).

A public entity is not liable for the willful and wanton conduct of its employees unless the conduct falls within one of the waiver provisions of this section. A.B. v. Adams-Arapahoe 28J Sch. Dist., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2011).

To recover under the "dangerous condition" of the CGIA, plaintiff must show as a threshold jurisdictional matter that the condition upon which the plaintiff bases the tort claim existed because of the government's act or omission in maintaining or constructing the condition rather than the government's design of the condition. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).

Statutory limitation on judgment in 24-10-114 is not an affirmative defense and is not waived if not presented in the pleadings, at trial, or in a motion for a new trial. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198 Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979).

It was proper for trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing after denial of state's motion to dismiss because the state took a timely interlocutory appeal after the trial court made findings of fact and ruled against dismissal. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).

"Emergency" means an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action or a pressing need. Fogg v. Macaluso, 870 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1995).

Whether the state has an obligation to install safety devices on a road depends on whether they are necessary to return the road to its original state of being, repair, or efficiency, as initially constructed. This question of necessity is a factual determination to be made by the trial court. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).

Applied in Gray v. City of Manitou Springs, 43 Colo. App. 60, 598 P.2d 527 (1979).

II. SUBSECTION (1).

For immunity to be waived under the CGIA, plaintiff's alleged injury must be directly related to the purpose of the public institution, as distinct from its operation. Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).

No waiver of eleventh amendment immunity. State's waiver of its immunity against suit in its own courts does not constitute a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity against suit in federal court. Verner v. Colo., 533 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 (1984); Griess v. Colo., 624 F. Supp. 450 (D. Colo. 1985), aff'd, 841 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1988).

The various waivers of immunity in subsection (1) are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that consideration of one possible ground for waiver of immunity, the "icy walkway waiver" in subsection (1)(d)(III), precluded consideration of another possible ground for immunity. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, 325 P.3d 571.

Conduct wrongful under 1983 cannot be immunized. Conduct by persons acting under color of state law that is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. 1983 cannot be immunized by state law. Mucci v. Falcon Sch. Dist. No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo. App. 1982).

County is a "public entity" entitled to sovereign immunity. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 547 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1976).

Charter schools established pursuant to the Charter Schools Act are public entities and, thus, absent a CGIA immunity exception, entitled to immunity from liability in claims that lie in tort or could lie in tort. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).

A charter school's unique characteristics, including its ability to contract for services, prepare its own budget, and handle its own personnel matters, does not render it a private entity. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).

Teacher and student advisor of a charter school is a public employee pursuant to this act and, as a result, is entitled to immunity. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).

CGIA does not waive immunity of a public entity from suit based on either its own willful and wanton acts or omissions or those of the entity's employees. Claim against city for vicarious liability based on employee's alleged willful and wanton conduct is barred. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.

Police officers have qualified immunity when dealing with stranded motorist and could not be held liable for subsequent assault suffered by the motorist in the absence of conduct that was willful, malicious, or intended harm. Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).

A public entity and its employees are immune from tort liability if the employee is operating a police vehicle while in actual pursuit of a suspected violator of title 42, even if the employee is not using the vehicle's emergency lights or sirens, if the pursuit is made to obtain verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected violator. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 62 P.3d 1020 (Colo. App. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

No waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a) where injuries did not arise from operation of police vehicle but rather arose from conduct of police officer inside the vehicle. Valanzuela v. Snider, 889 F. Supp. 1409 (D. Colo. 1995).

Sovereign immunity not waived for a tort claim asserted by a mineral estate owner that publishing of unauthorized and erroneous report about coal content of owner's land diminished the land's value. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1993).

None of the exceptions to immunity listed in the CGIA either explicitly or implicitly waive sovereign immunity for negligence of the Colorado department of public health and environment in issuing a point source discharge permit. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1996).

Sovereign immunity not waived for bad-faith denials of no-fault auto insurance benefits. Lopez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1994).

None of the waiver provisions listed in this section waive sovereign immunity for elementary school principal's alleged negligence in failing to protect children in her custody from the negligence of third parties; therefore, trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's claims to the extent that the court relied on waiver of sovereign immunity. Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 (Colo. App. 2001).

Amounts contracted to be paid are not "claims" within the meaning of this section. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957) (decided under former CRS 53, 130-2-1).

Claims arising under just compensation or due process clauses of the Colorado Constitution are not subject to the CGIA. Because the purpose of the just compensation and due process clauses is to provide a remedy for injury to private property inflicted by the government, claims arising under such clauses cannot be barred by governmental immunity. Desert Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Denver, 821 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1991).

CGIA bars a claim for replevin of property that was rightfully obtained but allegedly wrongfully detained. The claim lies or could lie in tort. The CGIA bars tort claims and there is no waiver for an action in replevin for property to obtain possession of property validly seized by a public entity's police power. Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2020 COA 134, 490 P.3d 884, aff'd, 2022 CO 56, __ P.3d __.

Applying the CGIA to replevin claim does not violate plaintiff's due process rights because he had a meaningful post-seizure remedy in a related criminal case. Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2020 COA 134, 490 P.3d 884, aff'd, 2022 CO 56, __ P.3d __.

A claim for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act is not a tort claim and thus not a claim within the meaning of this section. Hartman v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 22 P.3d 524 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).

Wrongful discharge claim brought by county employees against county commissioners was barred by the CGIA; however, claim for breach of employment contract was stated by allegations that published personnel policies and procedures established an employment agreement and employees' discharge violated that agreement. Koch v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs of Costilla Co., 774 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Colo. 1991).

Claim of bad faith breach of insurance contract against city is a tort and, therefore, is barred by sovereign immunity. Jordan v. City of Aurora, 876 P.2d 38 (Colo. App. 1993); Colo. Special Dists. v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, 277 P.3d 874.

Claims against city for equitable estoppel and misrepresentation "sound in tort" and are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Olsen & Brown v. City of Englewood, 867 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1993).

Claim for equitable estoppel properly dismissed by trial court because such claims are deemed to be tort claims for purposes of the CGIA. Allen Homesite Group v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32 (Colo. App. 2000); Giuliani v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2012 COA 190, 303 P.3d 131.

CGIA bars claim for damages resulting from city's delay in issuing a certificate of occupancy. Because a building permit is not a contract that promises or impliedly promises subsequent issuance of certificate of occupancy, the claim could only lie in tort. Patzer v. City of Loveland, 80 P.3d 908 (Colo. App. 2003).

Alleged flaws at intersection are all related to claimed inadequacies in design of intersection and are specifically excluded from type of claims that subsection (1) authorizes to be asserted. Szymanski v. State Dept. of Hwys., 776 P.2d 1124 (Colo. App. 1989).

Action against city for interference with performance of contract lies in tort and, therefore, is barred. Grimm Constr. v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 835 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1992).

A retaliatory discharge claim is a common-law tort claim. Although a statutory claim such as the one created by the "whistleblower" statute may be excepted, other claims of wrongful discharge are barred under the general rule of immunity stated in subsection (1). Holland v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 883 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1994).

Governmental immunity prevented an estoppel claim where the claim was actually based on misrepresentation and could lie in tort. The court did not determine, however, that all estoppel claims could lie in tort. Lehman v. City of Louisville, 857 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1992).

CGIA bars a civil conspiracy claim against a metropolitan district because such a claim is undeniably a tort claim but does not bar unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims when the source of both claims is a contract, invalidated for other legal reasons, that makes promises that the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Falcon Broadband v. Banning Lewis Ranch, 2018 COA 92, 474 P.3d 1231.

Action for reinstatement and back pay under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Colorado civil rights act is not an action seeking compensatory damages for personal injuries and, therefore, neither lies in tort nor could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA. City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 2000).

Action by health maintenance organization against department of health care policy and financing was grounded in contract law and, consequently, not barred by sovereign immunity. Parties were bound by three contracts, and health maintenance organization provided overwhelming evidence at trial that department had breached contracts by failing to calculate capitation rates in accordance with the language of the contracts and governing Medicaid payment rates. Further, trial court expressly found that liability arose from the contracts executed between the department and the health maintenance organization. Rocky Mtn. Health Maint. Org., Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Health Care Policy & Fin., 54 P.3d 913 (Colo. App. 2001).

Public entity not immune from liability if claim is for breach of obligation arising from terms of contract. Elliott v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 865 P.2d 859 (Colo. App. 1993); Adams ex rel. Adams v. City of Westminster, 140 P.3d 8 (Colo. App. 2005).

Private contractual right may exist against state agency regarding life insurance policy, based on statutory scheme and purpose for providing life insurance and the statutory requirement that notice of discontinuance be furnished. Elliott v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 865 P.2d 859 (Colo. App. 1993).

CGIA does not bar an action for damages for mental suffering since such an action does not lie in tort but arises as a result of breach of contract. Hoffsetz v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 757 P.2d 155 (Colo. App. 1988).

Seeking reimbursement only for personal injury protection benefits paid pursuant to contract with insured is not a claim in tort nor could it lie in tort, and it is not barred by the CGIA. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pinnacol Assurance, 56 P.3d 1218 (Colo. App. 2002).

Claim of promissory estoppel properly lies in contract and is not barred by the CGIA. Where plaintiff relied on a promise of employment made by the board of county commissioners, her claim was properly for promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, and, therefore, was not barred. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1996).

Claims for quantum meruit, rescission, restitution, and injunctive relief that arise from the parties' contract are not claims that lie or could lie in tort and, therefore, are not barred by the CGIA. CAMAS Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135 (Colo. App. 2001).

The CGIA does not necessarily bar equitable or declaratory relief. Canal company's claims against a municipality for relief regarding an easement fell entirely under property law; the claims neither depended upon liability for tortious conduct nor sought compensation for an injury caused by a breach of tort duty. Upper Platte & Beaver Canal v. Riv. Com., 250 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2010).

Sovereign immunity can be waived for claims seeking equitable, remedial, and noncompensatory relief. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.

No relief could properly be obtained where claims were predicated upon tort allegations, and none of the exceptions set forth in this section apply. Bd. of Soc. Servs. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 902 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1994).

Claims asking for orders for water services cannot lie in tort. They constitute in effect a mandamus action. Jones v. Ne. Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1980).

Public duty rule cannot be used to avoid liability where special relationship exists between public entity and plaintiff. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).

Special relationship rule applies when a person should reasonably foresee that his act, or failure to act, will involve unreasonable risk of harm to another; then there is a duty to avoid that harm. There is, however, no duty to prevent a third person from harming another absent a special relation between the actor and the wrongdoer or between the actor and the victim. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986); Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).

For purposes of the special relationship rule, police officers do not act affirmatively until they act in some way that induces reliance on a promise, expressed or implied, that they will assist or protect the victim. Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).

Police officers did not voluntarily assume any duty to stranded motorist where they determined that there was no real emergency or hazard and offered to call a tow truck but took no further action and, thus, could not be held liable under the special relationship rule for subsequent assault suffered by motorist. Whitcomb v. City & County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1986).

Police officer's actions did not fall within one of the six limited areas for which immunity has been waived where officer failed to offer motorist a ride home following a traffic stop in which the officer ordered the driver not to drive and the motorist was subsequently assaulted. Jarvis by and through Jarvis v. Deyoe, 892 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1994).

Existence of a special relationship, by itself, does not operate as a waiver of immunity under the CGIA. Rather, such relationship creates a duty that may subject defendants to liability only if it is first determined that defendant's sovereign immunity is waived for the activity in question. Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 (Colo. App. 2001).

Sovereign immunity is waived for claims brought under a statutory scheme if the scheme fits within one of the specific waiver exemptions. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.

Whether a statutory claim lies in tort or could lie in tort depends on the factual basis underlying the claim, the nature of the injury, whether the injury arises out of conduct that is tortious or from a breach of duty recognized in tort, and whether the relief seeks to compensate the plaintiff for that injury. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.

Enforcement actions under the solid waste act do not lie in tort because they are public actions that do not seek to compensate the state for personal injuries or specific property damage. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 2020 COA 50, 490 P.3d 695, aff'd, 2021 CO 43, 488 P.3d 1065.

Child Protection Act of 1987 (CPA) claim against city is barred. The CGIA controls on issues of public entity immunity because the CPA does not discuss public entities. The CPA claims do not fit within any of the statutory waiver provisions, and the civil liability allowed by the CPA is rooted in tort principles, therefore, immunity of public entities is not waived. L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, 413 P.3d 1280.

Private limited liability limited partnership created by municipal housing authority to finance low-income housing properties is an instrumentality of a public entity within the meaning of the CGIA and, therefore, a public entity itself entitled to governmental immunity under subsection (1). Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.

Partnership is an instrumentality of a public entity because the authority manages the partnership and exercises exclusive control over all of its day-to-day operations and because of its public purpose in providing low-income housing. The use of some private funding doesn't negate this public purpose. Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.

Remedies under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, including front pay and compensatory damages for a retaliation claim, do not sound in tort and are not barred by the CGIA. The remedies do not relieve tort-like personal injuries and are incidental to the Act's primary purpose of ending discriminatory employment practices. Williams v. Elder, 2019 COA 172, 479 P.3d 43, aff'd, 2020 CO 88, 477 P.3d 694.

A. Paragraph (a).

The definition of "motor vehicle" in this section and "mobile machinery" in 42-1-102 (93.5) are mutually exclusive. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 300 P.3d 977.

The definitions of motor vehicle and mobile machinery each combine two factors: design and use. A motor vehicle is primarily designed to travel on public highways and is generally and commonly used to transport persons and property over those highways. Mobile machinery is not primarily designed to transport persons or cargo over the public highways and is commonly used in the maintenance of roadways. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 300 P.3d 977.

Motor vehicle does not include a street sweeper for purposes of this section. A street sweeper fits under the definition of "special mobile machinery" as defined in 42-1-102 (93.5). Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152, 300 P.3d 977.

"Operation of a motor vehicle", as used in subsection (1)(a), includes the stops such vehicles ordinarily make. Negligently stopping to discharge a passenger at an improper place is part of the "operation" of a bus for which immunity has been waived under this section. Johnson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 916 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1995).

Providing adequate security is not necessary for bus driver to operate the vehicle, and sovereign immunity is not waived where passenger was attacked by other passengers. Statutory waivers of immunity are to be interpreted narrowly. Stockwell v. Reg'l Trans. Dist., 946 P.2d 542 (Colo. App. 1997); Robinson v. Ignacio Sch. Dist., 2014 COA 45, 328 P.3d 297.

By limiting waiver of immunity in this section only to acts or omissions of public employee, the general assembly did not intend to extend the waiver to any act or omission of the public entity itself. Stockwell v. Reg'l Trans. Dist., 946 P.2d 542 (Colo. App. 1997).

A bus that is incapable of being operated on streets or highways does not fit within the term "motor vehicle". DiPaolo v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist., 902 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1995).

Motor vehicle does not include a back hoe for purposes of this section. A back hoe is more in the nature of mobile machinery as defined in 42-1-102 (43). Bain v. Town of Avon, 820 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1991).

Sovereign immunity not waived for negligent operation of vehicles properly adapted and functioning as snowplows in maintenance of roadways at time of accident. Williams v. State Dept. of Hwys., 874 P.2d 465 (Colo. App. 1993).

Dump truck with attached snowplow blade is a motor vehicle for purposes of this section. Williams v. Dept. of Hwys., 879 P.2d 490 (Colo. App. 1994); Herrera v. City & County of Denver, 221 P.3d 423 (Colo. App. 2009).

A snowplow is a motor vehicle for purposes of this section and therefore falls within the waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a). Roper v. Carneal, 2015 COA 13, 411 P.3d 889.

Focus must be on design and use of vehicle at time of accident to determine whether sovereign immunity is waived. Williams v. State Dept. of Hwys., 874 P.2d 465 (Colo. App. 1993).

Because snowplow operated by defendant filled a cattle guard with snow and dirt and allowed horses to escape from their enclosure, which resulted in plaintiff's injuries, trial court erred in determining that subsection (1)(a) was inapplicable and that subsection (1)(d) was the exclusive provision under which defendants' immunity could be waived. Kallage v. Alvidrez, 969 P.2d 743 (Colo. App. 1998).

Road grader operating on highway was a "motor vehicle" within the motor vehicle exception to the CGIA. For purposes of this act, "motor vehicle" includes any "vehicle on wheels having its own motor and not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or highways". Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Kallage v. Alvidrez, 969 P.2d 743 (Colo. App. 1998).

The term "motor vehicle" includes the combination of a public entity's trailer attached to a borrowed motor vehicle, driven by public entity's agent for public entity's purposes and at public entity's request, for purposes of the CGIA. Grabler v. Allen, 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005).

Absent the right to possession, control, and use of an employee's vehicle, the payment of mileage reimbursement does not create a lease of the vehicle for purposes of subsection (1)(a). Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd on other grounds, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).

Payment of mileage reimbursement did not create a lease of the county employee vehicle for purposes of the CGIA, thus barring the plaintiff's claim against the county. Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd on other grounds, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).

County employee who caused an automobile accident while using his personal vehicle and acting in the course and scope of his employment was immune from liability under the CGIA. The language in 24-10-118 (2)(a) that waives immunity under "the circumstances specified in section 24-10-106 (1)" refers not only to the act of operating a motor vehicle but also to the ownership status of the vehicle. The motor vehicle must be "owned or leased" by the public entity. Section 24-10-118 definitively expresses the intent to grant immunity to negligent employees of immune governmental entities. Ceja v. Lemire, 143 P.3d 1093 (Colo. App. 2006), aff'd, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).

The specific reference to 42-4-108 (2) and (3) in subsection (1)(a) grants immunity under the CGIA to a public entity when the vehicle controlled by a public entity operates as an emergency vehicle. According to 42-4-108 (2) and (3), this is the case when the vehicle is responding to an emergency call, or when it is in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when it is responding to, but not returning from, a fire alarm. The vehicle must also make use of its audible and visual signals at the time of responding. City of Grand Junction v. Sisneros, 957 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1998).

The fact that an emergency vehicle driver has stopped at a red light before entering an intersection does not, without more, satisfy the exemption from the waiver of sovereign immunity for an emergency vehicle operating within the provisions of 42-4-108 (2) and (3). The court must also determine whether the driver was proceeding safely after entering the intersection and while driving through it. Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, 474 P.3d 247.

"Pursuit" defined as a chasing with haste or the act of chasing to overtake or apprehend. Court looked to the dictionary definition of the term "pursuit" to ascertain its plain meaning. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 62 P.3d 1020 (Colo. App. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

The term "emergency vehicle" includes police car. Zapp v. Kukuris, 847 P.2d 150 (Colo. App. 1992).

Police car is an emergency vehicle for purposes of this section. Fogg v. Macaluso, 870 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1993).

Under the emergency vehicle exception provided for by subsection (1)(a) of this section and 42-4-108 (2)(c), a trial court must find that a police officer who exceeded the speed limit in pursuit of a fleeing crime suspect did not endanger life or property before granting immunity from a lawsuit resulting from a pursuit-related traffic accident. Case remanded where the trial court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity without making such a finding. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. App. 2000).

A public entity does not have immunity if an operator of an emergency vehicle speeds and endangers life or property in violation of 42-4-108 (2)(c), but the public entity is liable for any claims against the operator of the emergency vehicle. Only when the operator's acts causing the injuries are willful and wanton is the operator personally liable. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).

Governmental immunity does not apply to an accident when an officer did not activate emergency warning lights and sirens until after exceeding the speed limit, notwithstanding the fact that the officer had activated the warning lights and sirens before the accident occurred. Giron v. Hice, 2022 COA 85M, 519 P.3d 1083.

When a peace officer is exceeding speed limits, the officer must, under 42-4-108, activate emergency warning lights and sirens as soon as the emergency vehicle exceeds the speed limit. It is not enough for the officer to activate warning lights or sirens sometime after exceeding the speed limit but before an accident. Giron v. Hice, 2022 COA 85M, 519 P.3d 1083.

Operation of a motor vehicle. For a public entity to be immune from a claim arising from the operation of an emergency vehicle, both the vehicle's lights and siren must have been in operation, and any violation of a traffic regulation that gave rise to the claim must have been one of those specified in 42-4-108 (2)(a) through (d). Sierra v. City & County of Denver, 730 P.2d 902 (Colo. App. 1986).

Immunity is not waived by subsection (1)(a) for a public employee who was driving his personally owned vehicle at the time of an accident while acting within the course and scope of his employment. Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).

Police officer was engaged in a pursuit within the provisions of 42-4-108 (3) when the driver of a car fled the scene in a clear attempt to avoid arrest or further investigation and the officer followed the car. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

Police officer's pursuit was not investigatory in nature when the officer already had authority to stop and arrest the driver of a car and the officer was pursuing the driver of the car for that reason; therefore, the officer was required to activate his emergency signals in order for the city to claim the protection of governmental immunity under the CGIA. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

"Operation", as used in subsection (1)(a), is a broad term that includes both the physical defects of a motor vehicle and its movement, as well as other actions fairly incidental to those defects or movements. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).

Since the waiver provision of subsection (1)(a) applies to injuries that result from the operation of a motor vehicle by a public employee who is acting as an operator, the term "operation" necessarily refers to actions of the operator related to the physical control of the functions of the motor vehicle. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).

The movement of passengers into and out of a bus is a function of the bus controlled by the bus driver. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).

Based on the broad definition of the term "operation" and the requirement that the waiver provision be strictly construed with deference in favor of the victim, the alleged negligent failure of an RTD bus driver to ensure that passengers board and disembark safely is included in the waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a). Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).

The waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(a) is applicable if injuries result from the operation of a bus, even if the underlying cause of the injuries may have been faulty maintenance. Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2000).

"Operation of a motor vehicle" in subsection (1)(a) applies to acts or omissions of a public employee but does not include conduct associated with the public entity's negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Kahland v. Villarreal, 155 P.3d 491 (Colo. App. 2006).

Public employee need not act "negligently" in the operation of a motor vehicle in order for the waiver of sovereign immunity from injuries to apply for injuries that resulted from the operation of the motor vehicle as long as the plaintiff proves that operation of the motor vehicle caused the injuries. Immunity may be waived pursuant to subsection (1)(a) even if the operation of the vehicle is not the direct cause of the injury or the basis for the cause of action, but rather whether the injury resulted from it. Teran v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 2020 COA 151, 477 P.3d 799.

Driver's failure to secure handcuffed passengers with seatbelts in a sheriff transport van falls within the waiver of immunity for the "operation of a motor vehicle". Young v. Jefferson County Sheriff, 2012 COA 185, 292 P.3d 1189.

B. Paragraph (b).

Primary purpose of a hospital is to provide medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons. Plummer v. Little, 987 P.2d 871 (Colo. App. 1999); Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000); Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2001); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).

Practice of medicine is within meaning of "operation of public hospital" for purposes of subsection (1)(b). Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000).

"Operation" of public hospital or other facility, within meaning of subsection (1)(b), does not include performance of functions only ancillary to, or remotely related to, primary purpose of facility. Daley v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 111 P.3d 554 (Colo. App. 2005).

Residency program operated by a public hospital under which resident physicians work at both public and nonpublic hospitals furthers the purposes of the public hospital and, therefore, constitutes the operation of a public hospital for purposes of subsection (1)(b). Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000).

Fact that alleged malpractice occurred at private hospital does not preclude determination that conduct is part of the operation of a public hospital when a physician holding a clinical faculty appointment with the residency program of a public hospital is supervising a resident physician at a nonpublic entity. Sereff v. Waldman, 30 P.3d 754 (Colo. App. 2000).

Although hospital is immune from suit for its own willful and wanton acts or omissions, or for the willful and wanton acts or omissions of its employees, hospital's sovereign immunity is nonetheless waived under subsection (1)(b). Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., 2012 COA 113, 284 P.3d 191 (conclusion that a public entity is immune from suit based on its own willful and wanton conduct disavowed in Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828).

Clinic not a public hospital for purposes of this section. Plummer v. Little, 987 P.2d 871 (Colo. App. 1999); Montoya v. Trinidad State Nursing Home, 109 P.3d 1051 (Colo. App. 2005).

Nursing home not a public hospital for purposes of this section. Montoya v. Trinidad State Nursing Home, 109 P.3d 1051 (Colo. App. 2005).

Provision of risk analysis, claim review, and litigation assistance services pursuant to private contract is ancillary to primary purpose of hospital and, therefore, does not constitute operation of a public hospital. Immunity, therefore, is not waived under subsection (1)(b). Daley v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 111 P.3d 554 (Colo. App. 2005).

Personnel action only remotely related to hospital's primary purpose. Relation between hospital employee's discharge and provision of medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons is particularly tenuous with respect to administrative employees. Subsection (1)(b) cannot be construed as waiver of state's immunity with respect to personnel action. Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2001).

Sovereign immunity not waived since all plaintiff's claims involved conflicts among employees, who happened to be physicians, and related only indirectly to patient care. Such conflicts among employees do not concern the operation of a public hospital. Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).

Specific immunity provision in 17-27.7-103 (1) prevails over general waiver of immunity in subsection (1)(b) regarding the operation of a correctional facility or jail. Norsby v. Jensen, 916 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1995).

"Operation" of a correction facility includes the provision of medical care necessary for basic health for purposes of subsection (1)(b). Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).

State officials may be sued in their individual capacities for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges that individual defendants acted in their personal capacities to withstand a motion to dismiss. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).

Sovereign immunity waived in an action for injuries resulting from public entity's operation of correctional facility; however, where officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, confinement in detention center for a few hours was not false imprisonment. Rose v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1999).

Operation of county jail does not include acts carried out in the performance of a criminal history investigation or in the making of a bond recommendation or report to a court, nor does it include the failure to serve warrants. Howard through Young v. Denver, 837 P.2d 255 (Colo. App. 1992).

A sheriff's determination not to release an inmate after the inmate has properly posted bond lies at the heart of the sheriff's duties and is related to the purpose and operation of a jail. Accordingly, sheriff is not immune from suit under subsection (1)(b). Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 COA 106, 522 P.3d 255.

Allegations of willful and wanton conduct in the operation of a jail do not raise an immunity issue. Hernandez v. City & County of Denver, 2018 COA 151, 439 P.3d 57.

Accordingly, the district court erred in resolving those allegations by way of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and an evidentiary hearing described in Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993). Hernandez v. City & County of Denver, 2018 COA 151, 439 P.3d 57.

District court erred in dismissing case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to CGIA immunity when the conduct in question occurred in the operation of a jail. Immunity does not apply to injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail, regardless of whether conduct was willful and wanton. Hernandez v. City & County of Denver, 2018 COA 151, 439 P.3d 57.

C. Paragraph (c).

"Public building" includes fixtures. Reynolds v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 937 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1996).

Public parking structure is a "public building" under subsection (1)(c). It falls within the ordinary meaning of "building". It is constructed and designed to be permanent. Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751.

Although a public parking structure -- like a public parking lot -- can be a "public facility" under subsection (1)(e), it can also be a "public building" within the meaning of subsection (1)(c). The terms "facility" and "building" mean different things, but are not mutually exclusive. A "building" can be a type of "facility". The general assembly's use of "facility" in two waivers and "building" in a third indicates that the legislature did not intend the term "facility" to be limited to a "building". However, as ordinary usage suggests, the term "building" has a more specific meaning than the term "facility" as a "building" can be a type of "facility". Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751.

The term "public" in the definition of "dangerous condition" does not exclude a person in a public building at a city's invitation. It is the immunity created by the CGIA, and not the exceptions thereto, that must be strictly construed. Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).

Waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) concerning a dangerous condition of any public building is limited to building or structural defects and cannot be used to waive immunity for actions involving only the use of a public building. Jenks v. Sullivan, 813 P.2d 800 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 826 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1992); Reynolds v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 937 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1996); Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1996); Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 603 (Colo. App. 2008).

To establish a waiver of sovereign immunity resulting from a dangerous condition under subsection (1)(c), the injured party must show that the injuries occurred as a result of the physical condition of a public facility or the use thereof that: (1) Constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, (2) is known to exist or should have been known to exist in the exercise of reasonable care, and (3) is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining such facility. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998); Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1 P.3d 256 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001); Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 603 (Colo. App. 2008).

Obligation to maintain facility includes ensuring any new design choice made in connection with maintenance does not cause a dangerous condition. A dangerous condition does not exist solely because the design of any facility is inadequate. But if an inadequate design is made in connection with a maintenance repair, a waiver of sovereign immunity is established. Stickle v. County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, 519 P.3d 751.

No waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) was intended for injuries caused by the use of facilities unless such use renders the facility itself an unreasonable risk to public safety or health. Mentzel v. Judicial Dept., 778 P.2d 323 (Colo. App. 1989).

No waiver of immunity exists under subsection (1)(c) when use of public building renders an integral part of the facility a dangerous physical condition. Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993); Hendricks by and through Martens v. Weld, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1995).

A public entity does not have governmental immunity when it constructs a building through the services of an independent contractor and a dangerous condition arises from that construction. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).

Alleged dangerous condition, airborne asbestos released during building demolition activities, was not proximately caused by any negligent act or omission in "constructing or maintaining" a public building. As a result, immunity under subsection (1)(c) not waived. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

Public entity may proximately cause a condition not only by affirmatively creating it but also by its omission in failing to reasonably discover and correct the unsafe condition. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).

Allegation that warm air vent on outside of public building caused or contributed to formation of ice on which plaintiff slipped was not sufficient to support waiver of immunity for a dangerous condition of a public building under subsection (1)(c) because the ice was not directly caused by or attributable to a physical or structural defect of the building and was at most an indirect effect of the design of the building. Seder v. City of Ft. Collins, 987 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1999).

Neither grounds surrounding a public building nor driveway leading up to it are subject to a waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) or (1)(d)(I). Stanley v. Adams County Sch. Dist. 27J, 942 P.2d 1322 (Colo. App. 1997).

No waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(c) was intended for injuries caused by negligent use of storage closet as seclusion room. Plaintiff does not allege negligent maintenance but, instead, alleges improper actions on part of school staff in placing child out of their line of sight. Accepting plaintiff's argument would mean that any time a school child is injured as a result of being inappropriately placed out of direct line of observation by staff, governmental immunity would be waived under the "dangerous condition" exception. Neither the plain language of the statute nor the case law supports such a construction. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by neither considering nor making findings of fact as to this evidence. Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1 P.3d 256 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2001).

Forcing students to participate in a human-pyramid activity on an unpadded gymnasium floor is insufficient to support a waiver under subsection (1)(c). Dorsey v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. 60, 140 F. Supp. 3d 1102 (D. Colo. 2015).

Student's injury resulted from "dangerous condition" after sliding into unpadded wall in elementary school gymnasium during physical education class. Hendricks by & through Martens v. Weld, 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1995).

Inoperable bus parked in a public building used for safety training is not part of the building that houses it and cannot be construed as a "dangerous condition of a public building" pursuant to this section. DiPaolo v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist., 902 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1995).

University student's common law negligence action was within the immunity waiver for a dangerous condition of a public building where student, at the direction of the teacher, was cleaning out an overhead storage space when the extension ladder student was standing on slipped on the freshly sealed floor. Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).

Determination of whether underground gasoline storage tanks constitute a dangerous condition of a public building under subsection (1)(c) depends on whether the tanks were installed in or annexed to the building as a fixture. Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1996).

Printing press was not a fixture, hence, liability was not waived for injury resulting from use of printing press inside a public building. Reynolds v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 937 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1996).

A dry erase board that would normally have been affixed to a wall is a dangerous condition of a public building where plaintiff's injuries were attributable to the failure to secure the board properly. Booth v. Univ. of Colo., 64 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2002), aff'd, 78 P.3d 1098 (Colo. 2003).

The failure to post a warning sign or to supervise is not a maintenance issue. Such a failure does not involve the use of a dangerous physical condition of the building that is associated with its maintenance. Therefore, public recreation center's immunity under subsection (1)(c) was not waived. Douglas v. City & County of Denver, 203 P.3d 603 (Colo. App. 2008).

Administrative building for city's gas department was "public" for purposes of subsection (1)(c). The operations served and benefitted the public with respect to the city's provision of gas service. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

D. Paragraph (d).

1. Subparagraph (I).

The words "a public highway, road, or street" at the beginning of subsection (1)(d) include county roads. Meserole v. City of Aspen, 786 P.2d 456 (Colo. App. 1989) (overruled in Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), annotated below); Madill v. County of Adams, 799 P.2d 949 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Colorado court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), 799 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1990).

"Dangerous condition" waiver of immunity applies to: (1) Any road within the corporate limits of any municipality; (2) any highway that is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the federal primary highway system; (3) any highway that is a part of the federal secondary highway system; and (4) any highway that is a part of the state highway system. This section has been construed to effect a waiver of immunity for these categories of roads only and does not effect a waiver of immunity by counties for actions arising from injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on county roads. Bloomer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Click v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 923 P.2d 347 (Colo. App. 1996); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002).

E-470 is included within the waiver of immunity in subsection (1)(d)(I). For purposes of the CGIA, E-470 constitutes a federal interstate, federal primary, or federal secondary highway system and therefore immunity is waived. Lauck v. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2008).

The federal highway designations contained in subsection (1)(d)(I) were replaced with a successor designation at the federal level, known as the national highway system (NHS). E-470 is listed as an NHS route, which is sufficient to establish a waiver of immunity under the CGIA. Lauck v. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2008).

If the intent of subsection (1)(d)(I) is to provide a waiver of immunity for dangerous conditions on public roads, then E-470, which is a paved, four-lane, limited access, divided highway owned, operated, and maintained by a public entity, would not be excluded from such waiver of immunity. Lauck v. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth., 187 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2008).

Subsection (1)(d) does not waive immunity of counties for dangerous conditions present on county roads. Subsection (1)(d) waives a public entity's sovereign immunity with regard to only four categories of roads demarcated by the disjunctive "or". The clause following the first "of" modifies "dangerous condition", and only the second and subsequent "of's" create categories of roads. Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002).

Addition in 1992 of last sentence in subsection (1)(d)(I) did not extend the waiver of sovereign immunity to dangerous conditions on county roads. Click v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 923 P.2d 347 (Colo. App. 1996); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002).

If subsection (1)(d) is stricken, county remains immune with respect to an accident occurring on a county road, because the effect would be not to extend the waiver of immunity to county roads but, rather, to rescind the waiver. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 547 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1976).

Reason immunity not extended to dangerous conditions of roads or streets. The apparent purpose of the general assembly in not extending sovereign immunity to actions for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions of roads or streets was to make governments liable for failure to maintain those facilities in a condition safe for public use. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983); Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).

If the meaning of "dangerous condition" is limited solely to the physical condition of the road, this purpose would not be fulfilled. Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).

Nothing in subsection (1)(d)(I) bars liability for a public entity if it failed to remove or mitigate the danger when it had the existing means to do so, actual notice of the condition through the proper public official responsible for the roadway, and a reasonable time to act. This is true even if the public entity's negligence did not proximately cause the dangerous condition consisting of an accumulation of sand and gravel on a roadway. Mason v. Adams, 961 P.2d 540 (Colo. App. 1997).

Dangerous condition may exist if there has been a failure to maintain the roadside so as to avoid the presence of obstructions on the traveled portion of a state highway. Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).

Allegations of unreasonable risk to public health or safety were sufficient to state a claim for relief under the statutory exception to sovereign immunity where the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that: (1) Condition of highway was dangerous, (2) defendants had previous knowledge of numerous similar accidents and fatalities caused by falling boulders on the highway, and (3) defendants negligently failed to install devices that would have prevented boulders from this unstable slope from falling onto the traveled portion of the highway. Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989).

Dangerous condition is not limited to those conditions that have their physical source in the highway itself, and, although the absence of a barricade may not have itself created a dangerous condition, evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that both the failure to maintain the barricade properly in front of the dirt embankment and the dirt embankment itself created dangerous conditions. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).

The phrase "interferes with the movement of traffic" modifies "[a] dangerous condition". Thus, this section waives governmental immunity only when a dangerous condition both exists and interferes with the movement of traffic. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126, 361 P.3d 1080.

Failure to post warning signs cannot serve as the basis for finding a dangerous condition and, thus, a waiver of sovereign immunity. Mason v. Adams, 961 P.2d 540 (Colo. App. 1997).

Failure to warn highway users of a hazardous condition on a highway and failure to issue a travel advisory, reroute traffic, or close a highway in response to a hazardous condition does not constitute a waiver of governmental immunity. Medina v. State, 17 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001)

Dangerous condition in a roadway not found. Sierra v. City & County of Denver, 730 P.2d 902 (Colo. App. 1986); City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, 418 P.3d 489.

Complaint alleged negligent design of intersection, since the complaint did not allege that the city's acts in constructing or maintaining the intersection differed in any way from the provisions for construction and maintenance of the intersection contained in the initial design; thus, claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).

Sovereign immunity not waived under subsection (1)(d)(I) because overgrown trees and bushes in a median do not physically interfere with movement of traffic on the paved portion of the street. Cordova v. Pueblo W. Metro. Dist., 986 P.2d 976 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).

No waiver of immunity for wildlife on highway. Immunity provision of 33-3-103 is not implicitly amended or repealed by subsection (1)(d). Deneau v. State, 883 P.2d 567 (Colo. App. 1994).

Necessary to go beyond the wording of subsection (1)(d) and look at legislative history to discern legislative intent since wording in subsection is ambiguous. City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).

Sidewalks are specifically included in description of municipal thoroughfares in subsection (1)(d); therefore, sovereign immunity is waived by the municipality. Meserole v. City of Aspen, 786 P.2d 456 (Colo. App. 1989), aff'd, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).

Sidewalk did not constitute a dangerous condition. Evidence did not establish that the sidewalk deviation presented a risk that "exceeded the bounds of reason". Therefore, city retained its immunity from suit. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, 504 P.3d 287.

Subsection (1)(d) does not provide immunity for city where a two-inch stub of a traffic sign interfered with and caused pedestrian to fall. City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1990).

City is immune from liability for a roadway's abrupt transition at the ditch because the roadway was in the same condition as when it was originally constructed. Because the roadway remained unchanged, the city did not repair the roadway and is immune from any claims for negligence for allowing this condition to exist. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).

Subsection (1)(d)(I) waives immunity for injuries occurring in parking areas of a municipal street. The "parking thereon" phrase applies to municipal highways, roads, streets, or sidewalks. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126, 361 P.3d 1080.

The meaning of "public highway, road, or street" in subsection (1)(d) does not include the paved surface of a fenced, street-level parking lot with restricted access. Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1992).

Constructive notice of dangerous condition. An entity's employees, ignorant of the presence of a particular obstruction, may be deemed to have had notice nonetheless if, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, they should have known of it. Morgan v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, 837 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1992).

The question of constructive notice depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case and is ordinarily a question to be determined by the jury. Morgan v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, 837 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1992).

The definition of "traffic marking" appears to be ambiguous, and the court must look beyond the bare meaning of the words. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).

Evidence presented supported the trial court's conclusion that a barricade is not a traffic marking, which conclusion is consistent with the principle that a legislative grant of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed and with the general assembly's purpose in not extending immunity to actions for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions of roads. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).

The 1986 amendments to this section did not alter the rule that a governmental entity can be sued for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition on a highway; rather, they were meant primarily to delete "traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof" from the statutory definition of "the phrase 'physically interferes with the movement of traffic'". Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1989); Moldovan v. State, 829 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 842 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1992).

Statutory language "the phrase 'physically interferes with the movement of traffic' shall not include traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof" excludes the failure to post warning signs from the general waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions. Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).

2. Subparagraph (II).

Improper placement of stop sign is within statutory definition of "dangerous condition" for which city may be held liable. Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983).

Failure to modify or improve traffic signals. While negligence of public entity in designing or constructing portions of street or highway system or in maintaining them free of defects or obstructions is actionable under the CGIA, failure to modify or improve them to make them safer in light of changing use is not. Karr v. City & County of Denver, 677 P.2d 1384 (Colo. App. 1984).

A temporary stop sign is a "traffic control signal" for purposes of subsection (1)(d)(II) even though it is not a power-operated device. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).

Because the singular includes the plural under the rule of statutory construction set forth in 2-4-102, the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in subsection (1)(d)(II) for "failure to repair a traffic signal on which conflicting directions are displayed" applies to a public entity that fails to repair multiple traffic control signals that display conflicting directions. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).

A conflict between a temporary stop sign and a traffic light is a "traffic control signal on which conflicting directions are displayed" for purposes of subsection (1)(d)(II). DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).

Subsection (1)(d)(II) precluded a grant of immunity to cities and a police officer in an action resulting from a car accident that occurred at an intersection where a temporary stop sign and a traffic light gave conflicting directions. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 990 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1999).

Sovereign immunity not waived under subsection (1)(d) where city allegedly failed to set a pedestrian signal so that a pedestrian could cross an entire intersection before the opposing traffic received a green light; however there was no evidence that the opposing traffic had a green signal at the same time as the pedestrian signal indicating that the pedestrian was allowed to cross the intersection. Lyons v. City of Aurora, 987 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1999).

At an intersection controlled by both traffic and pedestrian signals, where the traffic signal had been turned 90 degrees so that it displayed green lights simultaneously in two directions but the pedestrian signal was functioning properly, the trial court did not err in determining that "conflicting directions" were not displayed to a pedestrian for purposes of subsection (1)(d)(II). Moore v. City & County of Denver, 42 P.3d 82 (Colo. App. 2002).

Malfunctioning street light may constitute a dangerous condition. Though the street light is not physically on the roadway, it still "physically interferes with the movement of traffic". Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that city's immunity had been waived. Lin v. City of Golden, 97 P.3d 303 (Colo. App. 2004).

3. Subparagraph (III).

Although the public entity's failure to post warning signs alone could not establish a dangerous condition, that failure was relevant to whether the entity had used existing means available to it to mitigate the danger. Martinez v. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. App. 2002).

Trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff had established that defendant had actual notice of a dangerous condition when the particular place where the plaintiff fell was known to be a problem area, the build-up of ice there was a chronic and continuing problem, and the defendant had notice and knowledge of the condition. Martinez v. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 60 P.3d 736 (Colo. App. 2002).

Low-income housing facility is not a "public building open for public business" within the meaning of subsection (1)(d)(III). Although the facility is owned and operated by instrumentalities of a municipal housing authority, it functions as private residences and not as a public building. Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, 469 P.3d 491.

E. Paragraph (e).

"Public facility" in subsection (1)(e) is an ambiguous term, as it is reasonably subject to two differing interpretations: It can be construed to encompass a single piece of playground equipment or to exclude such equipment. The term "public facility" is not defined in the CGIA, and there is no pertinent legislative history that can illuminate its intended meaning. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

"Facility" has a different meaning than the term "building". The term "facility" applies to permanent bricks-and-mortar structures as well as to collections of individual items that, considered together, promote a broader, common purpose. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

A "facility" must also be "public" to qualify for a recreation area waiver. The term "public" modifies and constricts the types of facilities that can qualify for a recreation area waiver in subsection (1)(e). St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

For a facility to be "public" under subsection (1)(e), it must be accessible to the public and maintained by a public entity to serve a beneficial public purpose. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

Three-step analysis to determine whether a particular piece of property is "located in" a "recreation area". First, a court should determine what property is relevant to the analysis by determining the boundaries of the "putative recreation area". Second, the court should determine if the public entity's "primary purpose" in constructing or maintaining the recreation area is recreational. Third, assuming the primary purpose is recreational, the court should determine whether the public facility at issue was located in the boundaries of this recreation area. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891; St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

Under this analysis, the playground in which a zip line on which injury occurred was "located in" a "recreation area". The recreation area was contiguous property underlying the playground equipment. The property underlying the school is excluded because the school is designed to promote educational, not recreational, activities. Second, the primary purpose of the school in constructing or maintaining this area was to allow school children to play during their recess time. Accordingly, the primary purpose of the area was recreation. Third, the collection of playground equipment at issue in this case, the "public facility", was physically situated within the boundaries of the recreation area, the land underlying the playground equipment. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

The common meaning of the word "maintain", its legislative history, and Colorado case law support the court of appeals finding that a failure to "maintain" means a failure to keep a facility in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997).

Maintaining a safe work environment by diligently following personnel policies is at best ancillary to the purpose of operating a sanitation facility; therefore, claim that defendants failed to adhere to those policies is barred by the CGIA. Dobson v. City & County of Denver, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Colo. 1999).

Sovereign immunity not waived pursuant to subsection (1)(e) for drowning that occurred at lake in city park. Although the record was unclear whether the lake was natural or manmade, if it was natural, the city was immune from liability because the natural condition of land, even within a park, cannot lead to a waiver of immunity. Even if the lake was manmade, the risk was not unreasonable where there was no evidence to suggest the lake had steep or particularly slippery shores that were constructed by the city. Even if dangerous conditions did exist, plaintiff must show that the city knew of the risk and either originally created the risk or negligently allowed the risk to continue. DeAnzona v. City & County of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2000).

City's negligent failure to maintain the area surrounding a drainage ditch may support either a determination that a dangerous condition existed for purposes of subsection (1)(e) or a determination that, under subsection (1)(f), the negligent failure to maintain may have contributed to child's death and his brother's injuries. Where a drainage ditch is not properly maintained, a city may be held liable for obstacles that are not part of the original design. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 25 P.3d 1266 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to 24-10-103).

Water department immune from liability arising from injuries caused by water meter pits on private property because city does not both operate and maintain such water pits. City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1996); Horrell v. City of Aurora, 976 P.2d 315 (Colo. App. 1998); deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).

Water meter pit is not a public water facility when it is owned, operated, and maintained by a public entity but is located on private property and benefits solely the property on which it is located. deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).

A water meter pit owned by a city, located on city property, and operated and maintained by the city is a "public water facility" for purposes of subsection (1)(f). Wisdom v. City of Sterling, 36 P.3d 106 (Colo. App. 2001).

The 1986 amendment to subsection (1)(e) that deleted "public parking facilities" did not evidence the general assembly's intent to waive sovereign immunity for dangerous conditions in such facilities. In absence of clear language waiving immunity the court construed the subsection as evidencing the general assembly's intent to retain a public entity's sovereign immunity from liability for dangerous conditions in such facilities. Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1992), overruled in Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891.

The legislature's removal of the public parking facilities exception from subsection (1)(e) signaled its intent that the term "public facility" includes public parking lots. This conclusion flows from the well-established presumption that when the legislature amends a law, it intends to change that law. Thus, the legislature's removal of particular language serves as a statement of legislative intent that it did not wish to include such language. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891 (overruling Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. 1992)).

A parking lot that serves a public golf course is a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver. Such a parking lot is "public" if it is accessible to and operated for the benefit of the general public; it is also a "facility" in light of the CGIA's history and its purposes. Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, 327 P.3d 891.

No waiver of sovereign immunity under subsection (1)(e) for public parking facilities because there is no clear statutory language waiving such immunity. Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1992).

Any power or duty to maintain the visitor's parking lot at a correctional facility by the department of corrections is not directly related to the purpose of the facility. Pack v. Arkansas Valley Corr. Facility, 894 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1995).

Department of correction's maintenance of visitor area within correctional facility is directly related to purpose of correctional facility. Flores v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 3 P.3d 464 (Colo. App. 1999).

The term "public hospital" does not include veterinary hospitals but only those public hospitals which care for sick and injured persons. State of Colo. v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1990).

The term "foster home" cannot be characterized as a "hospital" or a "correctional facility" for purposes of the sovereign immunity statute. Gabriel v. City & County of Denver, 824 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1991).

On-site clinic at Denver international airport is operated as part of the overall health services provided by the Denver health department, and an extension of the services rendered by Denver general hospital, that serves all of the general populace in Denver; therefore, the clinic is a "public hospital" under this section. Farina v. City & County of Denver, 940 P.2d 1004 (Colo. App. 1996).

So long as the facility is owned and operated by the public entity, is devoted to a public purpose, and is beneficial to a substantial segment of the public, it is a public facility or hospital under the CGIA. Farina v. City & County of Denver, 940 P.2d 1004 (Colo. App. 1996).

An electrical vault on private property used as a restaurant is a public electrical facility for purposes of subsections (1)(e) and (1)(f); there is a public benefit from the usage of the electricity because the general public patronizes the restaurant and because the use of transformers located in such electrical vaults promotes the efficient delivery of electrical power in the town. Ellis v. Town of Estes Park, 66 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2002).

An individual piece of playground equipment such as a zip line does not, in and of itself, qualify as a "facility" under the recreation area waiver of subsection (1)(e) when that apparatus is divorced from the rest of the playground. However, an injury occurs on a "facility" when a zip line is a component of the larger playground. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

However, an entire playground, considered as a whole, including the collection of playground equipment, can qualify as a "public facility". This conclusion is anchored in the dictionary definition of "facility" and is further bolstered by statutory context. Moreover, this interpretation of "facility" comports with the underlying purposes of the CGIA. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

A collection of playground equipment at a public school qualifies as a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver because it is (1) relatively permanent or otherwise affixed to the land, (2) a man-made structure, (3) accessible to the public, and (4) maintained by a public entity to serve a beneficial, common public purpose. Injury occurred on a "facility" because claimant was injured on a zip line, a component of the playground that constitutes a facility. The injury occurred on a "public" facility because the playground was accessible and beneficial to both the greater public and the public school children attending the elementary school. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, 325 P.3d 1014.

A non-negligently constructed and maintained piece of playground equipment cannot be a "dangerous condition" under the CGIA's recreation area waiver. In order to be a dangerous condition within the meaning of 24-10-103 (1.3), a physical condition must be a physical or structural defect, not just an apparatus. In addition, the physical condition must be caused by some negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining a facility. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, 395 P.3d 751.

And the recreation area waiver does not recognize blanket claims of danger based on the design of a public facility. On the contrary, it explicitly precludes such claims. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, 395 P.3d 751.

"Public facility" located in a "recreation area" includes a college athletic field that is used for a variety of purposes, including recreation. Denmark v. State, 954 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1997).

A walkway that runs between a school building and a school playground is not a "public facility" for purposes of subsection (1)(e). It is also not a component of the public facility that is the school playground because it does not promote the broader overall purpose of children's play in the same way that an individual component of a playground like a swing set or sandbox does. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, 325 P.3d 571.

Mere use of cabin for school-sponsored field trip does transform it into a public facility owned or maintained by school or school district. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).

Rocks placed in a circle by a group of students do not constitute construction of a "facility". King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).

Circle of rocks is not a physical improvement to property under subsection (1)(e). King v. U.S., 954 P.2d 624 (D. Colo. 1999).

Immunity is waived pursuant to subsection (1)(e) only where the dangerous condition alleged of is of a physical improvement to the property, such as a building, boat dock, or fence. King v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999).

"Public facility" refers to a facility built or constructed by a public entity rather than a natural feature such as a tree based on the use of the phrase "public facility" in subsection (1)(e), its common meaning, and its grouping with other facilities in that subsection. Accordingly, a tree in a park or recreation area is not a public facility; however, if a public entity incorporates a tree into a facility in such a manner that it becomes an integral part of the facility and is essential for the intended use of the facility, the tree may be a component of the public facility. Rosales v. City & County of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. App. 2004), overruled in Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.

The legislature intended to retain immunity for injuries caused by native trees originating on unimproved property regardless of their proximity to a public facility, such as the improved area of a campsite. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.

The natural condition provision governs any injuries arising from naturally occurring features of parks without consideration of their proximity to man-made objects. For injuries caused by natural dangerous conditions, immunity should be retained. This means that immunity does not apply with respect to man-made objects and does apply to natural objects. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.

Immunity turns on the mechanism of an injury, not the location when the injury occurs. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.

Subsection (1)(e) does not create a duty to maintain natural features, nor does a duty arise merely because of the features' proximity or contiguity to improved property. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.

Even where the state chooses to maintain unimproved property to protect the public health and safety, it does not assume a duty to maintain the property where none otherwise existed. Such a policy encourages the provision of services to protect the public health and safety and allows public entities to allocate their limited fiscal resources. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.

Natural conditions of unimproved property are not transformed under subsection (1)(e) into improved property where, for the public health and safety, a public entity performs incidental maintenance. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005; Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.

The primary concern in implementing the CGIA was to provide the public with a sufficient avenue to tort recovery without exhausting governmental resources through excessive exposure to tort liability. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005.

A "natural condition of any unimproved property" includes native trees originating on unimproved property. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005 (overruling Rosales v. City & County of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. App. 2004)).

Because a limb from such a tree caused victim's injuries, the natural condition provision of subsection (1)(e) immunizes the government. Burnett v. Colo. Dept. of Natural Res., 2015 CO 19, 346 P.3d 1005 (overruling Rosales v. City & County of Denver, 89 P.3d 507 (Colo. App. 2004)).

A rock formation that abuts one side of a city-owned amphitheater is not part of the amphitheater nor is the formation a public facility; it is a natural condition of unimproved property. Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.

Injured parties' location in the amphitheater does not support a waiver of immunity under subsection (1)(e) for injuries caused by a natural condition, that is, a rock falling from the rock formation. Ackerman v. City & County of Denver, 2015 COA 96M, 373 P.3d 665.

Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of "swimming", the term "swimming facility" in subsection (1)(e) refers to a facility that is both suitable and commonly used for swimming. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).

An attraction in which visitors ride a raft down a plume is not a "swimming facility" for purposes of the CGIA. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).

Absence of someone to regulate the spacing of people in rafts on a water attraction did not constitute a dangerous condition under (1)(e) because there was no physical defect in attraction's construction or maintenance. Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 179 P.3d 81 (Colo. App. 2007).

F. Paragraph (f).

City ordinance requirement for assertion of claims held void. City ordinance that requires installation of backwater check valves for assertion of claims for damages resulting from operation and maintenance of sewage lines and facilities imposes a requirement that is more onerous than that imposed by subsection (1)(f) and, therefore, is void. Fleckman v. City of Greeley, 673 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1983).

When a coal tar contaminant plume from a public gas facility was ongoing and continued after the CGIA's enactment, applying the CGIA's immunity waivers would not be a retroactive application of those waivers. Rather, the waivers would be applied prospectively, namely to injuries caused after the CGIA's enactment. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

In order to be within the waiver of subsection (1)(f), plaintiff must show that public entity's negligence was related to a public water facility and that the negligence arose from the operation and maintenance of that facility. deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).

A public entity "maintains" a public facility, for purposes of the immunity waiver in subsection (1)(f), even if it hires an independent contractor to perform the maintenance. Lopez v. City of Grand Junction, 2018 COA 97, 488 P.3d 364.

Once a county chooses to operate and maintain a public water or sanitation facility, it has a duty not to do so in a negligent manner. The statutory waiver of governmental immunity for damages resulting from the operation and maintenance of a public water or sanitation facility is an acknowledgment of such a duty by the general assembly. Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 77 P.3d 870 (Colo. App. 2003).

The pertinent act or omission of the public entity in subsection (1)(f) is deemed to be an "operation" only if it is vested by law "with respect to the purposes" of the public water or sanitation facility, and sovereign immunity is waived only if the act or omission relates to the purpose of the facility. Richland Dev. Co. v. E. Cherry Creek, 934 P.2d 841 (Colo. App. 1996).

City's negligent failure to maintain the area surrounding a drainage ditch may support either a determination that a dangerous condition existed for purposes of subsection (1)(e) or a determination that, under subsection (1)(f), the negligent failure to maintain may have contributed to child's death and his brother's injuries. Where a drainage ditch is not properly maintained, a city may be held liable for obstacles that are not part of the original design. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 25 P.3d 1266 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to 24-10-103).

Trial court did not err in applying statutory waiver of governmental immunity for injuries caused by operation and maintenance of a public facility where defendant city had not constructed a storm sewer line in accordance with comprehensive plan and a later line installation constituted improper operation and maintenance of the facility. Scott v. City of Greeley, 931 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1996).

A "sanitation facility" as used in subsection (1)(f) includes a storm drain operated and maintained by a county. Burnworth v. Adams County, 826 P.2d 368 (Colo. App. 1991).

It also includes a "cross pan" that was a part of the town's storm water drainage system designed to transport water discharged into the cross pan from a culvert to a ditch that emptied into a lake. Smith v. Town of Estes Park, 944 P.2d 571 (Colo. App. 1996).

It also includes a drainage ditch built by a city to accommodate storm water runoff. City of Colo. Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to 24-10-103).

An artificial irrigation ditch that is partially owned and maintained by a city and is an integral part of the city's storm drainage system is a sanitation facility for purposes of subsection (1)(f). The fact that the city shares the ditch with others does not foreclose tort suits. A facility that fits the definition of sanitation facility because it is a device for the collection of storm water remains a sanitation facility whether or not it contains storm water on a particular occasion. City of Longmont v. Henry-Hobbs, 50 P.3d 906 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to 24-10-103).

Claims regarding an unsafe design of a drainage ditch fall within the provision of the CGIA, subsection (1)(f), that allows suit for injuries resulting from the operation and maintenance of a sanitation facility. City of Colo. Springs v. Powell, 48 P.3d 561 (Colo. 2002) (decided prior to 2003 amendments to 24-10-103).

The urban drainage and flood control district does not "operate or maintain" a "sanitation facility" within the meaning of this section; therefore, the district does not waive its sovereign immunity. Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage & Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941 (Colo. App. 2003).

By placing "gas facility" in the context of other public utilities in subsection (1)(f), the general assembly has expressed its intent to restrict the definition of that term to include only facilities that distribute natural gas rather than gasoline. Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1996); Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

Synthetic gas produced by a gas facility is a gas for purposes of subsection (1)(f). Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

Coal gasification plant for city's gas department is a "public gas facility" within the meaning of subsection (1)(f). Although the CGIA does not define "public gas facility", by placing "gas facility" in the context of other public utilities, the general assembly expressed its intent to include, for purposes of immunity, facilities that distribute gaseous fuel to the public primarily for use in heating and illumination. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

The plant produced a gaseous fuel distributed to the public primarily for use in illumination. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

Coal tar contamination generated through the operation of a coal gasification plant constituted injury from the operation or maintenance of a public gas facility, and immunity is therefore waived under subsection (1)(f). Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.

An electrical vault on private property used as a restaurant is a public electrical facility for purposes of subsections (1)(e) and (1)(f); there is a public benefit from the usage of the electricity because the general public patronizes the restaurant and because the use of transformers located in such electrical vaults promotes the efficient delivery of electrical power in the town. Ellis v. Town of Estes Park, 66 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2002).

Phrase "public water facility" includes a water meter pit. Montoya v. City of Westminster Dept. of Pub. Works, 181 P.3d 1197 (Colo. App. 2008).

Operation of public water facility. Condemnation of fishing rights for recreational use does not fall within this exception to sovereign immunity. Aurora v. Commerce Group Corp., 694 P.2d 382 (Colo. App. 1984).

Lake in city park does not fall within the definition of a public water facility or swimming facility under subsection (1)(f). DeAnzona v. City & County of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2000).

Ride at amusement park constituted a "swimming facility" for purposes of waiving immunity under subsection (1)(f). Water-themed adventure ride supervised by trained lifeguards in which participants generally wear bathing suits and ride a sled down a track, glide part way across a pool of water, and, after coming to a stop in the pool, swim a short distance and then walk out of the pool constitutes a swimming facility. Anderson v. Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 119 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2004).

A golf cart owned and maintained by a recreation district is not a "facility" for purposes of this section. Montes v. Hyland Hills Park, 849 P.2d 852 (Colo. App. 1992).

III. SUBSECTION (1.5).

The state is exposed to significant liability if negligence actions by prisoners are allowed, because of the unique nature of prisons and the obligations imposed in operating them. Subsection (1.5) recognizes the potential liability of the state, eliminates the potential exposure to this liability, and prevents the state from being subjected to frivolous lawsuits that may be brought by inmates. Davis v. Paolino, 21 P.3d 870 (Colo. App. 2001).

The waiver of immunity in subsection (1.5)(b) applies to both intentional torts and acts of negligence. Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828.

Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment -- an intentional tort -- was not barred. Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828.

The statutory language waiving immunity for "claimants who are incarcerated but not yet convicted" and who "can show injury due to negligence" sets a floor, not a ceiling. Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, 506 P.3d 828.

Immunity is waived where claimant pled guilty to a criminal charge and received a sentence of supervised probation, but was not sentenced to incarceration. Montoya v. Newman, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1263 (D. Colo. 2015).

Applied in Duke v. Gunnison County, 2019 COA 170, 456 P.3d 38; Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 COA 106, 522 P.3d 255.

IV. SUBSECTION (2).

Running a red light without slowing down is not "within the provisions of" 42-4-108 (2)(b); therefore, the government may be held liable for an accident resulting from such conduct. Tunget v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. App. 1999).

Individual defendants were not immune from liability pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) for negligent acts committed in course of operating correctional facility, and, therefore, state is not immune pursuant to this section. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).

V. SUBSECTION (3).

Individual defendants were not immune from liability pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) for negligent acts committed in the course of operating a correctional facility and, therefore, state is not immune under governmental immunity pursuant to this section. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).

VI. SUBSECTION (4).

Subsection (4) bars trespass claims in damage actions against public water or public sanitation facilities. In actions for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of, or the operation and maintenance of, a public water facility or public sanitation facility, subsection (4) operates to bar claims that would otherwise allow recovery without a showing of negligence. Colorado law does not recognize negligence-based trespass claims. Accordingly, allowing plaintiffs to pursue a trespass claim in this case is directly at odds with the requirement in subsection (4) that negligence be proven to establish liability in such actions. Lawrence v. Buena Vista Sanitation Dist. 989 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1999).

Subsection (4) bars trespass and nuisance claims against a board of county commissioners. Langlois v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 78 P.3d 1154 (Colo. App. 2003).