Previous  Next

18-3-306. Internet luring of a child.

Statute text

(1) An actor commits internet luring of a child if the actor knowingly communicates over a computer or computer network, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message to a person who the actor knows or believes to be under fifteen years of age and, in that communication or in any subsequent communication by computer, computer network, telephone network, data network, text message, or instant message, describes explicit sexual conduct as defined in section 18-6-403 (2)(e), and, in connection with that description, makes a statement persuading or inviting the person to meet the actor for any purpose, and the actor is more than four years older than the person or than the age the actor believes the person to be.

(2) It shall not be a defense to this section that a meeting did not occur.

(a) and (b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 1688, 8, effective July 1, 2007.)

(3) Internet luring of a child is a class 5 felony; except that luring of a child is a class 4 felony if committed with the intent to meet for the purpose of engaging in sexual exploitation as defined in section 18-6-403 or sexual contact as defined in section 18-3-401.

(4) For purposes of this section, "in connection with" means communications that further, advance, promote, or have a continuity of purpose and may occur before, during, or after the invitation to meet.


Source: L. 2006: Entire section added, p. 2055, 4, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1688, 8, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1) amended, (HB 09-1132), ch. 341, p. 1792, 2, effective July 1.





The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The statute does not suppress a large amount of speech subject to constitutional protection. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).

The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. A person of common intelligence can determine what is prohibited by the statute. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).

The statute does not violate the dormant commerce clause. Since the statute regulates conduct by adults who send sexually explicit messages that endanger the welfare of minors, there is no legitimate commerce that would be limited by the statute. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).

The statute as applied to defendant was not unconstitutional. The record contains numerous sexually explicit messages from the defendant that were obscene in nature. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).

Convictions for internet luring of a child and internet sexual exploitation of a child under a complicity theory vacated because prosecution failed to prove that defendant committed the crimes or that defendant acted as an accomplice to a principal who committed the crimes. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57, 296 P.3d 234.



Editor's note: This title was repealed and reenacted in 1971, and this part 4 was subsequently repealed and reenacted in 1975, resulting in the addition, relocation, and elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this part 4 prior to 1975, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume and the editor's note following the title heading. Former C.R.S. section numbers prior to 1975 are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.


Cross references: For introduction of evidence of similar acts or transactions by a defendant prosecuted pursuant to this part 4, see 16-10-301.