13-80-103. General limitation of actions - one year.
Statute text
(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
(a) The following tort actions: Assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, libel, and slander;
(b) All actions for escape of prisoners;
(c) All actions against sheriffs, coroners, police officers, firefighters, national guardsmen, or any other law enforcement authority;
(d) All actions for any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statutes;
(e) All actions under the "Motor Vehicle Repair Act of 1977", article 9 of title 42, C.R.S.;
(f) and (g) Repealed.
(h) All actions against a person alleging liability for a penalty for commission of a class A or a class B traffic infraction, as defined in section 42-4-1701; and
(i) All actions against a person alleging liability for a penalty for commission of a civil infraction, as described in section 16-2.3-101.
History
Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 696, 1, effective July 1; (1)(f) added, p. 707, 3, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(f) amended and (1)(g) added, p. 538, 11, effective July 1; (1)(f) amended and (1)(g) added, p. 567, 3, effective July 1; (1)(h) added, p. 1495, 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(e) and (1)(h) amended, p. 2550, 34, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1)(f) repealed, p. 3, 5, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2017: (1)(g) repealed, (SB 17-294), ch. 264, p. 1391, 28, effective May 25. L. 2022: (1)(i) added, (HB 22-1229), ch. 68, p. 340, 7, effective March 1.
Annotations
Editor's note: (1) The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1986. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
(2) Section 47 of chapter 68 (HB 22-1229), Session Laws of Colorado 2022, provides that the act adding subsection (1)(i) is effective March 1, 2022, but the governor did not approve the act until April 7, 2022.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Analysis
I. General Consideration.
II. Paragraph (a).
A. Assault and Battery.
B. False Arrest.
C. Libel.
III. Paragraph (c).
IV. Paragraph (d).
Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 38 Dicta 133 (1961).
Annotator's note. For cases concerning when a cause of action accrues under this section, see the annotations to 13-80-108.
Held constitutional. This section does not violate due process and is not unconstitutionally vague because of its failure to include or incorporate a definition of the term "any other law enforcement authority." Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 870 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1993).
A statute of limitations is enacted for the purpose of promoting justice, discouraging unnecessary delay, and forestalling the prosecution of stale claims. Klamm Shell v. Berg, 165 Colo. 540, 441 P.2d 10 (1968).
Assertion of defense held timely filed. Where plaintiffs file an amended complaint and defendants interpose the affirmative defense of statute of limitations for the first time in their amended answer to the amended complaint, the defense is timely filed. Griffen v. Pate, 644 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1981).
CRS 53, 135-4-2 (now 2-5-124), had the effect of reenacting former 13-80-102, 13-80-116, and 13-81-103(1)(c) despite repealing clause of 1939 act originally enacting 13-81-103. Kuckler v. Whisler, 191 Colo. 260, 552 P.2d 18 (1976).
Filing of an equal employment opportunity commission action does not operate to toll the one-year limit of former section. Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887 (D. Colo. 1982).
For inapplicability of this section when gist of cause of action is conspiracy, see Clark v. Machette, 92 Colo. 365, 21 P.2d 182 (1933).
Applied in Williams v. Burns, 463 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Colo. 1979); Ellis v. Rocky Mt. Empire Sports, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 166, 602 P.2d 895 (1979); Griffin v. Pate, 644 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1981); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo. 1982); Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982); Marlandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S. Ct. 92, 78 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1983); Russell v. McMillen, 685 P.2d 255 (Colo. App. 1984).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-103 (1)(a) is similar to former 13-80-102 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (a).
Where evidence shows no negligence, action must be for assault and subject to this section. Where plaintiff brings action to recover for injuries received as result of being beaten by defendant, and where complaint alleges negligence on part of defendant, but evidence indicates that beating was intentional and that no element of negligence was involved, action is founded on assault and is subject to one-year statute of limitations. Maes v. Tuttoilmondo, 31 Colo. App. 248, 502 P.2d 427 (1972).
Statute will not apply when defendant's assault causes delay. To apply the one-year statute of limitations rigidly to a situation where a plaintiff is rendered insane as a result of an assault and battery which condition prevents a timely filing of an action against the intentional tortfeasor would result in callous injustice. Rather than promoting justice, the statute of limitations would then become an effective instrument for injustice. When this situation occurs, trial courts properly may turn to estoppel or fashion an equitable exception to the statutory limitation period. Klamm Shell v. Berg, 165 Colo. 540, 441 P.2d 10 (1968).
One-year limitation period did not apply to complaint alleging negligent supervision arising out of a fight at a company-sponsored Christmas party. Bradley v. Guess, 797 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1989).
Statute not tolled. The fact that a professional team did not permit service of process on a team member at the team facility during the season or the preseason training camp did not toll the statute of limitations for an alleged assault and battery. MacMillian v. Bruce, 900 P.2d 131 (Colo. 1995).
Outrageous conduct is a separate tort, even though it may be premised on conduct amounting to a battery. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations under 13-80-102 is two years from the date of accrual for outrageous conduct, rather than the one year limit under this section for battery. Winkler v. Rocky Mtn. Conference, 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. App. 1995).
Further, where a claim may be pursued on two theories having different limitations, the longer limitation applies. Winkler v. Rocky Mtn. Conference, 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. App. 1995).
An action for damages for malicious prosecution is not an action for false arrest and barred by the one-year statute of this section. Lowen v. Hilton, 142 Colo. 200, 351 P.2d 881 (1960).
By this section actions for slander and libel must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues or they are barred. Bush v. McMann, 12 Colo. App. 504, 55 P. 956 (1899).
Even "new" claims must be asserted within the one year. In action for libel, where counts one and two in amended complaint constitute "new" claims, and are not asserted against defendant within one year after the cause of action accrued, the courts are now barred by the provision of this section. Walker v. Associated Press, 160 Colo. 361, 417 P.2d 486 (1966).
Libel claim barred if filed after statute has run. The relation back doctrine, in C.R.C.P. 15(c) does not permit a party to maintain a claim for libel filed after the statute of limitations in this section has run. Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 629 P.2d 1100 (Colo. App. 1981).
Each publication of a defamatory statement must be pled as a separate claim for limitations purposes under this section. Corporon v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 708 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1985).
Plaintiff knew, or should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the injury to his reputation and the cause of that injury; consequently, because the complaint was filed more than two years after plaintiff learned of the statements, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for libel, slander, and outrageous conduct as barred by subsection (1)(a) and 13-80-102 (1)(a). Taylor v. Goldsmith, 870 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1994).
Trial court erred in determining that plaintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of limitations when complaint alleges facts that show complaint was filed within the statutory time limitations. Burke v. Greene, 963 P.2d 1119 (Colo. App. 1998).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-103 (1)(c) is similar to former 13-80-103 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (c).
This section is framed in the interest of the official named and his bondsmen. People ex rel. Tritch v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 25 P. 302 (1890).
The purpose of this section is to prevent annoyance and injustice through the prosecution against the officers mentioned of stale demands predicated upon official neglect or other misconduct. People ex rel. Tritch v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 25 P. 302 (1890).
If possible, it should be so construed as also to protect litigants from remediless wrongs. People ex rel. Tritch v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 25 P. 302 (1890).
When the wrong committed by the sheriff furnishes the real and substantial foundation of the cause of action this section is applicable. People v. Putnam, 52 Colo. 517, 122 P. 796 (1912).
A cause of action only accrues when a sheriff's negligence or misconduct prevents or retards the vindication of a private right. People ex rel. Tritch v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 25 P. 302 (1890).
The term "sheriff" is used in its generic sense and includes the whole class of officers performing the duties of the office of sheriff and includes deputy sheriff. Bailey v. Clausen, 192 Colo. 297, 557 P.2d 1207 (1976).
"Any other law enforcement authority" encompasses all peace officers included in the compilation of state-recognized law enforcement authorities contained in 18-1-901. Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 870 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd, 892 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1995).
Because peace officers are granted the authority to enforce state law, they are "law enforcement authorities" for purposes of subsection (1)(c). Under 16-2.5-135 the executive director of the department of corrections, a warden, a corrections officer employed by the department, or other department employee assigned by the executive director, is a peace officer while engaged in the performance of his or her duties pursuant to title 17. Therefore, the executive director of the department, a warden of a correctional facility, a correctional facility hearing officer, and corrections officers are law enforcement authorities for purposes of subsection (1)(c). Garcia v. Harms, 2014 COA 154, 410 P.3d 561.
Paragraph applicable to sheriff's actions regardless of whether they are secured by bond. Cain v. Guzman, 761 P.2d 295 (Colo. App. 1988).
Receipt of investigative report is not the time at which cause of action accrues where party alleging injury filed notice stating injury occurred on a different, earlier date and complaint substantiated the earlier date. Mosher v. City of Lakewood, 807 P.2d 1235 (Colo. App. 1991).
Internal investigation by city would not have resulted in any civil relief to plaintiff and exhaustion of those procedures was not required as a necessary condition precedent to the institution of a legal action against the defendants. Mosher v. City of Lakewood, 807 P.2d 1235 (Colo. App. 1991).
One-year statute of limitation did apply to claims against police officer whose police dog attacked neighbor. Even though officer was off-duty at time, he was still acting in his official capacity because he was required by departmental policy to keep the police dog at his home. Kliewer by and through Kliewer v. Sopata, 797 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Colo. 1992).
Section 13-80-101 (1)(j) applies to tort actions brought against a sheriff's department arising from an alleged automobile accident involving a departmental vehicle. Because statutes of limitation are in derogation of a valid claim, the longer period of limitations in 13-80-103 (1)(j) should prevail over the shorter period in paragraph (c) which could arguably be applicable in this situation. Reider v. Dawson, 856 P.2d 31 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994).
Even though an underlying negligence action against a city's employee is barred under subsection (1)(c), a negligence action against the city based on respondeat superior is not barred under 13-80-102 (1)(h). Gallegos v. City of Monte Vista, 976 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1998).
Trial court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations to a 1983 action asserted against a corrections employee. The appropriate period is the 2-year limitation period of 13-80-102. Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-103 (1)(d) is similar to former 13-80-104 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this paragraph (d).
Action must be brought within one year after commission of offense. Where an action was not brought until the expiration of one year after the offense was committed, plaintiff had no cause of action for the "penalty". Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Tanner, 19 Colo. 559, 36 P. 541 (1894); Morris v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 416, 139 P. 582 (1914).
Statute of limitations is jurisdictional. The statute authorizing forfeiture for a public nuisance is penal in nature. In an action premised on a penal statute as opposed to a civil claim, the statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature, in that it specifies the time period during which a cause of action exists. Since the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, it may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, including a motion to dismiss. People v. Steinberg, 672 P.2d 543 (Colo. App. 1983).
In order for this section to apply, the action must have been brought to enforce a "penalty" provided for by statute. Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1977); Dorney v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1980).
This section held not to apply to a forfeiture of workers' compensation benefits under 8-42-402 because such forfeiture applied automatically upon conviction. Wolford v. Pinnacol Assurance, 81 P.3d 1079 (Colo. App. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 107 P.3d 947 (Colo. 2005).
Exemplary damages in this state constitute a penalty provided for by statute. Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1977).
The one-year limitation of this section applies to prayers for punitive damages. Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1977); Dorney v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1980).
Special one-year limitation in section applies to actions created by penal statutes, not prayers for damages arising out of claims for relief not based on penal statutes. Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257 (D. Colo. 1980).
Prayer for punitive or exemplary damages is not "claim" at all, in the sense of a claim for relief or cause of action to which a statute of limitations is directed. Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257 (D. Colo. 1980).
A claim for punitive damages is not barred by this section where the claim is based on an underlying tort claim, and is not just a suit for a penalty. Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983).
Claim for exemplary damages premised on 13-21-102 is not an action for a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of this section and is thus not barred. Adams v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 686 P.2d 797 (Colo. App. 1983).
This section does not apply to exemplary damage claims. Moon v. Platte Valley Bank, 634 P.2d 1036 (Colo. App. 1981).
Claim for punitive damages under 13-21-102, being ancillary to an independent civil claim for actual damages, is not an action for the recovery of a penalty of a penal statute within the intendment of the one year limitation period of this section. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
Claim must sustain cause independent of tort action. Where plaintiff's claim for exemplary damages was incapable of sustaining an independent cause of action but instead was dependent upon the underlying tort claim, plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was not a suit or action for a penalty or forfeiture. Dorney v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1980).
Claim alleging violation of fiduciary duties not action for penalty or forfeiture. Plaintiff's claim for relief alleging violation of fiduciary duties by the defendant, and seeking punitive damages for actions allegedly attended by circumstances of fraud, insult, and wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights was not an action for a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of this section. Res. Exploration & Mining, Inc. v. Itel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1980).
Nor claim based upon 13-21-102. This section does not apply to exemplary damage claims. Moon v. Platte Valley Bank, 634 P.2d 1036 (Colo. App. 1981).
Punitive damages. Claims for punitive damages under 13-21-102, being ancillary to an independent civil claim for actual damages, is not an action for the recovery of a penalty of a penal statute within the intendment of the limitation period of this section. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
Penalty may be provided for in separate statute. Where the general assembly has selected a one-year limitation period for statutes providing for penalties, it is inconsequential whether the penalty is provided for within the statute establishing the underlying cause of action, or in a separate statute which is parasitic to the existence of the underlying cause of action. The legislative intent to penalize and the legislative intent to limit the time within which such penalty actions may be brought remain the same. Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1977).
While this section has been applied to statutes which contain both a substantive cause of action and a penalty provision for noncompliance, there is no indication that it is limited to such applications. Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1977).
This section applies to recovery of penalty for unjust discrimination in freight charges. Section 40-31-102 providing for the recovery of a penalty for unjust discrimination in the matter of freight charges was held subject to this section. Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry., 35 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1888).
This section applies to a claim pursuant to 1132(c) of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, since the most analogous state law claim is a claim for civil penalties pursuant to a penal statute. Adams v. Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (D. Colo. 1999).
For inapplicability of this section to a private treble damage suit under federal antitrust laws, see Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952).
This section does not apply to proceeding before public utilities commission seeking reparation for excessive charges for service. Bonfils v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920).
This section does not apply to penalties for nonpayment of taxes. Penalties that are added to taxes as damages or interest on account of nonpayment are not such penalties as are contemplated by this section. Pinnacle Gold Mining Co. v. People, 58 Colo. 86, 143 P. 837 (1914).
This section does not apply to an action on behalf of the state under 6-1-112. Section 6-1-115 controls as the more specific statute. State ex rel. Weiser v. Castle Law Group, 2019 COA 49, 457 P.3d 699.
Statute is not suspended by institution of suit by foreign corporation which failed to pay privilege tax. The attempted institution of an action in the courts of Colorado by a corporation organized under the laws of another state, which has not paid the privilege fee imposed by the statute, has not the effect to stay the course of the statute of limitations. When the statutory period has elapsed the action is barred even though during the whole of that period the action appeared upon the docket of the court as a pending action, and the corporation afterwards paid the tax. W. Elec. Co. v. Pickett, 51 Colo. 415, 118 P. 988 (1911).
A general denial presents the defense of the limitation prescribed by this section. W. Elec. Co. v. Pickett, 51 Colo. 415, 118 P. 988 (1911).
Rule that statute is deemed waived if not pleaded does not apply. The general rule in civil actions that the statute of limitations is a special privilege, and must be pleaded in apt time, or is deemed waived, does not apply to penal actions. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Tanner, 19 Colo. 559, 36 P. 541 (1894).
If plaintiff fails to bring suit in a year, he has no cause of action. When a penal statute gives plaintiff the right to recover a penalty by suing for it, this section makes his cause of action dependent upon his bringing suit within a certain period; so that if he fails to bring his suit within such period he has no cause of action remaining. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Tanner, 19 Colo. 559, 36 P. 541 (1894).
The treble damages provision of 38-12-103, being penal in nature, is governed by the one-year statute of limitations; however, the recovery of the actual security deposit and the award of attorney's fees, being remedial in nature, are limited by the six-year statute of limitations. Carlson v. McCoy, 193 Colo. 391, 566 P.2d 1073 (1977).
The limitation period for actions for a penalty or forfeiture under penal statutes does not run against the state, in accordance with the general rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the state unless the statute specifically or by necessary implication so provides. Gibbs v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 883 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1994).
The legislature did not intend for the one-year statute of limitations found in subsection (1)(d) to apply to 10-3-1116 (1). The three-part test described in Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198 (Colo. 2008), is not applicable when the intent of the legislature is clear that a particular cause of action is or is not governed by a certain statute of limitations. Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 CO 44, 418 P.3d 1173.