Statute text
Articles 40 to 47 of this title shall be known and may be cited as the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado".
History
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 468, 1, effective July 1.
Annotations
Editor's note: This section is similar to former 8-40-101 as it existed prior to 1990.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Analysis
I. General Consideration.
II. Purposes of the Act.
III. Construction of the Act.
Law reviews. For article, "Workmen's Compensation Law", see 1 Den. B. Ass'n Rec. 4 (1924). For article, "Practice and Procedure Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Colorado", see 6 Dicta 3 (1929). For article, "Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation", see 20 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1947) and 20 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 117 (1948). For comment on Continental Oil Co. v. Sirhall appearing below, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 364 (1951). For article, "Damages, Workmen's Compensation and Labor Law", see 31 Dicta 460 (1954). For symposium article on workmen's compensation, see 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 397 (1959). For article, "One Year Review of Corporations, Partnership and Agency", see 37 Dicta 11 (1960). For article, "One Year Review of Torts", see 38 Dicta 93 (1961). For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law -- 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For article, "Primer on Permanent Disability in the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Law", see 57 Den. L.J. 573 (1980). For article, "Labor Law", see 59 Den. L.J. 319 (1982). For article, "Conflict Between Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy and Common Law Actions for Psychic Injuries", see 14 Colo. Law 1992 (1985). For article, "Work-Related Stress Claims", see 18 Colo. Law. 1529 (1989). For article, "Workers' Compensation Fraud: 'Trashing the System'", see 20 Colo. Law. 1119 (1991).
Annotator's note. Since 8-40-101 is similar to 8-40-101 as it existed prior to the 1990 repeal and reenactment of the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of title 8, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.
Act does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Difference in methods of calculating benefits for partial and total injuries is rationally related to the governmental interest in providing benefits efficiently and fairly, notwithstanding that the classification is not perfect and that inequality may result in individual cases. Duran v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 883 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1994).
Because the workers' compensation act implicates no fundamental rights, the rational basis test provides the appropriate gauge in determining whether a statutory classification comports with equal protection. Young v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 969 P.2d 735 (Colo. App. 1998).
The workmen's compensation act was passed under the police power of the state. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Indus. Comm'n, 66 Colo. 580, 185 P. 348 (1919).
The workmen's compensation act deals exclusively with matters growing out of the relationship of employer and employee, and is binding only upon such as elect to come within its provisions. All others are strangers to the act and their usual lawful rights and remedies are unaffected by it. Rocky Mt. Fuel Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 105 Colo. 220, 96 P.2d 413 (1939).
Applied in Riley v. Indus. Comm'n, 628 P.2d 147 (Colo. App. 1981).
The purpose of the act is to protect all workmen, save those specifically excluded, and provide an award of compensation in favor of an injured employee against all persons who may be liable therefor. Empire Zinc Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 102 Colo. 26, 77 P.2d 130 (1938); Sechler v. Pastore, 103 Colo. 139, 84 P.2d 61 (1938); Fast Freight v. Walker, 103 Colo. 347, 85 P.2d 720 (1938); Drake v. Hodges, 114 Colo. 10, 161 P.2d 338 (1945); Univ. of Denver v. Memeht, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967).
The purpose of the workmen's compensation act is to protect employees who sustain injuries arising out of their employment. Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo. 1982).
The purpose of the act is to speedily and justly compensate employees for injuries incurred in performing their jobs regardless of the fault of the employee or the employer. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United Cable Television of Jeffco, Inc., 816 P.2d 289 (Colo. App. 1991).
The purpose of the Act is to provide the exclusive remedy to a covered employee for injuries sustained while performing services arising out of and in the course of employment and which are proximately caused by injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment. Ferris v. Local 26, 867 P.2d 38 (Colo. App. 1993).
Purposes of act, as stated in 1991 repeal and reenactment, cited in Duran v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 883 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1994).
The act provides a remedy in areas where remedies do not exist at common law. Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co., 142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044 (1960).
Another purpose of the workmen's compensation act is to provide a method whereby claims arising out of industrial accidents may be speedily resolved. Stanley Hotel v. Thomas, 153 Colo. 503, 387 P.2d 27 (1963); Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo. 1982).
Primary purpose of the workmen's compensation act is to afford workmen compensation for job-related injuries, regardless of fault. Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, 510 P.2d 891 (1973).
Compensation legislation is a system of benefits one of whose independent social objectives is to prevent destitution among dependents of workmen who lose their lives in industrial activity. In re Hampton v. State, 31 Colo. App. 141, 500 P.2d 1186 (1972).
Employee is compensated and employer immunized from common-law claims. The workmen's compensation act grants the employee compensation from the employer, even though the employee may be negligent and even if the employer is not negligent. In return, the employer who is responsible under the workmen's compensation act is granted immunity from common-law claims. Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, 510 P.2d 891 (1973).
But workmen's compensation act is not to shield third-party tortfeasors from liability for damages resulting from their negligence. Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, 510 P.2d 891 (1973).
Consideration of the mental state of a third party is consistent with no-fault character of workers' compensation act, as it is the fault of the claimant and employer that is generally disregarded. Bralish v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1091 (Colo. App. 2003).
Bad-faith handling of a claim by an insurer is similarly not a risk contemplated by the general coverage provisions of the act. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); McKelvy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 983 P.2d 42 (Colo. App. 1998).
Independent insurance adjusting firm, acting on behalf of a self-insured employer, owes a duty of good faith to an injured claimant in investigating and processing a claim despite lack of contractual privity. Johnson v. Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc., 797 P.2d 786 (Colo. App. 1990), aff'd, 821 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991).
Retaliation violates public policy. Since an employee is granted the specific right to apply for and receive compensation under this Act, an employer's retaliation for the exercise of such right violates public policy and provides the basis for a common-law claim by the employee to recover damages sustained by him as a result of that violation. Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo. App. 1989).
Annotator's note. Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to the industrial commission were decided prior to the 1969 amendment which vested the director of the division of labor with the power, previously exercised by the industrial commission, to enforce and administer the workmen's compensation act.
Act to be liberally construed. The workmen's compensation act is highly remedial and beneficent in purpose, and should be liberally construed so as to accomplish its evident intent and purpose. Indus. Comm'n v. Johnson, 64 Colo. 461, 172 P. 422 (1918); Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 65 Colo. 283, 176 P. 314 (1918); Karoly v. Indus. Comm'n, 65 Colo. 239, 176 P. 284 (1918); Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 84 Colo. 481, 271 P. 617 (1928); Danielson v. Indus. Comm'n, 96 Colo. 522, 44 P.2d 1011 (1935); McBride v. Indus. Comm'n, 97 Colo. 166, 49 P.2d 386 (1935); McNeil Coal Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 105 Colo. 263, 96 P.2d 889 (1939); Skjoldahl v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 140, 113 P.2d 871 (1941); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 111 Colo. 470, 143 P.2d 267 (1943); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 114 Colo. 91, 162 P.2d 413 (1945); Arvas v. McNeil Coal Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949); Nat'l Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950); Cont'l Oil Co. v. Sirhall, 122 Colo. 332, 222 P.2d 612 (1950); L.B. Cole Produce Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 123 Colo. 278, 228 P.2d 808 (1951); Indus. Comm'n v. Golden Cycle Corp., 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d 902 (1952); Indus. Comm'n v. Corwin Hosp., 126 Colo. 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952); Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Indus. Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957); Graden Coal Co. v. Yturralde, 137 Colo. 527, 328 P.2d 105 (1958); Univ. of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959); Indus. Comm'n v. Baldwin, 139 Colo. 268, 338 P.2d 103 (1959); Snyder v. Indus. Comm'n, 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959); Idarado Mining Co. v. Barnes, 148 Colo. 166, 365 P.2d 36 (1961); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Faulk, 158 Colo. 441, 407 P.2d 348 (1965); In re Hampton v. State, 31 Colo. App. 141, 500 P.2d 1186 (1972); James v. Irrigation Motor & Pump Co., 180 Colo. 195, 503 P.2d 1025 (1972); Conley v. Indus. Comm'n, 43 Colo. App. 10, 601 P.2d 648 (1979); Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1985).
The workmen's compensation laws are to be liberally construed to accomplish the beneficent social and protective purposes of such enactments. Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 34 Colo. App. 434, 528 P.2d 966 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 190 Colo. 138, 546 P.2d 481 (1975); Mtn. City Meat Co. v. Oqueda, 919 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1996).
The workmen's compensation act is broadly and liberally construed so as to provide just compensation for workmen and their families for injuries during employment. Finnerman v. McCormick, 499 F.2d 212 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 95 S. Ct. 624, 42 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1974).
The act is remedial and beneficent in purpose, and should be liberally construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose of assisting injured workers and their families. Colo. Counties, Inc. v. Davis, 801 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1990).
The courts will construe the workmen's compensation law and interpret the legislative intent as it may appear from a consideration of the purpose and intent of the entire enactment. Univ. of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959).
The workmen's compensation provisions must not be pushed beyond the limits of their purpose, nor its funds diverted to those not clearly entitled thereto. Indus. Comm'n v. Baldwin, 139 Colo. 268, 338 P.2d 103 (1959).
Nonexistent provision may not be read into the act. The provision that the workmen's compensation act shall be liberally construed cannot be extended to clothe the court with power to read into it a provision which does not exist. Maley v. Martin, 111 Colo. 545, 144 P.2d 558 (1943); Md. Cas. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 116 Colo. 58, 178 P.2d 426 (1947); Snyder v. Indus. Comm'n, 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959).
The tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy does not arise under the workers' compensation laws of Colorado. Rundle v. Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (D. Colo. 2001).
Where the provisions of the workmen's compensation act do not expressly limit the employee with respect to remedies, a court is not disposed to read or interpret such limitations into this act. Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co., 142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044 (1960).
However, consideration of the statute as a whole, together with its clear legislative intent, may persuade a court to impose such a limitation. Buzard v. Super Walls, Inc., 681 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1984).
And hypertechnical refinements in construction should be avoided. In order to carry out the intended purpose of the workmen's compensation act, it is necessary to avoid hypertechnical refinements in the construction of the terms and provisions of the act, especially where there is no prejudice to the employer. City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967); Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1985).
Mandatory provisions cannot be ignored. The doctrine of liberal construction to be applied to the act does not clothe the industrial commission with power to ignore its mandatory provisions. Stahura v. Indus. Comm'n, 103 Colo. 451, 86 P.2d 1080 (1939).
All portions should be construed together. To give full import to the purposes of the workmen's compensation act, all portions thereof should be read together and harmonized if possible. McBride v. Indus. Comm'n, 97 Colo. 166, 49 P.2d 386 (1935).
In workers' compensation cases, the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties are determined by the statute in effect at the time of a claimant's injury, while procedural changes in the statute become effective during the pendency of a claim. Am. Comp. Ins. Co. v. McBride, 107 P.3d 973 (Colo. App. 2004); Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth. v. Jones, 131 P.3d 1074 (Colo. App. 2005); Brownson-Rausin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 131 P.3d 1172 (Colo. App. 2005).
Workers' compensation carrier is responsible for pro rata payment of plaintiff's attorney fees and costs in third-party action, where carrier is subrogated against third-party tortfeasor, despite no active contribution by carrier to the prosecution of the claim or its settlement. Colo. Counties, Inc. v. Davis, 801 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1990).
Both the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act and this act apply when a person is injured in an auto accident during the course and scope of employment. County Workers Comp. Pool v. Folk, 895 P.2d 1083 (Colo. App. 1994).