27-65-101. Legislative declaration.
Statute text
(1) The general assembly declares that the purposes of this article 65 are:
(a) To secure for each person with a mental health disorder such care and treatment suited to the person's needs and to ensure that the care and treatment are skillfully and humanely administered with full respect for the person's dignity and personal integrity;
(b) To deprive a person of the person's liberty for purposes of care or treatment only when less restrictive alternatives are unavailable and only when the person's safety or the safety of others is endangered;
(c) To provide the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity, and other rights to persons undergoing care and treatment for a mental health disorder;
(d) To encourage the use of voluntary, rather than coercive, measures to provide care and treatment for mental health disorders and to provide the care and treatment in the least restrictive setting;
(e) To provide appropriate information to family members concerning the location and fact of admission of a person with a mental health disorder to inpatient or residential care and treatment;
(f) To encourage the appropriate participation of family members in the care and treatment of a person with a mental health disorder and, when appropriate, to provide information to family members in order to facilitate that participation; and
(g) To facilitate the recovery and resiliency of each person who receives care and treatment pursuant to this article 65.
(2) To carry out these purposes, the provisions of this article 65 must be liberally construed.
History
Source: L. 2022: Entire article amended with relocations, (HB 22-1256), ch. 451, p. 3170, 1, effective August 10.
Annotations
Editor's note: This section is similar to former 27-65-101 as it existed prior to 2022.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Law reviews. For article, "Patients' Rights vs. Patients' Needs: The Right of the Mentally Ill to Refuse Treatment in Colorado", see 58 Den. L.J. 567 (1981).
Annotator's note. Since 27-65-101 is similar to 27-10-101 as it existed prior to the 2010 amendments to this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.
The intent of this article is to provide services to all mentally ill persons, as defined, not just to those persons who are so mentally ill as to be gravely disabled or an imminent danger to themselves or others. Goebel v. Colo. Dept. of Institutions, 830 P.2d 1036 (Colo. 1992).
The statutory scheme for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons is calculated (1) to provide care and treatment adequately suited to the needs of patients in a dignified and least restrictive manner and (2) to ensure against premature release of patients when that release would pose a likely risk of serious bodily harm to the patient or others as a result of the patient's mental condition. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); People in Interest of Reynes, 870 P.2d 518 (Colo. App. 1993).
Difference from criminal commitment not violative of equal protection. The differences in the commitment procedures and standards of release for criminal and civil commitments do not violate equal protection of the laws. People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981).
Entire tenor of this article is to recognize and protect the dignity and legal rights of patients treated pursuant to its provisions. Goedecke v. State Dept. of Insts., 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979).
Concern of general assembly was to devise system which protects rights of the individual while, at the same time, creating a method to discover the truth of the patient's mental illness and whether this illness causes the individual to be a danger to others or to himself or to be gravely disabled. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).
This article applies to both voluntary and involuntary patients. Goebel v. Colo. Dept. of Institutions, 764 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1988); Goebel v. Colo. Dept. of Institutions, 830 P.2d 1036 (Colo. 1992).
Primary purpose of civil commitment is to secure such treatment as is suited to the needs of the person under conditions which are as least restrictive of liberty as practicable. People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981).
This act applies to those who are mentally ill and seek treatment before they become so mentally ill as to be dangerous or gravely disabled. Goebel v. Colo. Dept. of Institutions, 830 P.2d 1036 (Colo. 1992).
Article is to be strictly construed to see that no limit is placed on a person's right to seek voluntary treatment. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).
The provisions of this article must be strictly construed because of their curtailment of personal liberty. People in Interest of Bucholz, 778 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1989).
Powers to confine carefully restrained. The state's power to confine persons on the basis of mental illness must be carefully restrained by procedural safeguards, and can be invoked only by conditions great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty. People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978).
Disability sufficient to justify involuntary commitment must arise as result of mental illness; and in keeping with the statutory purpose, it must be so grave that the person's safety is threatened by his inability to take care of his basic personal needs. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).
Mere disability alone is insufficient to warrant involuntary commitment. Mere disability alone, even if found in conjunction with mental illness, is not enough to warrant involuntary commitment. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).
Duty of a therapist to protect third persons from harm must be measured by the foreseeability of the risk and whether the danger created is sufficiently large to embrace the specific harm. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983) (decided prior to enactment of 13-21-117).
The therapist-patient relationship is one which under certain circumstances will give rise to a duty on the part of the therapist to protect third persons from harm. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983) (decided prior to enactment of 13-21-117).
For due process considerations in civil commitment proceedings, see People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981).
Less restrictive alternatives need not be considered as a condition precedent to certification. Civil commitment constitutes a severe infringement of liberty requiring due process protection. However, the statutory scheme set forth in this article contains a number of procedural safeguards that greatly reduce the inherent risk of erroneous deprivation. Therefore, due process does not require a mandatory hearing at the time of certification since the statute provides for a hearing on request. People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).
Psychologist-client privilege. In keeping with the statutory goal of securing care and treatment on an individual basis, former 27-10-120 is intended as an authorization for a psychologist to testify to observations concerning an involuntarily detained person when the issue before the court is whether the statutory conditions for certification for short-term treatment have been satisfied. People v. District Court, 797 P.2d 1259 (Colo. 1990).
Applied in People in Interest of Paiz, 43 Colo. App. 352, 603 P.2d 976 (1979); Sisneros v. District Court, 199 Colo. 179, 606 P.2d 55 (1980); People in Interest of Freeman, 636 P.2d 1334 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. White, 656 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1983).