2-4-203. Ambiguous statutes - aids in construction.

Statute text

(1) If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the general assembly, may consider among other matters:

(a) The object sought to be attained;

(b) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;

(c) The legislative history, if any;

(d) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;

(e) The consequences of a particular construction;

(f) The administrative construction of the statute;

(g) The legislative declaration or purpose.

History

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1424, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 135-1-203.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Where the natural significance of a clause is plain and unambiguous and involves no absurdity, construction is unnecessary. Lassner v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972).

Unambiguous statute is not subject to interpretation or construction. Husson v. Meeker, 812 P.2d 731 (Colo. App. 1991); Wycon Const. v. Wheat Ridge Sanitation, 870 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1993); Kenna v. Huber, 179 P.3d 189 (Colo. App. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 205 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2009).

If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction. Seaman v. Manufactured Hous. Lic. Bd., 832 P.2d 1041 (Colo. App. 1991); Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1992); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 860 P.2d 566 (Colo. App. 1993); Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1993); McCarty v. People, 874 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1994).

Only in the absence of express definitions will statutory terms be construed according to the various interpretive rules governing the construction of statutes. Moody v. Larsen, 802 P.2d 1169 (Colo. App. 1990); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).

And statutes must be construed as a whole, and the several parts of a statute reflect light upon each other. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of Am., Inc., 177 Colo. 97, 493 P.2d 660 (1972).

Statutes to be harmonized. Statutes should be interpreted, if possible, to harmonize and give meaning to other potentially conflicting statutes. People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982).

If a statute is plain and its meaning is clear it must be interpreted as written. Casados v. City & County of Denver, 832 P.2d 1048 (Colo. App. 1992); East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. Dist. Ct., 842 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992); Hohn v. Morrison, 870 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1993).

Statute should be interpreted so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts, and its words and phrases should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. In re Davisson, 797 P.2d 809 (Colo. App. 1990); People in Interest of J.L.R., 895 P.2d 1151 (Colo. App. 1995).

A court's primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislative purpose underlying the enactment. Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, (Colo. 1992); Montes v. Hyland Hills Park, 849 P.2d 852 (Colo. App. 1992).

The primary goal of statutory construction is to effect the intent of the general assembly. Water Quality Control Div. v. Casias, 843 P.2d 665 (Colo. App. 1992).

To determine legislative purpose we first look to the statutory language itself, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted and understood meaning. Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1992); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1995).

Words and phrases should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning unless the result is absurd. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bd. of City Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1985); Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1993).

When construing a statute, the court should not follow statutory construction that leads to absurd result. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1992); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1995); People in Interest of J.L.R., 895 P.2d 1151 (Colo. App. 1995).

Court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the general assembly in enacting the statute. States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1990); Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1992); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1995).

In discerning legislative intent, the court must look first to the statutory language. States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1990); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1991); R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992); Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1992); Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1993).

Legislative intent may be inferred from an examination of successive drafts of a bill or statute. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc. v. Griffin, 757 P.2d 1088 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd, 775 P.2d 555 (Colo. 1989).

If the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear, a court may look to pertinent legislative history to determine the purpose of the legislation. 24, Inc. v. Bd. of Equaliz., 800 P.2d 1366 (Colo. App. 1990); Seaman v. Manufactured Hous. Lic. Bd., 832 P.2d 1041 (Colo. App. 1991); Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1992); L.E.L. Constr. v. Goode, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994); Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107 (Colo. 1995); Fishburn v. City of Colo. Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1995).

If statutory language may be interpreted different ways and its intended scope is unclear, the court may rely on the intent of the general assembly, the circumstances under which the statute was adopted, and legislative history to determine the appropriate meaning of the statute. Gleason v. Becker-Johnson Assocs., Inc., 916 P.2d 662 (Colo. App. 1996).

If plain reading of a statute does not reveal the legislative intent, the court may interpret the statute by considering laws upon the same or similar subject. Montes v. Hyland Hills Park, 849 P.2d 852 (Colo. App. 1992).

But a court should look to the incidents of the statute itself in order to determine whether its terms have a sufficiently definite and understandable meaning, making specific reference to the group of persons to whom the statute applies, the kind of sanction imposed, the nature of the statute's subject matter, and the economic and social desirability of the statute's particular legislative policy. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of Am., Inc., 177 Colo. 97, 493 P.2d 660 (1972).

Subsequent legislation clarifying the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. BQP Indus. v. State Bd. of Equaliz., 694 P.2d 337 (Colo. App. 1984).

Later unsuccessful attempts to modify a statutory provision provide no guidance as to the legislature's intent in adopting that provision. Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1988); Three Bells Ranch v. Cache La Poudre, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1988).

Successive drafts of a bill may prove helpful in determining legislative intent in adopting provision contained in such bill. Three Bells Ranch v. Cache La Poudre, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1988).

Just and reasonable result presumed intended. In determining the intent of the general assembly in the enactment of a statute, it is presumed that a just and reasonable result is intended, and that the public interest is favored over any private interest. In making that determination, the court may consider, among other things, the consequences of a particular construction. Conrad v. City of Thornton, 36 Colo. App. 22, 536 P.2d 855 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 191 Colo. 444, 553 P.2d 822 (1976).

A statute should not be construed in a manner that would result in absurd consequences. People v. Pipkin, 762 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1988).

Ambiguities may be resolved by consideration of the objective of the general assembly in enacting the statute, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, its legislative history, and its legislative declaration or purpose. States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1990); Henderson v. RSI, Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1991).

Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. If the legislature wishes to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under the common law, it must manifest its intent either expressly or by clear implication. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1992).

Statutes may not be interpreted to abrogate the common law unless such abrogation was clearly the intent of the general assembly. Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433 (Colo. 2001); Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).

A statute is not presumed to alter the common law except to the extent that such statute expressly provides. Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 355 P.2d 117 (1960); Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433 (Colo. 2001).

Absent such clear intent, statutes must be deemed subject to the common law. Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).

Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed in favor of the person against whom their provisions are intended to be applied. Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433 (Colo. 2001); Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).

Court will generally interpret ambiguous tax statutes in favor of the taxpayer. Douglas County Bd. of Eq. v. Fidelity Castle Pines, 890 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1995).

If a statute is ambiguous, the court may determine the intent of the general assembly by considering the statute's legislative history, the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment, the problem addressed by the legislation, and the statutory remedy created to cure the problem. Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993).

If a statute is ambiguous, a court may consider a variety of factors, including the consequences of a particular construction, the legislative declaration or purpose, and the administrative construction of the statute. Hallam v. City of Colo. Springs, 914 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1995).

If the language of a statute is unclear, the court may rely on several indicators, including the object that the legislature sought to obtain by its enactment, the circumstances under which it was adopted, and the consequences of a particular construction. State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1993).

Consideration of title of act. The title of legislation is relevant to the determination of legislative intent. L.E.L. Constr. v. Goode, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994).

Consideration of report of expert commission. Where legislative history evinced intent to adopt recommendations of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, statute would be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Commission's report issued prior to introduction of bill. L.E.L. Constr. v. Goode, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994).

Consideration of results of construction. In case of a dispute as to the meaning of a statute, the court should consider the results of the construction urged. No provision of the law should be interpreted in a way which requires an impossible task. People in Interest of K.M.J., 698 P.2d 1380 (Colo. App. 1984); Huff v. Tipton, 810 P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1991).

Consideration of administrative construction. Construction of statute by administrative officials charged with its enforcement shall be given deference by courts. Larimer Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Indus. Comm'n, 727 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1986), cert. denied, 752 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1988); Bluewater Ins. Ltd. v. Balzano, 823 P.2d 1365 (Colo. 1992).

Agency interpretations are not binding on the court, notwithstanding the rule of deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute and the usefulness of such interpretations when the statute involves a technical subject in which the agency possesses expertise. Douglas County Bd. of Eq. v. Fidelity Castle Pines, 890 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1995).

When the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration has not been uniform, the rule which authorizes courts to give deference to administrative interpretations of a statutory scheme is inapplicable. Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1988).

Agency's interpretation not binding if inconsistent with clear language of statute or with legislative intent. If an agency's regulations exceed the scope of the statute for which they were written, they are void. Kenna v. Huber, 179 P.3d 189 (Colo. App. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 205 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2009).

Deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of law is not warranted when the agency's interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. The Colorado collection agency board's advisory opinion that insurance subrogation claims are "debt" under the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is not entitled to deference because the opinion is not supported by the plain language of the statute where the statute defines "debt" as "any obligation . . . arising out of a transaction" and a transaction requires some type of business dealing between parties. Ybarra v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C., 2016 COA 116, 488 P.3d 109, aff'd on other grounds, 2018 CO 81, 429 P.3d 839.

When a statute is silent as to the issue before the trier of fact, precedent dictates that legislative intent must govern the decision. O'Gorman v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 826 P.2d 390 (Colo. App. 1991).

A most basic resource for determination of legislative intent is the discussion which takes place in hearings before legislative committees concerning the enactment of legislation. People in Interest of G.W.R., 943 P.2d 466 (Colo. App. 1996).

If the language is clear and the intent of the general assembly may be discerned with reasonable certainty, the statute must be applied as written. Montes v. Hyland Hills Park, 849 P.2d 852 (Colo. App. 1992).

Ambiguities appearing in statutes regulating pension and retirement funds are construed favorably toward the employee. Taylor v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 189 Colo. 486, 542 P.2d 383 (1975).

Applied in In re U.M. v. District Court, 631 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1981); Mtn. Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983); People v. Walker, 665 P.2d 154 (Colo. App. 1983); Allen v. Charnes, 674 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1984); Alamosa - La Jara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983); Engelbrecht v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 680 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1984); United States v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1984); Calhan Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. El Paso County, 686 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1984); Berkeley Metro. Dist. v. Poland, 705 P.2d 1004 (Colo. App. 1985); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Dept. of Local Affairs, 729 P.2d 994 (Colo. App. 1986); Kirby of Se. Denver, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 732 P.2d 1232 (Colo. App. 1986); City of Ouray v. Olin 761 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1988); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989).