COCODE

2-4-201. Intentions in the enactment of statutes.

Statute text

(1) In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:

(a) Compliance with the constitutions of the state of Colorado and the United States is intended;

(b) The entire statute is intended to be effective;

(d) A result feasible of execution is intended;

(e) Public interest is favored over any private interest.

History

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1423, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 135-1-201.

Annotations

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

General assembly did not intend statutory construction violative of due process. The general assembly did not intend that the long-arm statute be construed to permit jurisdiction to be asserted where to do so would violate due process of law. Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980).

A statute is presumed to be constitutional. People v. Sneed, 183 Colo. 96, 514 P.2d 776 (1973); Gates Rubber Co. v. South Sub. Metro. Recreation & Park Dist., 183 Colo. 222, 516 P.2d 436 (1973); Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973); People v. Summit, 183 Colo. 421, 517 P.2d 850 (1974); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); People v. Loomis, 698 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1985); Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1991); Watso v. Dept. of Servs., 841 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1992); People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993); Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 870 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1993).

A statute will be presumed to conform to constitutional requirements. People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1980).

Absent constitutional infirmity, it is not within the judicial power to exclude from a statute that which the legislature expressly includes. Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the party asserting the invalidity of a particular statute bears the burden of establishing such beyond a reasonable doubt. Anderson v. State Dept. of Pers., 756 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1988); Spradling v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 870 P.2d 521 (Colo. App. 1993); Colo. Cmty. Health Network v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 166 P.3d 280 (Colo. App. 2007).

And one attacking its validity has the burden of establishing invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark v. People, 176 Colo. 48, 488 P.2d 1097 (1971); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); People v. Loomis, 698 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1985); Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1991); Watso v. Dept. of Servs., 841 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1992); Burtkin Assocs. v. Tipton, 845 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1993); People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993).

It is the duty of courts to presume a statute is constitutional. Harris v. Heckers, 185 Colo. 39, 521 P.2d 766 (1974).

When statute may be interpreted in two ways, the way which renders it constitutional must be adopted. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973); Duprey v. Anderson, 184 Colo. 70, 518 P.2d 807 (1974); People v. District Court, 185 Colo. 78, 521 P.2d 1254 (1974); Meyer v. Putnam, 186 Colo. 132, 526 P.2d 139 (1974); People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 593 P.2d 962 (1979); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986); Catholic Health Initiatives Colo. v. City of Pueblo, 207 P.3d 812 (Colo. 2009).

If a statute is susceptible of both constitutional and unconstitutional interpretation, the court should adopt a constitutional construction if such construction is reasonably consistent with the legislative intent. People in re R.M.D., 829 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1992); People v. Felgar, 58 P.3d 1122 (Colo. App. 2002).

Because the general assembly is presumed to have intended to pass a constitutional statute. State, Dept. of Insts. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n ex rel. McAllister, 185 Colo. 42, 521 P.2d 908, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1084, 95 S. Ct. 672, 42 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1974).

And the court presumes that it was passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing law dealing with the same subject. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270, 499 P.2d 1169 (1972).

And it is presumed a just and reasonable result is intended. In determining the intent of the general assembly in the enactment of a statute, it is presumed that a just and reasonable result is intended, and that the public interest is favored over any private interest. In making that determination, the court may consider, among other things, the consequences of a particular construction. Conrad v. City of Thornton, 36 Colo. App. 22, 536 P.2d 855 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 191 Colo. 444, 553 P.2d 822 (1976); Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1985); In re Estate of Hill, 713 P.2d 928 (Colo. App. 1985); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989); Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989); People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo. App. 1991); Wycon v. Wheat Ridge Sanitation, 870 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1993); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 872 P.2d 1367 (Colo. App. 1994).

Because the court presumes that legislation is intended to have just and reasonable effects, it must construe statutes accordingly and apply them so as to ensure such results. State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1993).

Therefore, statutes must be given whatever meaning was intended by the general assembly, irrespective of the consequences. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Coffeen, 96 Colo. 375, 42 P.2d 998 (1935).

In interpreting a statute, a court must give effect to the intent of the lawmaking body and presume that the general assembly intends a just and reasonable result. Thus, a statutory interpretation that defeats the legislative intent or leads to an absurd result will not be followed. Avicomm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998).

And the statutory rule in the construction of acts of the general assembly was laid down by the general assembly itself. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Coffeen, 96 Colo. 375, 42 P.2d 998 (1935).

Moreover, courts must so act as to give full force and effect when possible to the statutory law of the state. Colo. & S. Ry. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 162, 493 P.2d 657 (1972).

When reviewing a statute upon a challenge of unconstitutionality due to vagueness, the duty of the reviewing court is to construe the statute so as to uphold its constitutionality whenever a reasonable and practical construction may be applied to the statute. People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993).

Statutes to be harmonized. Statutes should be interpreted, if possible, to harmonize and give meaning to other potentially conflicting statutes. People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982); Ragsdale Bros. Roofing v. United Bank, 744 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1987); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989).

A statute is to be construed as a whole to give a consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986); People v. Torres, 812 P.2d 672 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo. App. 1991); Bluewater Ins. Ltd. v. Balzano, 823 P.2d 1365 (Colo. 1992); People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181 (Colo. 1992); Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 859 P.2d 235 (Colo. App. 1992); People v. Armstrong, 919 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1995); Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998); Catholic Health Initiatives Colo. v. City of Pueblo, 207 P.3d 812 (Colo. 2009).

In construing a statutory scheme, a court may consider its history. Indus. Comm'n v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 410 P.2d 181 (1966); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).

Statute must be construed to further the legislative intent evidenced by the entire statutory scheme. Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986); Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1989).

A statute must be construed in a manner that gives effect to the legislative purpose underlying its enactment and that achieves a just and reasonable result consistent with that purpose. Johnson v. Indus. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 1140 (Colo. 1988); Subsequent Injury Fund v. Trevethan, 809 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1991); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645 (1991); Rocky Mtn. Gen. v. Simon, 827 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1992); Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1993).

When construing a statute, the statute must be read and considered as a whole, so as to ascertain the intent of the general assembly in passing it. Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 496 P.2d 1040 (1972); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986); Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993); Kittinger v. City of Colo. Springs, 872 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1993).

When construing statutes, the court must determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and adopt the statutory construction that best effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1991); Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1991); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992); Dickman v. Jackalope, Inc., 870 P.2d 1261 (Colo. App. 1994); Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993); Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1995); City & County of Denver v. Gonzales, 17 P.3d 137 (Colo. 2001).

Courts must construe statutes to give effect to legislative intent and interpret them as a whole so as to give effect to all parts. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000); People v. Felgar, 58 P.3d 1122 (Colo. App. 2002).

In interpreting a comprehensive legislative scheme, the court must give meaning to all portions thereof and construe the statutory provisions to further legislative intent. A.B. Hirschfeld Press v. Denver, 806 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1991); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).

The court's primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the general assembly by looking first at the language of the statute. Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1997); Waneka v. Clyncke, 157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007).

And the meaning of any one section must be gathered from a consideration of the entire legislative scheme. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Haase, 189 Colo. 69, 537 P.2d 300 (1975).

The court's task in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the general assembly, not to second guess its judgment. Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993); People v. Valencia, 888 P.2d 319 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd, 906 P.2d 115 (Colo. 1995); Walker v. People, 932 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1997).

Because the object to be attained in the construction of any statute is the intention of the legislative body which enacted it. Stermer v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 P. 839 (1895) (decided under former law).

The court's objective in interpreting seemingly conflicting statutes is to give effect to the intent of the general assembly. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Haase, 189 Colo. 69, 537 P.2d 300 (1975).

The task in construing statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the general assembly. In the Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); People v. Torres, 812 P.2d 672 (Colo. App. 1990); Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1991).

The court may not infer the intent of the general assembly by review of a subsequent amendment to the statute, however. People v. Duncan, 109 P.3d 1044 (Colo. App. 2004).

Amendatory legislation, in and of itself, contributes little to the judicial construction of the original, unamended statutory language in the absence of an adequate indication of intent to clarify. Union Pac. R.R. v. Martin, 209 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2009).

In questions of statutory interpretation, the most critical guide to the court is the intent of the legislature as evidenced by an entire statutory scheme. In determining the intent of the legislature, it is useful to consider the history of the statute. Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1989).

Legislative intent is to be ascertained and given effect wherever possible. People v. Sneed, 183 Colo. 96, 514 P.2d 776 (1973); R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992).

Statute may not be construed in such a way as to defeat obvious legislative intent. People v. Meyers, 182 Colo. 21, 510 P.2d 430 (1973); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986); R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992); Koucherik v. Zavaras, 940 P.2d 1063 (Colo. App. 1996).

And perhaps the best guide to intent is the declaration of policy which frequently forms the initial part of an enactment. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 28, 349 P.2d 995 (1960).

Although penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant, this rule of construction should not be used to defeat the intent of the general assembly. Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1991); Organ v. Jorgensen, 888 P.2d 336 (Colo. App. 1994); Koucherik v. Zavaras, 940 P.2d 1063 (Colo. App. 1996).

Strained or forced constructions of statutes are disfavored. Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).

If the language of a statute is plain, its meaning clear, and no absurdity results, courts may not adopt a strained interpretation. People v. Nara, 964 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1998).

Two statutes concerning same subject matter should be read together. People in Interest of M.K.A., 182 Colo. 172, 511 P.2d 477 (1973).

Statutes addressing the same subject matter must, if possible, be construed together to give full effect to the legislative purpose of each statute. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Trevethan, 809 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1991).

Statutes are to be construed in pari materia so as to give effect to the legislative intent and to avoid inconsistencies and absurdities. Whisler v. Kuckler, 36 Colo. App. 200, 538 P.2d 477 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 191 Colo. 260, 552 P.2d 18 (1976).

Another fundamental rule of construction is to give effect to every word of an enactment if possible. Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223, 493 P.2d 651 (1972) (decided under former law); Blue River Defense Comm. v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo. App. 10, 516 P.2d 452 (1973).

A well-established rule of statutory construction is that the entire statute is intended to be effective. People v. Phillips, 652 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1982); In re Estate of Hill, 713 P.2d 928 (Colo. App. 1985).

It is presumed that the general assembly has knowledge of the legal import of the words it uses and that it intends each part of the statute to be given effect. Longbottom v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls., 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993).

And courts are not to presume that legislative body used language in a statute idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language. Blue River Defense Comm. v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo. App. 10, 516 P.2d 452 (1973).

Hence it is the legislative meaning of the words used which it is important to know. Stermer v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 P. 839 (1895).

And to ascertain that, the courts avail themselves of the usual means employed in the construction of statutes. Stermer v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 P. 839 (1895).

For instance, in interpreting a statute one should look to the contemporaneous construction of the act by public officials charged with its administration. Davis v. Conour, 178 Colo. 376, 497 P.2d 1015 (1972).

The testimony of the zoning administrator, who dealt with a zoning ordinance on a day-to-day basis, is significant in construing ambiguous language in the ordinance. Humana, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 189 Colo. 79, 537 P.2d 741 (1975).

Prior judicial constructions of language used in subsequent legislation. It is to be presumed that a general assembly is cognizant of and adopts the construction which prior judicial decisions have placed on particular language when such language is employed in subsequent legislation. Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973).

Also a legislative intent to change the meaning of statutes in the course of a general revision will not be inferred unless this intent is clearly and indubitably manifested. Davis v. Conour, 178 Colo. 376, 497 P.2d 1015 (1972); Associated Grocers of Colo., Inc. v. Bendickson, 36 Colo. App. 239, 538 P.2d 476 (1975).

Resort to common law for definition of acts constituting crime. Where a statute does not define a crime, but merely gives to it its common-law name or designation, resort must be had to the common law to ascertain what acts constitute the crime in question. Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973).

The primary task in interpreting a statute is to give it a construction and interpretation that will render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645 (Colo. 1991); Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 859 P.2d 235 (Colo. App. 1992).

A court should look first to the plain language of the statute, and the words used should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1991); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992); People v. Valencia, 888 P.2d 319 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd, 906 P.2d 115 (Colo. 1995); Organ v. Jorgensen, 888 P.2d 336 (Colo. App. 1994); Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995); Koucherik v. Zavaras, 940 P.2d 1063 (Colo. App. 1996); Walker v. People, 932 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1997); Int'l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 155 P.3d 640 (Colo. App. 2007).

If the language of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, it must be applied as written. Heagney v. Schneider, 677 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1984); In Interest of A.R.W., 903 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1994); Catholic Health Initiatives Colo. v. City of Pueblo, 207 P.3d 812 (Colo. 2009).

If statutory language is clear and the legislative intent appears to be reasonably certain, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc. v. Griffin, 757 P.2d 1088 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd, 775 P.2d 555 (Colo. 1989); In the Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); Colonial Penn v. Colo. Ins. Guar. 799 P.2d 448 (Colo. App. 1990); Bloomer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990); McKinney v. Kautzky, 801 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1990); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1995); Walker v. People, 932 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1997); Allstate Ins. v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, 942 P.2d 1352 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Bill Boom Inc., 961 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1998).

The court will not resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction and will apply the statute as written when the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1997); Waneka v. Clyncke, 157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007); Kenna v. Huber, 179 P.3d 189 (Colo. App. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 205 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2009).

However, the intent of the legislature will prevail over a literal interpretation of the statute that leads to an absurd result. Avicomm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998).

Consideration of results of construction. In case of a dispute as to the meaning of a statute, the court should consider the results of the construction urged. No provision of the law should be interpreted in a way which requires an impossible task. People in Interest of K.M.J., 698 P.2d 1380 (Colo. App. 1984).

If statutory language is uncertain as to its intended scope, with the result that the statutory text lends itself to alternative constructions, then a court may appropriately look to pertinent legislative history in determining which alternative construction is more in accordance with the legislative purpose. Fraternal Order, No. 27 v. Denver, 914 P.2d 483 (Colo. App. 1995).

The fact that a jury has twice been unable to agree upon a verdict in a given criminal case is not a proper or sufficient basis to establish that a criminal statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Loomis, 698 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1985).

When the general assembly substantively amends a statute, it is presumed that a change in the law was intended. Allee v. Contractors, Inc., 783 P.2d 273 (Colo. 1989); Organ v. Jorgensen, 888 P.2d 336 (Colo. App. 1994).

As a general proposition, when a statute is amended there is an intent to change the law but this is not applicable when a law is amended to clarify an ambiguity. Div. of Emp. v. Parkview Episcopal Hosp., 725 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1986); Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1991).

Unless a contrary intent is expressed in the statute, procedural changes are applicable to existing causes of action and not merely to those which accrue in the future. Loredo v. Denver Pub. Sch. Dist. 1, 827 P.2d 633 (Colo. App. 1992); People ex rel. Orange County v. M.A.S., 962 P.2d 339 (Colo. App. 1998).

A legislative intent to change the meaning of statutes in the course of a general revision will not be inferred unless this intent is clearly and indubitably manifested. Davis v. Conour, 178 Colo. 376, 497 P.2d 1015 (1972); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1992).

The general assembly is presumed cognizant of the judicial precedent in a particular area when it enacts legislation in that area. Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973); People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1985); Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987); Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1997).

When a statute is amended, the judicial construction previously placed upon the statute is deemed approved by the general assembly to the extent that the provision remains unchanged. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961); Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987); State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1993).

Although the title of a statute is not dispositive of legislative intent, it may be used as an aid in construing a statute. Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986).

The appropriate construction of a statute is a question of law. Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 855 P.2d 6 (Colo. App. 1992).

The construction of a statute, ordinance, or regulation is not one of fact, to be resolved with the assistance of retained experts. Rather, it is a question of law for the courts. Walcott v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 964 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 1998).

Whether the general assembly intends a statutory provision to be directory or jurisdictional requires consideration of the legislative history, the language of the statute, its subject matter, the importance of its provisions, their relation to the general object intended to be accomplished by the act, and, finally, whether or not there is a public or private right involved. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).

The factor which most heavily weighs in favor of a mandatory construction is the use of the word "shall" in the provision; unless the context indicates otherwise, the word "shall" generally indicates that the general assembly intended the provision to be mandatory. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).

Applied in Hofer v. Polly Little Realtors, Inc., 37 Colo. App. 86, 543 P.2d 114 (1975); Conrad v. City of Thornton, 191 Colo. 444, 553 P.2d 822 (1976); DeLeon v. Tompkins, 40 Colo. App. 241, 576 P.2d 563 (1977); Wasson v. Hogenson, 196 Colo. 183, 583 P.2d 914 (1978); Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396, 586 P.2d 36 (1978); McCoy v. State, Dept. of Rev., 42 Colo. App. 267, 595 P.2d 706 (1979); Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980); People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981); People v. Gillett, 629 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1981); In re U.M. v. District Court, 631 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1981); People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. District Court, 638 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1981); City & County of Denver v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 638 P.2d 837 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Ferguson, 653 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1982); Stephen v. City & County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1983); People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983); Mtn. Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983); People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp., 660 P.2d 1295 (Colo. App. 1982); World Wide Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Chapman, 665 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Walker, 665 P.2d 154 (Colo. App. 1983); Strong Bros. Enters. v. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo. App. 1983); Bernstein v. Rosenthal, 671 P.2d 979 (Colo. App. 1983); Allen v. Charnes, 674 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1984); People v. Russell, 703 P.2d 620 (Colo. App. 1985); Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986); Baca v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 732 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1986); 6S Corp. v. Martinez, 831 P.2d 509 (Colo. App. 1992); Yadon v. Southward, 64 P.3d 909 (Colo. App. 2002).