Any person, other than the perpetrator, complicitor, coconspirator, or accessory, participating in good faith in the making of a report, in the facilitation of the investigation of such a report, or in a judicial proceeding held pursuant to this title, the taking of photographs or X rays, or the placing in temporary protective custody of a child pursuant to section 19-3-405 or otherwise performing his duties or acting pursuant to this part 3 shall be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, or termination of employment that otherwise might result by reason of such acts of participation, unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines that such person's behavior was willful, wanton, and malicious. For the purpose of any proceedings, civil or criminal, the good faith of any such person reporting child abuse, any such person taking photographs or X rays, and any such person who has legal authority to place a child in protective custody shall be presumed.
Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 770, 1, effective October 1. L. 89: Entire section amended, p. 916, 7, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-10-110 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.
Claims of negligence not alleging bad faith are not sustainable against this person immunized by this section if good faith is alleged by such person. Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1988).
Though a parent is not among the individuals required to report suspected child abuse, with certain exceptions, any person reporting suspected child abuse is immune from civil liability if the report is made in good faith. Lawson v. Stow, 2014 COA 26, 327 P.3d 340.
Section does not provide immunity for actions not arising out of statutory duty to report suspected child abuse, including negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1988).
Statutory presumption of good faith insufficient to support summary judgment when the plaintiffs in their pleading and affidavits assert facts which, if true, would rebut the presumption. Martin v. County of Weld, 43 Colo. App. 49, 598 P.2d 532 (1979); Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1988).
Rebutting the "good-faith"exception. To rebut a statutory presumption of good faith, both a subjective and objective component must be satisfied. The subjective component requires evidence of evil motive, and the objective component requires evidence that the person acting in good faith did not have any factual basis to believe that activities had been performed that would require him or her to make a report pursuant to 19-3-304 (1). Credit Serv. Co. v. Dauwe, 134 P.3d 444 (Colo. App. 2005).
Although this section immunizes a person "participating in good faith in the making of a report ... or otherwise performing his duties or acting pursuant to this article", the mere declaration of good faith by an affiant is not sufficient to resolve that issue in the face of a pleaded denial precluding summary judgment. Martin v. County of Weld, 43 Colo. App. 49, 598 P.2d 532 (1979).
Immunity extends to employer of employee making report if immunity is properly granted for employee's actions. Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1988).
The grant of immunity provided by this section does not extend to new acts of exploitation admitted to by the defendant. People v. Atencio, 780 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1989).
Applied in People v. Beruman, 638 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1982); Griffin v. Pate, 644 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1981).