Statute text
The definitions in sections 18-8-101 and 18-8-301 are applicable to this part 5, and, in addition to those definitions:
(1) "Materially false statement" means any false statement, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could have affected the course or outcome of an official proceeding, or the action or decision of a public servant, or the performance of a governmental function.
(2) (a) "Oath" includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting to the truth of that which is stated. For the purposes of this section, written statements shall also be treated as if made under oath if:
(I) The statement was made on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable; or
(II) The statement recites that it was made under oath, the declarant was aware of such recitation at the time he made the statement and intended that the statement should be represented as a sworn statement, and the statement was in fact so represented by its delivery or utterance with the signed jurat of an officer authorized to administer oaths appended thereto; or
(III) The statement is made, used, or offered with the intent that it be accepted as compliance with a statute, rule, or regulation which requires a statement under oath or other like form of attestation to the truth of the matter contained in the statement; or
(IV) The statement meets the requirements for an unsworn declaration under the "Uniform Unsworn Declarations Act", article 27 of title 13.
(b) An oath is "required or authorized by law" when the use of the oath is specifically provided for by statute, court rule, or appropriate regulatory provision.
(3) "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency, or official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including any magistrate, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or depositions in any such proceedings.
History
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 462, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 40-8-501. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 360, 23, effective April 9. L. 96: (1) amended, p. 738, 11, effective July 1. L. 2009: (2) amended, (HB 09-1190), ch. 115, p. 485, 2, effective August 5. L. 2017: (2)(a)(IV) amended, (SB 17-154), ch. 130, p. 442, 5, effective August 9. L. 2018: (2)(a)(IV) amended, (SB 18-032), ch. 8, p. 156, 10, effective October 1.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Law reviews. For article, "The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client", see 59 Den. L.J. 75 (1981).
Not every false statement constitutes perjury. People v. Onorato, 36 Colo. App. 178, 538 P.2d 898 (1975).
To be perjurious, a false statement must also be "material". People v. Onorato, 36 Colo. App. 178, 538 P.2d 898 (1975).
Test of materiality is whether a witness's testimony, at the time his answers were given, could have affected the course or outcome of the investigation; where the subject of the grand jury's investigation was the heroin distribution ring operating in the Colorado Springs area, all leads were material which might have assisted the grand jury in identifying those who had at any time been members of the heroin ring. People v. Maestas, 199 Colo. 143, 606 P.2d 849 (1980).
To be material, a false declaration must have a tendency to influence, impede or hamper the grand jury from pursuing its investigation and it need not be material to the main issue or directed to the primary subject of the investigation. People v. Spomer, 631 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1981).
Materiality. A false statement is material for purposes of 18-8-502 (1) if it could have affected the outcome of the official proceeding. People v. Scott, 785 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1990); People v. Drake, 841 P.2d 364 (Colo. App. 1992); People v. Ellsworth, 15 P.3d 1111 (Colo. App. 2000).
Materiality properly question of law. This section does not improperly render the element of materiality in a first degree perjury charge a question for the judge and does not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial on every element of the offense. People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979), abrogated in People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997).
Materiality is an element of the offense of first-degree perjury entitling a defendant to have a jury determine whether his false statement is material. People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997)(abrogating People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979)).
A mistrial is an "official proceeding" within the meaning of this section. People v. Valdez, 39 Colo. App. 213, 568 P.2d 71 (1977).
Lawyer knowingly presenting perjuring witness commits subornation of perjury. A lawyer who presents a witness knowing that the witness intends to commit perjury thereby engages in the subornation of perjury. People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981).
Written as well as oral statements may be made under "oath". People v. Chaussee, 847 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).
"Official proceeding", which includes judicial proceedings in the course of which depositions are given under oath, must be read as including interrogatories. People v. Chaussee, 847 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).
As a matter of law, an application for court-appointed counsel constitutes part of an official proceeding under subsection (3). People v. Schupper, 140 P.3d 293 (Colo. App. 2006).
Applied in People v. Frayer, 661 P.2d 1189 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd, 684 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1984).