18-6-801.5. Domestic violence - evidence of similar transactions.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly hereby finds that domestic violence is frequently cyclical in nature, involves patterns of abuse, and can consist of harm with escalating levels of seriousness. The general assembly therefore declares that evidence of similar transactions can be helpful and is necessary in some situations in prosecuting crimes involving domestic violence.

(2) In criminal prosecutions involving domestic violence in which the defendant and the victim named in the information have engaged in an intimate relationship as of the time alleged in the information, evidence of any other acts of domestic violence between the defendant and the victim named in the information, and between the defendant and other persons, constitute other acts or transactions for the purposes of this section, and the court may authorize the admission of evidence as provided in subsection (3) of this section.

(3) The proponent of evidence of other acts or transactions under this section shall advise the trial court by offer of proof of such evidence and shall specify whether the evidence is offered to show a common plan, scheme, design, identity, modus operandi, motive, or guilty knowledge or for some other purpose.

(4) Upon the offer of proof under subsection (3) of this section, the trial court shall determine whether the probative value of the evidence of similar acts or transactions is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury if the evidence is allowed or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

(5) Upon admitting evidence of other acts or transactions into evidence pursuant to this section and again in the general charge to the jury, the trial court shall direct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is admitted and for which the jury may consider it.

History

Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 2020, 2, effective June 3. L. 2001: (2) amended, p. 730, 1, effective July 1.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

A court should consider evidence of previous incidents as necessary in evaluating subsequently charged acts of domestic violence. This section does not abrogate the standard set forth in People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1991), that the prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior acts actually occurred. This section does not require, however, that the court hold an evidentiary hearing on an offer of proof. People v. Ma, 104 P.3d 273 (Colo. App. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 121 P.3d 205 (Colo. 2005).

Court applies People v. Spoto (795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990)) test in determining admissibility of prior acts and this section does not limit admissibility of evidence of other acts to married partners. People v. Raglin, 21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000).

Evidence of prior transaction properly admitted. People v. Ramirez, 18 P.3d 822 (Colo. App. 2000).

Evidence of a prior act of domestic violence may be relevant to prove an intent to harm the victim, rather than to frighten him or her. People v. Torres, 141 P.3d 931 (Colo. App. 2006).

Court properly admitted evidence of acts toward intimate partners. The court, at a hearing, found the defendant committed the acts and the acts were related to a material fact with logical relevance. The court found the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Lujan, 2018 COA 95, 484 P.3d 718, rev'd on other grounds, 2020 CO 26, 461 P.3d 494.

Trial court's failure to give contemporaneous limiting instructions in connection with testimony about two prior instances of domestic violence did not cast a serious doubt on the reliability of defendant's conviction and, thus, was not plain error. Although the trial court did not give the limiting instruction during the testimony of two witnesses, it alleviated any potential prejudice by (1) giving the instruction during the testimony of a third witness; (2) stating, at that time, that the instruction applied not only to the testimony of that witness but also to the testimony of the other two witnesses; and (3) providing the jury with a written instruction at the close of the evidence explicitly reminding them that the testimony of the three witnesses had been admitted only for a limited purpose. People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2004).