18-4-105. Fourth degree arson.
Statute text
(1) A person who knowingly or recklessly starts or maintains a fire or causes an explosion, on his own property or that of another, and by so doing places another in danger of death or serious bodily injury or places any building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage commits fourth degree arson.
(2) Fourth degree arson is a class 4 felony if a person is thus endangered.
(3) Fourth degree arson is:
(a) A petty offense if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is less than three hundred dollars;
(b) A class 2 misdemeanor if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is three hundred dollars or more but less than one thousand dollars;
(c) A class 1 misdemeanor if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is one thousand dollars or more but less than two thousand dollars;
(d) A class 6 felony if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is two thousand dollars or more but less than five thousand dollars;
(e) A class 5 felony if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is five thousand dollars or more but less than twenty thousand dollars;
(f) A class 4 felony if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is twenty thousand dollars or more but less than one hundred thousand dollars;
(g) A class 3 felony if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is one hundred thousand dollars or more but less than one million dollars; and
(h) A class 2 felony if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is one million dollars or more.
(4) Repealed.
(5) It shall not be an arson offense pursuant to this section if:
(a) A person starts and maintains a fire as a controlled agricultural burn in a reasonably cautious manner; and
(b) No person suffers any of the following as a result of the fire:
(I) Bodily injury;
(II) Serious bodily injury; or
(III) Death.
(6) For purposes of this section, "controlled agricultural burn" means a technique used in farming to clear the land of any existing crop residue, kill weeds and weed seeds, or reduce fuel buildup and decrease the likelihood of a future fire.
History
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 426, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 40-4-105. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 962, 21, effective July 1. L. 2010: (5) and (6) added, (HB 10-1123), ch. 121, p. 404, 1, effective August 11. L. 2021: (3) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3175, 201, effective March 1, 2022; (4)(b) added by revision, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, pp. 3175, 3331, 201, 803.
Annotations
Editor's note: Subsection (4)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (4), effective March 1, 2022. (See L. 2021, pp. 3175, 3331.)
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Law reviews. For article, "Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code", see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981).
Control of fire is a matter of great public concern. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Thus the general assembly may make the commission of a prohibited act a crime, irrespective of scienter, when public policy dictates it for the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
The general assembly is not constitutionally restricted to punishing conduct that only "imminently" puts a structure in danger of damage. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Not facially vague. Absent indications that this section is being applied to conduct which a citizen could not reasonably have known was forbidden, the statute should not be ruled unconstitutional on grounds of facial vagueness. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
This is not a statute that employs technical terms with inadequate definitions but uses words of common understanding. This section is drafted in words that are not susceptible to difficulties of interpretation by a person of common understanding and intelligence. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Subsection (1) contains ordinary language with an obvious purpose and a clear meaning. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
The phrase "starts or maintains a fire" conveys a plain meaning as to the general conduct proscribed by the statute. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
However, the phrase "starts or maintains a fire" in this section must be read in accordance with 18-1-501(9) and 18-1-502. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
The statutory requirement that a structure be placed "in danger of damage" gives both the defendant and the jury a practical guideline to acceptable behavior. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
"Building", "property of another", and "occupied structure". The words used in subsection (1) are without technical meaning except for "building", "property of another", and "occupied structure", which are all adequately defined by statute in 18-4-101. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Property includes property situated anywhere in the state. Therefore, a person can be convicted of fourth degree arson for lighting another person's clothing on fire while that person is wearing the clothing because the person is situated on property in the state. People v. Vasquez, 2022 COA 100, 521 P.3d 1042.
Unit of prosecution under this section allows for multiple convictions based on the number of victims placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury by defendant's fire or explosion. The gravamen of each offense is what or who is damaged or endangered, not the number of fires set. People v. Magana, 2020 COA 148, 490 P.3d 948, aff'd, 2022 CO 25, 511 P.3d 585.
Section 18-1-502 expressly removes any ambiguity as to the culpability requirement of this section. That section states that if an offense does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of strict liability. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Prosecution need not prove intent to endanger the person or building. People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233 (Colo. 1983); People v. Copeland, 976 P.2d 334 (Colo. App. 1998), aff'd, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2000).
The knowingly or recklessly mens rea requirement only applies to starting or maintaining a fire, not to the endangerment provisions. Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2000).
This section would not apply to a fire started by events beyond the actor's control; the actor must purposefully start a fire, though he may not intend or foresee the consequences. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Construed in accordance with 18-1-502, this section would be inapplicable to those situations in which there was no voluntary act or omission to perform an act within the physical capabilities of the person. Thus, the statute would not apply to a fire started by events beyond the actor's control. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).
Applied in People v. Johnson, 757 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1988).