(1) A person commits the crime of enticement of a child if he or she invites or persuades, or attempts to invite or persuade, a child under the age of fifteen years to enter any vehicle, building, room, or secluded place with the intent to commit sexual assault or unlawful sexual contact upon said child. It is not necessary to a prosecution for attempt under this subsection (1) that the child have perceived the defendant's act of enticement.
(2) Enticement of a child is a class 4 felony. It is a class 3 felony if the defendant has a previous conviction for enticement of a child or sexual assault on a child or for conspiracy to commit or the attempted commission of either offense, or if the enticement of a child results in bodily injury to that child.
(3) When a person is convicted, pleads nolo contendere, or receives a deferred sentence for a violation of the provisions of this section and the court knows the person is a current or former employee of a school district in this state or holds a license or authorization pursuant to the provisions of article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S., the court shall report such fact to the department of education.
Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 715, 2, June 7. L. 87: (2) amended, p. 606, 12, effective July 1. L. 90: (3) added, p. 1025, 5, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 711, 48, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 1846, 30, effective August 2.
Attempted sexual assault of any degree sufficient. This statute requires proof only that the defendant acted with the intent to cause the result of a sexual assault of some degree upon a victim younger than fifteen years of age. Failure to complete sexual assault of particular degree is irrelevant. People v. Black, 759 P.2d 746 (Colo. App. 1988).
This section does not preclude a presentence remedy such as a deferred sentence under 18-1.3-102. Until defendant is sentenced, the Lifetime Supervision Act does not apply. People v. Loveall, 203 P.3d 540 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 231 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2010).
Communication with an adult intermediary is sufficient to prove the "invite or persuade" element. Statute does not require evidence of direct communication between the defendant and a child. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57, 296 P.3d 234.
Defendant's invitation to child to sit on the couch satisfies the element of "inviting or persuading the child to enter a room". Invitation necessarily invited the child to enter a particular room in the home where the couch was located. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57, 296 P.3d 234.