18-1.3-405. Credit for presentence confinement.
Statute text
A person who is confined for an offense prior to the imposition of sentence for said offense is entitled to credit against the term of his or her sentence for the entire period of such confinement. At the time of sentencing, the court shall make a finding of the amount of presentence confinement to which the offender is entitled and shall include such finding in the mittimus. The period of confinement shall be deducted from the sentence by the department of corrections. A person who is confined pending a parole revocation hearing is entitled to credit for the entire period of such confinement against any period of reincarceration imposed in the parole revocation proceeding. The period of confinement shall be deducted from the period of reincarceration by the department of corrections. If a defendant is serving a sentence or is on parole for a previous offense when he or she commits a new offense and he or she continues to serve the sentence for the previous offense while charges on the new offense are pending, the credit given for presentence confinement under this section shall be granted against the sentence the defendant is currently serving for the previous offense and shall not be granted against the sentence for the new offense.
History
Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1403, 2, effective October 1. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (HB 09-1263), ch. 105, p. 383, 3, effective August 5.
Annotations
Editor's note: This section is similar to former 16-11-306 as it existed prior to 2002.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Law reviews. For article, "Colorado Felony Sentencing", see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). For article, "Criminal Procedure", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with the time credited on sentences, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 188 (1985). For article, "Colorado Felony Sentencing -- an Update", see 14 Colo. Law 2163 (1985). For article, "Criminal Sentencing in Colorado After Blakely v. Washington", see 34 Colo. Law. 85 (Jan. 2005).
Annotator's note. Since 18-1.3-405 is similar to 16-11-306 as it existed prior to the 2002 relocation of certain criminal sentencing provisions, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.
Constitutionality. The provisions of this section, giving discretionary power to a sentencing court in granting credit for presentence confinement, are not unconstitutional. People v. Dennis, 649 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1982).
There is no constitutional right to receive credit for presentence confinement. People v. Martinez, 192 Colo. 388, 559 P.2d 228 (1977); Godbold v. District Court, 623 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1981) (decided under former law); People v. Corbett, 713 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1985) (decided under law in effect prior to 1979 repeal and reenactment).
Without legislation providing for credit for time served prior to the commencement of sentence, credit for presentence confinement is not a matter of right, since there is no constitutional right to credit. People v. Jones, 176 Colo. 61, 489 P.2d 596 (1971) (decided under 40-1-303 (1)); People v. White, 623 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1981) (decided under former law); People v. Emig, 676 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1984).
Constitutional right to credit for presentence confinement. A sentencing judge is constitutionally required to give an indigent defendant credit for time served in presentence confinement, even where the total of the presentence confinement and the sentence imposed after trial is less than the maximum sentence allowed for the offense. Godbold v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1981) (decided under former law).
Three principles should guide courts when applying this statute. First, a defendant is entitled to presentence confinement credit for each day served where there is a substantial nexus between the charge or conduct for which the defendant is confined and the sentence that is ultimately imposed. A substantial nexus exists when the defendant would have remained confined on the charge or conduct for which credit is sought in the absence of any other charge. Therefore, the People v. Torrez, 2017 CO 91, 403 P.3d 189 "but for" causation test is overruled because it is inconsistent with the language of the statute. Second, causation, not geography, is the defining question when determining whether a substantial nexus exists. Third, a defendant is not entitled to duplicative presentence confinement credit. When a defendant commits a new crime while already serving a sentence or on parole, the period of confinement prior to sentencing on the new offense will be credited only against the original sentence. Russell v. People, 2020 CO 37, 462 P.3d 1092.
Presentence confinement credit is not a component of a sentence; instead, it is time served before a sentence is imposed, which is later credited against the defendant's sentence. People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, 452 P.3d 759.
Confinement must result from same transaction as sentence. In order for defendant to be given credit for presentence confinement, that confinement must be a result of the same transaction for which defendant is to be sentenced. People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Freeman, 705 P.2d 528 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 735 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1987) (decided prior to 1986 amendment); People v. Etts, 725 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Saathott, 728 P.2d 367 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Fransua, 2016 COA 79, 457 P.3d 64, aff'd, 2019 CO 96, 451 P.3d 1208.
When a defendant is confined prior to sentencing for a different transaction from that for which he is to be sentenced, he is not entitled to credit. People v. Matheson, 671 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1983).
A defendant is entitled to credit for the time served as the result of the charge for which the sentence is imposed or the time served as the result of the conduct on which such charge is based, whichever is longer. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985); Torand v. People, 698 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1985); People v. Saathott, 728 P.2d 367 (Colo. App. 1986).
There must be a substantial nexus between the charge or conduct and the period of confinement for which credit is sought. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985); People v. Etts, 725 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Murray, 805 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Bray, 819 P.2d 528 (Colo. App. 1991); People v. Finley, 141 P.3d 911 (Colo. App. 2006).
Where defendant has not proven, and the record does not establish, that there was a substantial nexus between the first county's charges and the defendant's imprisonment in the second county jail or that the issuance of the first county's arrest warrant was the actual cause of the defendant's confinement in the second county, presentence confinement credit cannot be awarded. People v. Freeman, 735 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1987) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).
Defendant not entitled to presentence confinement credit for time defendant was confined in jurisdiction other than where defendant sought presentence confinement credit if there is a separate and independent criminal proceeding that was causing defendant's confinement in that other jurisdiction. People v. Torrez, 2012 COA 51, 405 P.3d 243, aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 2017 CO 91, 403 P.3d 189, overruled on other grounds in Russell v. People, 2020 CO 37, 462 P.3d 1092.
There was no substantial nexus, as matter of law, between the Colorado charges upon which defendant was being sentenced and defendant's confinement in an English prison prior to the date the extradition warrant was served. People v. Bray, 819 P.2d 528 (Colo. App. 1991).
"Substantial nexus" required between charges filed in one judicial district and periods of presentence confinement in another in order for defendant to be entitled to an award of presentence confinement credit against defendant's sentence in the first district. Massey v. People, 736 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1987).
To receive presentence confinement credit, an offender must have been actually confined, and there must have been a substantial nexus between the confinement and the charge for which the sentence is ultimately imposed. People v. Chavez, 122 P.3d 1036 (Colo. App. 2005).
Credit against maximum term and any minimum term should specifically include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which the defendant has been committed. People v. Jones, 176 Colo. 61, 489 P.2d 596 (1971) (decided under 40-1-303 (1)).
Section is applicable even though defendant was sentenced prior to the time for which defendant seeks credit. People v. McGraw, 30 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2001).
Defendant should advise judge of time to be credited. If, at the time of sentencing, a defendant or his counsel has any reason to believe that the trial judge is unaware of the length of time the defendant was in custody or is not considering presentence confinement in arriving at a sentence, such information should be presented to the judge, along with other mitigating factors. People v. Jones, 176 Colo. 61, 489 P.2d 596 (1971) (decided under 40-1-303 (1)).
And record should reflect credit. A well prepared mittimus and record should reflect the actual time spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence and should direct that credit be allowed for the time spent in custody prior to imposition of sentence. People v. Jones, 176 Colo. 61, 489 P.2d 596 (1971) (decided under 40-1-303 (1)).
No distinction between confinement within and without state. The statute does not distinguish between confinement within Colorado and confinement outside of the state, but instead requires credit for all presentence time that a defendant is confined on the charge for which he is ultimately sentenced. People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763 (Colo. App. 1982).
Section does not apply to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1979. Godbold v. District Court, 623 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1981).
Under the plain meaning of this section and 17-22.5-104, prisoners are entitled to credit against their life sentences for time spent in presentence confinement. Inmate, therefore, was entitled to a parole eligibility date that was calculated to include 329 days of presentence confinement credit. Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1999) (overruling People v. Payseno, 954 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1997)).
Section does not apply to life sentences. People v. Payseno, 954 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1997), overruled in Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1999).
Section does not apply to probationary sentences even when those probationary sentences include a jail component. People v. Smith, 2014 CO 10, 318 P.3d 472.
The provision in this section that precludes presentence confinement credit for time served while on parole also applies to credit for time served for misdemeanor sentences in 18-1.3-509. People v. Carrillo, 2013 COA 3, 297 P.3d 1028.
Section does not refer to the date of eligibility for parole. People v. Payseno, 954 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1997), overruled in Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1999).
Defendant is entitled to presentence confinement credit for both the day of arrest and the day of release. People v. Houston, 2014 COA 56, 411 P.3d 808; People v. Fransua, 2016 COA 79, 457 P.3d 64, aff'd, 2019 CO 96, 451 P.3d 1208.
Duty to assure credit against sentence. This section removes from the trial court the discretion whether to grant or deny a defendant credit against his sentence from presentence confinement time, and imposes upon the department of corrections a duty to assure that credit is given in every case. People v. Dempsey, 624 P.2d 374 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Patrick, 683 P.2d 801 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Massey, 707 P.2d 1038 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 736 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1987).
Plain meaning of section indicates that any presentence confinement credit earned as a result of being reincarcerated on a parole violation must be applied against the previous offense. People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003); People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183 (Colo. App. 2007).
The plain language of the section coupled with legislative intent lead to the conclusion that such an application is the only means by which courts can avoid granting duplicative credit to offenders. People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003).
Mandatory parole was intended to be included in the scope of an offender's "sentence" when the sentencing scheme was amended in 1993. Parole is a clear infringement on an offender's liberty and thus logically part of his or her sentence. People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003).
"Sentence" incorporates both the incarceration component and the mandatory parole component of an offender's penalty. People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003).
Section 17-2-103 (6)(c) does not negate or change the general rule for applying presentence confinement credit set forth in this section, which provides that a defendant receive presentence confinement credit on his or her original sentence and not on the new sentence. Rather, the filing of a parole revocation complaint merely provides jurisdiction to the parole board, but once the parole board makes its decision, the time starts running again from the date of the complaint whether the complaint is dismissed or parole is revoked. People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183 (Colo. App. 2007).
Section creates a right to credit only with respect to the presentence confinement served in connection with the charge or conduct for which a particular sentence is ultimately imposed. Santisteven v. Johnson, 751 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1988) (decided under section as it existed prior to 1986 amendment).
Defendant, who escaped while serving concurrent sentences, was not entitled to credit for presentence confinement for serving one of the sentences while an arrest warrant was still outstanding for the other. Confinement did not result from the same transaction as the sentence. People v. Taylor, 7 P.3d 1030 (Colo. App. 2000).
Service in Cenikor program does not constitute "confinement" so the defendant was not entitled to credit for such service against his sentence. People v. Beecroft, 862 P.2d 973 (Colo. App. 1993).
Service in work release as a condition of probation is a form of "confinement" deserving of presentence confinement credit. People v. Widhalm, 991 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1999).
"Substantial nexus" found between defendant's charges in case and presentence confinement. Although defendant had also been confined on probation violation warrant from a prior case, the defendant would have remained confined on the charges in the other case in the same judicial district in the absence of the prior case. Defendant, therefore, was entitled to presentence confinement for all incarceration time after the arrest. People v. Brown, 119 P.3d 486 (Colo. App. 2004).
Credit not mandatory where sentence is to county jail. This section does not mandate a sentencing judge to credit a defendant with time spent in presentence confinement when the sentence is to a county jail. Castro v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1982); People v. Smith, 312 P.3d 1173 (Colo. App. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 2014 CO 10, 318 P.3d 472.
Additional credit not required to be awarded when sentence on menacing conviction ordered to run concurrently with a previously imposed sentence. Defendant was already serving a sentence as a result of independent criminal conduct in another case and the menacing charge was not the cause of that confinement, so he was not entitled to receive additional credit for his presentence imprisonment on the menacing charge. People v. Taylor, 886 P.2d 302 (Colo. App. 1994).
Credit not mandatory where sentence is to a facility not under the supervision of the department of corrections. However, the trial court must make a finding that the facility is operated by another entity if credit is denied. People v. Lachicotte, 713 P.2d 408 (Colo. App. 1985).
The credit for presentence confinement mandated by this section applies only where a defendant is sentenced to a facility under the supervision of the department of corrections. People v. Garcia, 757 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1988).
This section does not mandate presentence confinement credit for a defendant who is sentenced to the youthful offender system. Section 18-1.3-407, enacted after this section, establishes court discretion in awarding presentence confinement credit to a juvenile. People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, 382 P.3d 1258.
Although the statute does not specifically limit its applicability to sentences to a state correctional facility, the language requiring the department of corrections to deduct the period of presentence confinement from the sentence implies that credit for presentence confinement is mandated only when the sentence is to be served in a state correctional facility. Castro v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1982); People v. Johnson, 776 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 797 P.2d 1296 (Colo. 1990); People v. Smith, 312 P.3d 1173 (Colo. App. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 2014 CO 10, 318 P.3d 472.
If an offender violates a rule or condition of community correctional placement while on nonresidential status, the offender is not entitled upon resentencing to credit for time served while on nonresidential status. People v. Hoecher, 822 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1991) (overruling People v. Herrera, 734 P.2d 136 (Colo. App. 1986)); People v. Pimble, 2015 COA 112, 369 P.3d 729.
A trial court is not statutorily required to give any presentence confinement credits against any misdemeanor sentence. However, a sentencing court may, in the exercise of its discretion, credit the length of any presentence confinement against a misdemeanor sentence. Castro v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1982); People v. Johnson, 776 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 797 P.2d 1296 (Colo. 1990).
Trial court has discretion to credit presentence confinement credit to a misdemeanor sentence to county jail rather than to a consecutive felony sentence to a state correctional facility. People v. Johnson, 797 P.2d 1296 (Colo. 1990).
Trial court erred in denying defendant presentence confinement credit and failing to include such credit in the mittimus. A sentencing court has no discretion to deny presentence confinement credit to which a defendant is entitled; its role is to determine the amount and enter it on the mittimus. People v. Henry, 2013 COA 104M, 362 P.3d 1084.
An error in presentence confinement credit does not render a sentence "not authorized by law" pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a) because presentence confinement credit is not a component of a sentence. Rather, it is credit earned for time served prior to sentencing that is later applied against the sentence. People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, 452 P.3d 759.
Where trial court imposed both a felony sentence to which this section was applicable and a misdemeanor sentence to which the statute did not apply, the discretion which the court might otherwise have exercised did not exist and the court was required to credit the pre-sentence confinement time against the sentence imposed upon defendant for his conviction of felony. People v. Johnson, 776 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 797 P.2d 1296 (Colo. 1990).
Supervised period following release from community correction facility is not confinement within the meaning of this section. Thus, defendant was not entitled to presentence confinement credit. People v. Carroll, 779 P.2d 1375 (Colo. App. 1989).
A suspended sentence subject to the condition that an offender receive treatment for drug abuse does not constitute "confinement" under this section. Defendant was not entitled to presentence confinement credit. Beecroft v. People, 874 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1994).
Duplicative credit. Where defendant was arrested based on separate felony warrants arising from both of two counties, time served in either first county jail or second county jail between date of arrest until defendant was placed on probation in the second county case related to both of these charges, and thus any days for which the defendant had already received presentence credit under the second county's mittimus could not also be credited against the first county offense. People v. Massey, 707 P.2d 1038 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 736 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1987).
Defendant not entitled to duplicative credit for time served. People v. Etts, 725 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Garcia, 757 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1988); People v. Johnson, 776 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 797 P.2d 1296 (Colo. 1990).
Original offense and subsequent probation violation are the same transaction. When defendant is confined due to parole revocation, he is entitled to presentence confinement credit for all periods of confinement relating to the original charge, as well as time served for violation of probation terms. People v. Myles, 702 P.2d 292 (Colo. App. 1985).
This section requires credit to be applied to any existing continuing sentence from a prior offense, not against a sentence for a new offense committed by the same defendant, when the defendant was serving a sentence or was on parole for a previous offense at the time he committed the new offense. People v. Ostuni, 58 P.3d 531 (Colo. 2002); People v. Dixon, 133 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2006).
A probationer is entitled to presentence confinement credit for the actual time confined to the county or municipal jail, where the trial court committed the probationer to a county or municipal jail as a facility utilized in conjunction with a work release program pursuant to 16-11-212 (1). People v. Lee, 678 P.2d 1030 (Colo. App. 1983).
No statutorily mandated deduction of the period of presentence confinement from a term of probation. As with incarceration in a county jail a grant of probation does not put the defendant under the supervision of the department of correction, nor is there a statutorily mandated deduction of the period of presentence confinement from a term of probation. People v. Freeman, 705 P.2d 528 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 735 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1987) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).
When sentencing an offender to probation, a trial court has discretion to award less than the full amount of presentence confinement against a jail sentence imposed as a condition of probation. People v. Smith, 2014 CO 10, 318 P.3d 472.
No credit for time spent at halfway house. Where residency in a community corrections facility is imposed as a condition of probation, it does not involve confinement as contemplated by this section, thus no credit may be given for time spent at a community corrections halfway house. People v. Radar, 652 P.2d 1085 (Colo. App. 1982).
Confinement for first conviction not pretrial confinement for second offense. Where a pretrial defendant is incarcerated pursuant to the sentence imposed in connection with his earlier conviction and he is receiving credit on that sentence for that time period, this confinement is not attributable to a second charge and he is not entitled to pretrial confinement credit on the second offense. People v. Loggins, 628 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1981) (decided under former law).
Defendant not entitled to presentence confinement credit for confinement in a different county jail while awaiting federal charges. There was no substantial nexus between the confinement for the federal charges and the confinement for this case. People v. Lacallo, 2014 COA 78, 338 P.3d 442.
Sentence for life imprisonment. When the penalty provided by statute is a sentence for life imprisonment, there is no authority in the sentencing court at the time of sentencing thereafter to make the sentence anything but life imprisonment. Consideration of presentence confinement in fixing sentence would be without purpose or result. People v. Jones, 198 Colo. 578, 604 P.2d 679 (1979) (decided under former law).
Where defendant is convicted under death penalty statute later held unconstitutional and court is required to resentence defendant to life imprisonment, there is no authority in sentencing court to award presentence confinement credit for time spent on death row prior to resentencing. People v. Corbett, 713 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1985) (decided under law in effect prior to 1979 repeal and reenactment).
In the case of concurrent sentences, the period of presentence confinement should be credited against each sentence. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985); People v. Etts, 725 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1986); People v. Roy, 252 P.3d 24 (Colo. App. 2010).
Defendant is entitled to presentence confinement credit for confinement in one county for an offense committed in another county if the sentences for both offenses are concurrent. There was a substantial nexus between the charges in the second county and the probation revocation in the first county since the revocation was based on the new offense in the second county. People v. Howe, 2012 COA 177, 292 P.3d 1186.
When consecutive sentences are imposed, crediting the period of presentence confinement against one of the sentences will assure the defendant full credit against the total term of imprisonment. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985).
If only one sentence is ultimately imposed and the other concurrently filed counts or charges are dismissed, then the entire period of presentence confinement should be credited against the sentence imposed. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985).
But if the case on which the defendant is sentenced has been only recently filed, and the defendant has been confined for a much longer period of time on an older case which relates to a separate criminal transaction and which is to be dismissed as part of a plea agreement, then the defendant is entitled to credit only for that period of confinement attributable to the case resulting in the sentence. The parties may nevertheless agree as part of a sentence concession that credit should be given for the entire period of presentence confinement. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985).
If defendant's parole is revoked during presentence confinement for pending charges, and defendant thereupon resumes service of sentence unrelated to pending charges, then, with respect to such pending charges, defendant is entitled to credit for presentence confinement prior to, but not following, revocation of his parole. Torand v. People, 698 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1985).
An annotation of "credit for time served" on a mittimus must be construed as an order for a specific amount of credit to which the defendant is entitled by statute, not a specific method for applying that credit to the entire sentence or for calculating the defendant's ultimate parole eligibility or mandatory release dates. People v. Ostuni, 58 P.3d 531 (Colo. 2002).
Writ of habeas corpus not appropriate. An order of one district court concerning presentence confinement credit may not be challenged by prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus in a district court of another judicial district. Pipkin v. Brittain, 713 P.2d 1358 (Colo. App. 1985).
Retroactive reduction of sentence and parole date does not entitle defendant to presentence confinement credit for offenses committed in different transaction even though practical effect of such reduction was that defendant was confined beyond parole date for separate transaction. People v. Lepine, 744 P.2d 81 (Colo. App. 1987).
No credit is allowed where defendant not incarcerated or confined but only supervised. People v. Winters, 789 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1990).
No credit is allowed while defendant was on bond despite being subject to electronic monitoring and a curfew. Electronic monitoring and a curfew do not so limit liberty as to constitute confinement under this section. People v. Chavez, 122 P.3d 1036 (Colo. App. 2005).
Defendant who is on parole at the time of the commission of a new offense is not entitled to receive presentence confinement credit for the new offense, and it is not necessary to revoke the defendant's parole in order for the defendant to be ineligible for such presentence confinement credit. People v. Hays, 817 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1991).
An offender who has earned presentence confinement credit is entitled to have that credit deducted from his mandatory parole if the offender is no longer serving a sentence of confinement. Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138 (Colo. 2008).
Trial court has no authority to retain jurisdiction over a defendant after sentencing for the reason that the law may be changed by a subsequent court decision even though the court, at the time of sentencing, is aware of a case appealed to the state supreme court which may change the interpretation of statute regarding credit against the sentence for presentence confinement. People v. Mortensen, 856 P.2d 45 (Colo. App. 1993).
Applied in People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1009 (Colo. 1981); People v. Lowery, 642 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1982); People v. Lopez, 961 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1998); People v. Houston, 2014 COA 56, 411 P.3d 808; Sardakowski v. Remaro, 883 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2018).