16-19-103. Fugitives from justice.

Statute text

Subject to the provisions of this article, the provisions of the constitution of the United States controlling, and any act of congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.

History

Source: L. 53: p. 314, 2. CSA: C. 72, 47. CRS 53: 60-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: 60-1-2.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 35 Dicta 26 (1958).

Purpose of extradition. The United States constitutional provision regarding extradition from one state to another was adopted to promote justice, to aid the states in enforcing their laws, and not to shield malefactors. Tinsley v. Woods, 135 Colo. 590, 313 P.2d 1006 (1957); Travis v. People, 135 Colo. 141, 308 P.2d 997 (1957).

The public purpose to be effected by extradition is to prevent the successful escape of all persons accused of crime, whether convicted or unconvicted, and to secure their return to the state from which they fled for the purpose of punishment. It is invoked to aid the administration of criminal justice and to more certainly insure the punishment of the guilty. Travis v. People, 135 Colo. 141, 308 P.2d 997 (1957); Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969 (1976).

The several states adopted the provisions of this uniform act so that one who commits a crime in one state cannot go to a sister state to avoid prosecution, or cannot send agents or accomplices from one state into another with impunity while he remains out of the state where the crime is perpetrated. Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403, 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).

Extradition serves the interest of comity between states. Bryan v. Conn, 187 Colo. 275, 530 P.2d 1274 (1975).

And, therefore, extradition proceeding should not be utilized as a vehicle to challenge acts undertaken by a sister state to enforce their criminal laws. Bryan v. Conn, 187 Colo. 275, 530 P.2d 1274 (1975).

Transfer of custody not a waiver of jurisdiction. This article contemplates that the mere transfer of custody to another jurisdiction will not be deemed a presumptive or implied waiver of jurisdiction by the demanding state. Schoengarth v. Bray, 200 Colo. 288, 615 P.2d 655 (1980).

Waiver of state's right to extradite. A finding of a waiver of a state's right to extradite requires affirmative evidence of a state's intent to waive jurisdiction over the fugitive and will not be presumed from a silent record. Schoengarth v. Bray, 200 Colo. 288, 615 P.2d 655 (1980).

Construction of section. Statutes providing for the arrest and extradition of fugitives are in derogation of constitutional guarantees of immunity from arrest and must be strictly construed. Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102, 314 P.2d 906 (1957).

The extradition statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to enable offenders against the laws of a state to find permanent asylum in another state. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969 (1976).

The clause "any person charged with a crime" includes a person whose judgment of conviction remains unsatisfied. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969 (1976).

No probable cause necessary where person convicted and sentenced. No showing of probable cause is necessary for the extradition of a person who has been convicted and sentenced. Morgan v. Miller, 197 Colo. 341, 593 P.2d 357 (1979).

The phrase "fled from justice" has generally been interpreted to cover individuals who are merely absent from the state when they are sought to answer for a crime, irrespective of their manner of leaving the state. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969 (1976).

Reason for leaving jurisdiction of demanding state immaterial. For extradition purposes, it is immaterial why the person demanded left the jurisdiction of the demanding state: he is a fugitive within the meaning of this section if he was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the offense charged and thereafter departed for whatever reason. Danielson v. Miller, 196 Colo. 537, 587 P.2d 788 (1978).

Where demanding state voluntarily released fugitive to another state. Under this section, a person can be classified as a fugitive from justice where the demanding state voluntarily released him to another state to serve out his unexpired sentence there. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969 (1976).

The United States constitution guarantees no right of asylum to a person who has committed a crime in one state or territory of the United States and fled to another jurisdiction. Cutting v. Geer, 135 Colo. 503, 313 P.2d 314 (1957).

Extradition to or from territories has been upheld under the federal statute, even though the United States constitution is silent as to extradition to or from territories. Cutting v. Geer, 135 Colo. 503, 313 P.2d 314 (1957).

The governor of Colorado has no inherent powers of arrest and surrender and cannot proceed as a volunteer but is limited to acting pursuant to a demand or a request from the executive of a sister state, and then only in strict conformity with law. Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102, 314 P.2d 906 (1957); Conrad v. McClearn, 166 Colo. 568, 445 P.2d 222 (1968).

This section makes it the duty of the governor to cause the arrest and surrender of any person who is charged with a felony in the demanding state and who has fled therefrom and taken asylum in Colorado. Olson v. People, 138 Colo. 310, 332 P.2d 486 (1958).

It is the duty of the governor to issue his warrant for the arrest and delivery to the executive of another state any person charged with a crime in that state who has fled from justice and is found in this state. Krutka v. Bryer, 150 Colo. 293, 372 P.2d 83 (1962).

Demanding state has right to extradition of fugitive. When demanding the return of a fugitive, the demanding state does not seek a favor, but appears as a sovereign state demanding rights granted to it by the constitution and laws of the United States. Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102, 314 P.2d 906 (1957); Olson v. People, 138 Colo. 310, 332 P.2d 486 (1958).

Constitutional rights to limitations on the use of evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence are not at issue in the rendition proceeding. What is in issue is the constitutional right of the demanding state to have a defendant promptly returned to that state on a showing of probable cause. North v. Koch, 169 Colo. 508, 457 P.2d 915 (1969).

Demanding state is entitled to obtain custody of the petitioner through extradition proceedings after extradition statute was complied with and proof established that the appellant is a fugitive from justice. Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288, 505 P.2d 1 (1973).

A sister state may proceed in extradition in either of two ways: (1) Make a demand upon any state for return of a fugitive under the constitution and laws of the United States and this section; or (2) make demand upon the governor of Colorado for surrender under 16-19-107 for any person in this state charged in another state with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand. Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102, 314 P.2d 906 (1957); Olson v. People, 138 Colo. 310, 332 P.2d 486 (1958); Layher v. Van Cleave, 171 Colo. 465, 468 P.2d 32 (1970).

Habeas corpus proceeding is not filed as part of an extradition proceeding but is filed as an independent civil action. People v. Gomez, 192 Colo. 313, 558 P.2d 439 (1976).

Form complied with 16-19-104. Demand for extradition complied with 16-19-104 although the requisition documents contained both a demand for extradition, pursuant to this section, and a request for extradition predicated on 16-19-106, which controls executive agreements, since the executive agreement, which accompanied the requisition documents, served only to ensure that the demanding state would return and surrender defendant to the Colorado authorities upon the completion of the trial in the demanding state. Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45, 536 P.2d 827 (1975).

Prima facie showing of identity is made when the name of the person is identical to that appearing in the requisition documents. Light v. Cronin, 621 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1980).

Where there is a discrepancy in the name in the extradition documents and the name claimed by the prisoner, a prima facie showing of identity is made where testimony, photographs, and fingerprints identify the fugitive being sought. Secrest v. Simonet, 708 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1985).

Governor's grant of extradition prima facie evidence that constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Howe v. Cronin, 197 Colo. 17, 589 P.2d 930 (1979).

Presumption of defendant's presence in demanding state at time of crime. The issuance of a governor's warrant by the governor of the asylum state creates a presumption that the person sought to be extradited was in the demanding state at the time the crime was committed. The person whose extradition is sought must show by clear and convincing evidence that he was not in the demanding state at the time the crime was committed. Light v. Cronin, 621 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1980); Briddle v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1981).

Where any statutory ground exists to substantiate extradition documents on their face, the courts of the asylum state may not block the extradition process. Howe v. Cronin, 197 Colo. 17, 589 P.2d 930 (1979).

Applied in Wilkerson v. Vogt, 167 Colo. 109, 445 P.2d 715 (1968); People v. Calloway, 40 Colo. App. 543, 577 P.2d 1109 (1978); Steinman v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1981); People v. Campbell, 633 P.2d 509 (Colo. App. 1981); Parker v. Glazner, 645 P.2d 1319 (Colo. 1982); Morris v. Nelson, 659 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1983).