(1) Notwithstanding any other statutory provisions to the contrary, all actions except those governed by section 4-2-725, C.R.S., brought against a manufacturer or seller of a product, regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought, for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, installation, preparation, assembly, testing, packaging, labeling, or sale of any product, or the failure to warn or protect against a danger or hazard in the use, misuse, or unintended use of any product, or the failure to provide proper instructions for the use of any product shall be brought within two years after the claim for relief arises and not thereafter.
(2) If any person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this section is under the age of eighteen years, mentally incompetent, imprisoned, or absent from the United States at the time the cause of action accrues and is without spouse or natural or legal guardian, such person may bring said action within the time limit specified in this section after the disability is removed. If such person has a legal representative, such person's representative shall bring the action within the period of limitation imposed by this section.
Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 698, 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former 13-80-127.5 as it existed prior to 1986.
Annotator's note. Since 13-80-106 is similar to former 13-80-127.5 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.
Section held not to violate equal protection guarantees of United States and Colorado Constitutions. Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987).
By enacting this statute, the legislature made manifest its intent to encompass all forms of product liability actions against manufacturers of products regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought. Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987); Boyd v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 776 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1989).
Colorado law does not impose upon a natural parent a legal duty to prosecute any personal injury claim on behalf of their minor child. Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Colo. 2011).
The statute of limitations begins to run when the child reaches the age of eighteen and is then competent to file a lawsuit in his or her own right. Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Colo. 2011).
Definition of "legal guardian" does not include natural parents or next friends of any person under disability unless appointed by a court. Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Colo. 2011).
Where claim is based on allegedly improper design and construction of improvement to real property and not on allegedly defective product, former 13-80-127 controls the time limits for filing and not former 13-80-127.5. Stanske v. Wazee Elec. Co., 722 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1986).
Statute by its terms does not apply to claims arising from injuries caused by hidden defects in equipment. Urban v. Beloit Corp., 711 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1985).
Claims for breach of warranty governed by 4-2-725 since they are causes of action based upon contract. Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 521 (D. Colo. 1984).
Actions or claims for breach of express and implied warranties under the UCC are governed by the limitation period in 4-2-725 and not this section. Wieser v. Firestone Tire &a,p; Rubber Co., 596 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Colo. 1984).
Liability of materialmen. Materialmen are in a position distinct from the architect, contractor, engineer or inspector in that the materialman provides manufactured goods and should be held accountable under the general tort rules governing liability for defects in those products. Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982).
Claims against company found not barred by three-year statute of limitations. Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36 (D. Colo. 1983).
Applicability of statutes of limitations. In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, a statute of limitations specifically addressing a particular class of cases will control over a more general or catch-all statute of limitations. Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987).
This section was adopted as a part of a legislative package that provided for actions based upon injury or damage caused by defective products. Stanske v. Wazee Elec. Co., 722 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1986); Boyd v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 776 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1989).
Buyers' deceit and negligent misrepresentation claims against a manufacturer, were founded on a fundamental design defect theory within the intendment of this section. Boyd v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 776 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1989).
Buyers' claim for relief arose when they knew or should have known that damage to their corn was caused by a defect in the silo. Boyd v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 776 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1989).
Negligently showing a film as part of selling tires for large earth movers qualifies tire supplier as a "seller" of a product within the intendment of this section. Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987).
The second anniversary of the injury is within the two year filing period created by this section. Simon v. Wisconsin Marine Inc., 947 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1991).
Discovery of an initial asbestos-related disease did not trigger the running of a statute of limitations on a separate, distinct, and later manifested disease caused by the same asbestos exposure. Miller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 949 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1991) (decided under law in effect prior to 1986 repeal and reenactment).
Applied in Haberkorn by Haberkorn v. ROHM-GMBH, 709 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1985).