Statute text
(1) A tenancy may be terminated by notice in writing, served not less than the respective period fixed before the end of the applicable tenancy, as follows:
(a) A tenancy for one year or longer, ninety-one days;
(b) A tenancy of six months or longer but less than a year, twenty-eight days;
(c) A tenancy of one month or longer but less than six months, twenty-one days;
(d) A tenancy of one week or longer but less than one month, or a tenancy at will, three days;
(e) A tenancy for less than one week, one day.
(2) Such notice shall describe the property and the particular time when the tenancy will terminate and shall be signed by the landlord or tenant, the party giving such notice or his agent or attorney.
(3) Any person in possession of real property with the assent of the owner is presumed to be a tenant at will until the contrary is shown.
(4) No notice to quit shall be necessary from or to a tenant whose term is, by agreement, to end at a time certain.
(5) Except as otherwise provided in section 38-33-112, C.R.S., the provisions of subsections (1) and (4) of this section shall not apply to the termination of a residential tenancy during the ninety-day period provided for in said section.
History
Source: L. 1885: p. 226, 6. R.S. 08: 2606. C.L. 6372. CSA: C. 70, 7. CRS 53: 58-1-7. L. 55: p. 407, 3. C.R.S. 1963: 58-1-7. L. 79: (5) added, p. 1399, 2, effective June 21. L. 2012: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 825, 9, effective July 1. L. 2017: (1)(c) amended, (SB 17-245), ch. 352, p. 1837, 2, effective August 9.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Law reviews. For note, "Holdover Tenants in Colorado", see 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 320 (1962). For article, "The Effect of Zoning Violations on the Enforceability of Leases", see 19 Colo. Law. 2077 (1990).
Constitutionality. The forcible entry and detainer statute, as applied, neither deprives the tenant of property without due process of law nor violates his right to equal protection of the laws. Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218 (Colo. 1982).
Notice to quit purporting to be by landlord's attorney is good. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899).
It is not essential that the landlord's notice to quit should be upon a single piece of paper. Two papers, relating to the same matter, and served at the same time, are necessarily construed as one document. Hepp Wall Paper & Mercantile Co. v. Deahl, 53 Colo. 274, 125 P. 491 (1912).
Provision for notice to tenant has no application where tenant voluntarily vacates. This section, which provides that a tenant from month to month is entitled to 10 days notice to quit to terminate the tenancy, has no application to an action to recover rent for premises occupied without a lease from month to month, or other definite period, brought after the premises had been voluntarily vacated by the tenant. Salomon v. O'Donnell, 5 Colo. App. 35, 36 P. 893 (1894).
Notice to quit is not required where, by the express words of the lease, the term ends at a day certain. Dulmaine v. Reed Bldg. Co., 46 Colo. 469, 104 P. 1038 (1909); Hancock v. Central Shoe & Clothing Co., 53 Colo. 190, 125 P. 123 (1912); Swaim v. Swanson, 118 Colo. 509, 197 P.2d 624 (1948); Mahaney v. Field, 120 Colo. 518, 211 P.2d 827 (1949).
Notice to quit not required. Defendants were tenants at sufferance with a possessory interest pursuant to an agreement which expired at a time certain. Therefore, a notice to quit was not a condition precedent to maintaining an action for unlawful detention. July Bldg. Corp. v. Heathrow & Co., Ltd., 679 P.2d 1120 (Colo. App. 1984).
Payment of rent at stated periods is a criterion as to duration of term. The reservation of rent and its payment at stated periods, as for a year or month, is, in the absence of express agreement as to length of the lease, one of the principal criterions to determine the duration of the term. Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77 (1878).
Month to month tenant entitled to ten days notice from landlord who was purchaser of premises at federal tax sale. Danyew v. Phelps, 676 P.2d 707 (Colo. App. 1983).
This section recognizes a monthly tenancy as distinct from one from year to year. Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77 (1878).
Holding merely at will of landlord deemed tenancy from year to year. A holding merely at the will of the landlord, according to the ancient meaning of the term "tenancy at will", is an estate unknown in modern times, unless where created by express agreement between the parties, or by clear implication. All such tenancies are, for the purpose of a notice to quit, deemed to be tenancies from year to year. Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77 (1878).
Where term is for less than year holding over is implied to be for like term. Where a tenant for a year or for years holds over after the expiration of his term, with the assent of his landlord, the holding is implied to be from year to year. But where the term is for a shorter period than a year, according to the current of authorities, both English and American, the holding over is implied to be for a like term, and the notice to quit is determined thereby, and is sufficient if it equals the length of the term or the interval between the times of payment of rent. Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77 (1878).
Where there was a holding over by a tenant from month to month, after conveyance by the original lessor, with the assent of both the landlord and tenant, it was held that such holding over was upon the same terms as the prior letting, and, in the absence of a new lease, the character of the tenancy continued the same. Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77 (1878).
Where a tenant occupied premises for several years, and then entered into a lease for one year certain, it was held that his former occupancy did not inure to his benefit and constitute him a tenant from year to year and so entitle him to three months notice to quit under this section. Brandenburg v. Reithman, 7 Colo. 323, 3 P. 577 (1884).
Applied in Maxwell v. District Court, 641 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1982).