COCODE

13-21-115. Actions against landowners - short title - legislative declaration - definitions.

Statute text

(1) The short title of this section is the "Colorado Premises Liability Act".

(2) The general assembly finds and declares that:

(a) The provisions of this section were enacted in 1986 to promote a state policy of responsibility by both landowners and those upon the land as well as to ensure that the ability of an injured party to recover is correlated with the injured party's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee;

(b) These objectives were characterized by the Colorado supreme court as "legitimate governmental interests" in Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989);

(I) Ensure that the language of this section effectuates these legitimate governmental interests by imposing on landowners a higher standard of care with respect to an invitee than a licensee and a higher standard of care with respect to a licensee than a trespasser; and

(II) Create a legal climate that will promote private property rights and commercial enterprise and foster the availability and affordability of insurance;

(d) The general assembly recognizes that by amending this section it is not reinstating the common law status categories as they existed immediately prior to Mile Hi Fence v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971) but that its purpose is to protect landowners from liability in some circumstances when they were not protected at common law and to define the instances when liability will be imposed in the manner most consistent with the policies set forth in subsections (2)(a) and (2)(c) of this section; and

(e) (I) The Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner, 2020 CO 51, 467 P.3d 287, and Wagner v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., 2019 COA 26, 471 P.3d 1089, decisions do not accurately reflect the intent of the general assembly regarding landowner liability and must not be relied upon in applying this section to the extent that the majority opinions determined:

(A) The foreseeability of third-party criminal conduct based upon whether the goods or services offered by a landowner are controversial; and

(B) That a landowner could be held liable as a substantial factor in causing harm without considering whether a third-party criminal act was the predominant cause of that harm, as noted by the dissenting justices and judge.

(II) In making this declaration, the general assembly does not intend to reject or otherwise disturb any judicial decision other than the Wagner decisions.

(3) In any civil action brought against a landowner by a person who alleges injury occurring while on the real property of another and by reason of the condition of such property, or activities conducted or circumstances existing on such property, the landowner is liable only as provided in subsection (4) of this section. Sections 13-21-111, 13-21-111.5, and 13-21-111.7 apply to an action to which this section applies. This subsection (3) must not be construed to abrogate the doctrine of attractive nuisance as applied to persons under fourteen years of age. A person who is at least fourteen years of age but is less than eighteen years of age is presumed competent for purposes of the application of this section.

(4) (a) A trespasser may only recover damages willfully or deliberately caused by the landowner.

(b) A licensee may only recover damages caused:

(I) By the landowner's unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care with respect to dangers created by the landowner that the landowner actually knew about; or

(II) By the landowner's unreasonable failure to warn of dangers not created by the landowner that are not ordinarily present on property of the type involved and that the landowner actually knew about.

(c) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4)(c)(II) of this section, an invitee may recover for damages caused by the landowner's unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect against dangers the landowner actually knew about or should have known about.

(II) If the landowner's real property is classified for property tax purposes as agricultural land or vacant land, an invitee may recover for damages caused by the landowner's unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect against dangers the landowner actually knew about.

(5) It is the intent of the general assembly in enacting the provisions of subsection (4) of this section that the circumstances under which a licensee may recover include all of the circumstances under which a trespasser could recover and that the circumstances under which an invitee may recover include all of the circumstances under which a trespasser or a licensee could recover.

(6) In any action to which this section applies, the court shall determine whether the plaintiff is a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee, in accordance with the definitions set forth in subsection (7) of this section. If two or more landowners are party defendants to the action, the court shall determine the application of this section to each landowner. The issues of liability and damages in any such action must be determined by the jury or, if there is no jury, by the court.

(7) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) "Invitee" means a person who enters or remains on the land of another to transact business in which the parties are mutually interested or who enters or remains on such land in response to the landowner's express or implied representation that the public is requested, expected, or intended to enter or remain.

(b) "Landowner" means, without limitation, an authorized agent or a person in possession of real property and a person legally responsible for the condition of real property or for the activities conducted or circumstances existing on real property.

(c) "Licensee" means a person who enters or remains on the land of another for the licensee's own convenience or to advance the licensee's own interests, pursuant to the landowner's permission or consent. "Licensee" includes a social guest.

(d) "Trespasser" means a person who enters or remains on the land of another without the landowner's consent.

(8) If any provision of this section is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the section are deemed valid.

History

Source: L. 86: Entire section added, p. 683, 1, effective May 16. L. 90: (1.5), (3.5), (5), and (6) added and (3) and (4) amended, p. 867, 1, effective April 20. L. 2006: (2) amended, p. 344, 1, effective April 5. L. 2022: Entire section amended, (SB 22-115), ch. 75, p. 381, 2, effective April 7.

Annotations

Editor's note: Subsections (5)(a) and (5)(c), as they were enacted in House Bill 90-1107, were relettered on revision in 2002 as (5)(c) and (5)(a), respectively.

Annotations

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 22-115, see section 1 of chapter 75, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.

Annotations

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Law reviews. For article, "Legal Aspects of Health and Fitness Clubs: A Healthy and Dangerous Industry", see 15 Colo. Law. 1787 (1986). For article, "The Landowners' Liability Statute", see 18 Colo. Law. 208 (1989). For article, "The Changing Boundaries of Premises Liability after Gallegos", see 18 Colo. Law. 2121 (1989). For article, "Recreational Use Of Agricultural Lands", see 23 Colo. Law. 529 (1994). For article, "The Colorado Premises Liability Statute", see 25 Colo. Law. 71 (May 1996). For article, "Stealth Statute: The Unexpected Reach of the Colorado Premises Liability Act", see 40 Colo. Law. 27 (Mar. 2011). For article, "Expanding Potential Exposure for Businesses: Causation Standards and the Planned Parenthood Shooting Opinion", see 50 Colo. Law. 46 (May 2021). For article, "A Deeper Look at CDARA's Scope", see 51 Colo. Law. 32 (Aug.-Sept. 2022).

Constitutionality. The phrase "deliberate failure to exercise reasonable care" found in subsection (3)(c) is not unconstitutionally vague. Giebink v. Fischer, 709 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1989).

This section does not violate article II, 6, of the state constitution since that provision is a mandate to the judiciary and not the legislature. Giebink v. Fischer, 709 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1989).

This section does not violate article V, section 25 of the state constitution since this provision applies uniformly to all landowners. Giebink v. Fischer, 709 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1989).

This section does not violate equal protection since the provision of limited protection to landowners is reasonably related to the protection of the state economy. Giebink v. Fischer, 709 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1989).

Unconstitutionality. This section violates both the federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws. Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989); Klausz v. Dillion Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1989) (disagreeing with Giebink v. Fischer cited above) (decided prior to 1990 amendments).

This section provides the exclusive remedy against a landowner for physical injuries sustained on the landowner's property. Henderson v. Master Klean Janitorial, Inc., 70 P.3d 612 (Colo. App. 2003); Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2004); Anderson v. Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 119 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2004); Sweeney v. United Artists Theater Circuit, 119 P.3d 538 (Colo. App. 2005); Raup v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (D. Colo. 2016).

A landowner may not be simultaneously liable for damages separately assessed under this section and under common law negligence theories. Reid v. Berkowitz, 2016 COA 28, 370 P.3d 644.

Section applies to conditions, activities, and circumstances on a property that the landowner is liable for in its capacity as a landowner. Defendant, in its capacity as a landowner, was responsible for the activities conducted and conditions on its premises, including the process of assisting a customer with loading a freezer he had purchased from defendant. Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, 303 P.3d 558.

This section applies to activities conducted on the property, such as driving a motor vehicle, and is not limited solely to activities related to the land. Tancrede v. Freund, 2017 COA 36, 401 P.3d 132.

This section preempts the common law creation of both landowner duties and defenses to those duties. Consequently, the open and obvious danger doctrine cannot be asserted by a landowner as a defense to a premises liability law suit. Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2004); Tancrede v. Freund, 2017 COA 36, 401 P.3d 132.

Section does not require that damages resulting from landowner's negligence be assessed without regard to negligence of the injured party or fault of a nonparty. Union Pac. R.R. v. Martin, 209 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2009).

Section does not abrogate statutorily created defenses, which were available to landowners before the 2006 amendment and afterward. The trial court correctly allowed defendants' affirmative defenses of comparative negligence and assumption of the risk. Tucker v. Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch, 211 P.3d 708 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Volunteers of Am. v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 (Colo. 2010).

The pre-2006 version of this section never expressly excluded the statutory defense of comparative negligence from its coverage, and limiting the statutory protection provided to landowners would tend to increase liability rather than protect landowners from liability. DeWitt v. Tara Woods Ltd. P'ship, 214 P.3d 466 (Colo. App. 2008) (decided under law in effect prior to 2006 amendment).

Statute does not have to expressly bar waiver by contract for the contract provision to be invalid because it is contrary to public policy. Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705 (Colo. App. 1996).

Exculpatory provision in athletic club's membership agreement did not bar mother's claim under this section against club based on minor daughter's alleged injuries sustained as a result of club employee's sexual abuse. The exculpatory provision did not express the parties' intention to waive negligence claims related to the risk of sexual abuse in clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal language. And the exculpatory provision created a substantial likelihood that a reader would fail to recognize that the provision could apply to the risk of sexual abuse resulting from the club's negligence or failure to exercise reasonable care. Doe v. Wellbridge Club Mgmt., 2022 COA 137, __ P.3d __ (decided under law in effect prior to the 2022 amendment).

Holding title to property is not dispositive in determining who is a landowner under subsection (1). Wark v. U.S., 269 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2001).

The term "landowner" is no more expansive than the common law definition. Wark v. U.S., 269 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2001).

A landowner is any person in possession of real property and such possession need not necessarily be to the exclusion of all others. Therefore, for purposes of this section, a landowner can be an independent contractor. Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215 (Colo. 2002).

This section offers its protection to a person who is legally conducting an activity on the property or legally creating a condition on the property. Such person or entity is responsible for the activity or condition and, therefore, prospectively liable to an entrant onto the property. Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215 (Colo. 2002); Wycoff v. Grace Cmty. Church, 251 P.3d 1260 (Colo. App. 2010).

Defendant is not a "landowner" where there is no evidence that it was in possession of the sidewalk or that it was responsible for creating a condition on the sidewalk or conducting an activity on the sidewalk that caused plaintiff's injuries. Jordan v. Panorama Ortho. & Spine Ctr., 2013 COA 87, 350 P.3d 863, aff'd, 2015 CO 24, 346 P.3d 1035; Lopez v. Trujillo, 2016 COA 53, 399 P.3d 750, aff'd, 2017 CO 79, 397 P.3d 370; Andrade v. Johnson, 2016 COA 147, 409 P.3d 582.

When a plaintiff is injured on a public sidewalk adjacent to private property, the property owner is not considered a "landowner" of the public sidewalk and is not liable pursuant to the provisions of this section. Andrade v. Johnson, 2016 COA 147, 409 P.3d 582.

A seller of property pursuant to an installment land contract is not a "landowner" and not responsible for injury to a third party on the property despite being the record title holder of the property if the seller is not in possession of the property at the time of the injury and is not otherwise legally responsible for the conditions, activities, or circumstances on the property pursuant to the contract. Lucero v. Ulvestad, 2015 COA 98, 411 P.3d 949.

The test for determining if a victim is an invitee is whether she or he was on the premises to transact business in which the parties are mutually interested. Grizzell v. Hartman Enters., Inc., 68 P.3d 551 (Colo. App. 2003).

Plaintiff was an invitee. Defendant owned the temporary electrical box at issue and was responsible for its condition and for providing electrical access to subcontractors at a construction site. Defendant thus was a property owner for purposes of this section because it was legally responsible for the condition of the box. Plaintiff was a subcontractor who was injured while using the box during construction. Because the parties were mutually interested in transacting business, plaintiff was defendant's invitee for purposes of accessing power from the box. Warembourg v. Excel Elec., Inc., 2020 COA 103, 471 P.3d 1213.

Trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff was defendant's licensee rather than invitee. Therefore, jury instructions minimized the duties defendant owed to plaintiff under this section, Wycoff v. Seventh Day Adventist Ass'n, 251 P.3d 1258 (Colo. App. 2010).

If the victim was on the premises at an employee's invitation for either the employee's benefit, victim's benefit, or their mutual benefit, then she or he was a licensee or trespasser not an invitee. Grizzell v. Hartman Enters., Inc., 68 P.3d 551 (Colo. App. 2003).

Volunteers are generally classified as licensees. Grizzell v. Hartman Enters., Inc., 68 P.3d 551 (Colo. App. 2003); Rieger v. Wat Buddhawararam of Denver, Inc., 2013 COA 156, 338 P.3d 404.

So long as a landowner retains possession of its property, it cannot delegate the duties imposed on it by subsection (1). Jules v. Embassy Props., Inc., 905 P.2d 13 (Colo. App. 1995).

When a landowner is vicariously liable under the nondelegability doctrine for acts or omissions of other defendants, the trial court should instruct the jury to determine the respective shares of fault of the landowner and the other defendants. But, in entering a judgment, the court shall aggregate the fault of the landowner with any other defendants for whom the landowner is vicariously liable. Reid v. Berkowitz, 2013 COA 110M, 315 P.3d 185.

But possession of property is not dependent upon title and need not be exclusive. Under this section, a party not an owner or lessee may nevertheless be a "landowner" if the party either maintains control over the property or is legally responsible for either the condition of the property or for activities conducted on the property. Henderson v. Master Klean Janitorial, Inc., 70 P.3d 612 (Colo. App. 2003).

However, a contractor who would otherwise be categorized as a "landowner" during time of work on property is not liable if, at the time of the accident in question, the contractor was neither in possession of the property nor conducting any activity related to the property. In such a case, the plaintiff is not required to prove that defendant contractor had actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. Land-Wells v. Rain Way Sprinkler & Lands., 187 P.3d 1152 (Colo. App. 2008); Collard v. Vista Paving Corp., 2012 COA 208, 292 P.3d 1232.

Contractor who had a legal responsibility for the condition of the premises and who was potentially liable for injuries resulting from that condition held to be a "landowner" for purposes of this section. Henderson v. Master Klean Janitorial, Inc., 70 P.3d 612 (Colo. App. 2003).

When a public entity provides a public building for public use, it owes a nondelegable duty to protect invitees from an unreasonable risk to their health and safety due to a negligent act or omission in constructing or maintaining the facility. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).

Owner of property adjacent to public sidewalk does not have a duty to pedestrians to clear sidewalk of snow merely because it complied with snow removal ordinance from time to time and on a voluntary basis in order to avoid the imposition of penalties. Burbach v. Canwest Invs., LLC, 224 P.3d 437 (Colo. App. 2009).

Snow removal ordinance does not make public sidewalks the "property of" adjacent property owners. The court therefore properly granted summary judgment since owner of property adjacent to public sidewalk was not legally responsible for the condition of the sidewalk. Burbach v. Canwest Invs., LLC, 224 P.3d 437 (Colo. App. 2009).

A landlord retaining sufficient control over an area or instrumentality has a duty to exercise due care in maintaining that area or instrumentality. Nordin v. Madden, 148 P.3d 218 (Colo. App. 2006).

In effect, this section establishes two separate elements for landowner liability: (1) Breach of a duty to use reasonable care to protect against a danger on the property, and (2) actual or constructive knowledge of the danger. Sofford v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Colo. 1997).

Statute's requirement that the landowner "knew or should have known" of the danger can be satisfied by actual or constructive knowledge. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008).

Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to overcome defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of knowledge because, as the builder, defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the violation of a building code provision that was intended to ensure the safety of those on the premises, such as plaintiff. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008).

The fact that landowner did not obtain a plumbing permit when he installed a water heater does not support an inference that he knew or should have known of a leak in a propane pipe three years later. Invitee could not identify particular sections of the plumbing code that govern the possibility of propane gas leaks. The intent of the permit requirement is too general and its connection to a propane gas leak too remote to reasonably impute knowledge to the landowners. Giblin v. Sliemers, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D. Colo. 2015).

Plaintiff may overcome summary judgment on the issue of a landowner's unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care by presenting evidence that the landowner violated a statute or ordinance that was intended to protect the plaintiff from the type of injury plaintiff suffered. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008).

Common law tort principles apply to the concept of causation in subsection (3)(c)(I). There were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether or not a shooter was the predominate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, so summary judgment was not appropriate. Rocky Mtn. Planned Parenthood v. Wagner, 2020 CO 51, 467 P.3d 287.

Whether a landowner should have known of a danger to invitees and whether the actions of another person limit a landowner's liability are factual issues that must be decided by a jury. Wagner v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 2019 COA 26, 471 P.3d 1089, aff'd, 2020 CO 51, 467 P.3d 287.

A court could find a danger to be so unprecedented and remote that, as a matter of law, no rational juror could find that a landowner should have known about it, but a court could not so find when invitees presented some evidence suggesting that the risk of an "active shooter" incident in a facility, especially one that performed abortions, was not unknown. Wagner v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 2019 COA 26, 471 P.3d 1089, aff'd on other grounds, 2020 CO 51, 467 P.3d 287.

A plaintiff may recover against the landowner pursuant to the statute only and not under any other theory of negligence. The language of the premises liability statute makes clear that a party may no longer bring a negligence per se claim against a landowner to recover for damages caused on the premises. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008); Tancrede v. Freund, 2017 COA 36, 401 P.3d 132.

Building code violation may be evidence that owners failed to use reasonable care. Trial court did not err in tendering to a jury an instruction that included this statement, while rejecting other jury instructions that misstated the relationship between the common law and the premises liability act. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 266 P.3d 412 (Colo. App. 2011).

No lessor liability for injuries. Under this section, as under common law, a lessor who has transferred possession and control over the leased premises to a lessee has no liability for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of the premises absent proof as to one of the exceptions. Perez v. Grovert, 962 P.2d 996 (Colo. App. 1998).

Under this section, a landlord who has transferred control of the premises to a tenant is no longer a "person in possession" of the real property and is not liable for injuries resulting from a danger on the premises unless the landlord had actual knowledge of the danger before the transfer. Wilson v. Marchiondo, 124 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2005).

And no landowner liability for injuries occurring on that portion of an easement exclusively owned, maintained, and controlled by easement holder. deBoer v. Jones, 996 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 2000); deBoer v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 17 P.3d 187 (Colo. App. 2000).

The reservation of the right of inspection and the right of maintenance and repairs is generally not a sufficient attribute of control to support imposition of tort liability on the lessor for injuries to the tenant or third parties. Wilson v. Marchiondo, 124 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2005).

This section does not reflect an intention to extend the application of the premises liability doctrine to the negligent supply of a chattel by a landowner. Geringer v. Wildhorn Ranch, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Colo. 1988).

This section does not apply to ski accident cases which are governed by the Ski Safety Act, article 44 of title 33, Calvert v. Aspen Skiing Co., 700 F. Supp. 520 (D. Colo. 1988).

This section would apply to ski accident cases which involve dangerous conditions that are not ordinarily present at ski areas since the Ski Safety Act, article 44 of title 33, protects skiers against only those dangerous conditions that are commonly present at ski areas. Giebink v. Fischer, 709 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1989).

Claim of spectator injured by flying puck at hockey rink governed by this section. The common law "no duty" rule for injuries suffered by spectators at sporting events was superceded by this section. Teneyck v. Roller Hockey Colo., Ltd., 10 P.3d 707 (Colo. App. 2000).

Subsection (2) does not apply when plaintiff is a co-owner of the area where the injuries were sustained, because the injury could not have occurred on the real property of another. Acierno v. Trailside Townhome Ass'n, Inc., 862 P.2d 975 (Colo. App. 1993).

Jury instructions presenting a general negligence theory with regard to an invitee was not prejudicial error, even if there is a meaningful difference between a failure to exercise reasonable care, in the instruction, and an unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care, from the statute. Lawson v. Safeway, Inc., 878 P.2d 127 (Colo. App. 1994); Thornbury v. Allen, 991 P.2d 335 (Colo. App. 1999).

Because plaintiff is a landowner, trial court should have applied the standard of care in this section rather than the standard of care for operators of amusement devices contained in the jury instructions. Anderson v. Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 119 P.3d 533 (Colo. App. 2004).

The provisions of this act do not apply to the common areas of a townhome complex that are owned by a townhome owners association, because the townhome owners have a continuing right of access to the common areas in the townhome complex by virtue of their status as owners, regardless of whether the association has given consent. Trailside Townhome Ass'n, Inc. v. Acierno, 880 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1994).

Rather, the relationship between the townhome owners association and the townhome owners is controlled by the duties specified in the operative documents creating the townhome complex and the association, to the extent those duties are consistent with public policy. Trailside Townhome Ass'n, Inc. v. Acierno, 880 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1994).

Under this section, a tenant is classified as an invitee, as a customer of the landlord in a continuing business relationship that is mutually beneficial, regardless of the particular activity in which the tenant was engaged when injured. Maes v. Lakeview Assocs., Ltd., 892 P.2d 375 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd, 907 P.2d 580 (Colo. 1995); Pedge v. RM Holdings, Inc., 75 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2002).

Plaintiff who paid admission was invitee and not a social guest. Social hosts do not typically require their guests to sign permission slips and pay for their hospitality. Wycoff v. Grace Cmty. Church, 251 P.3d 1260 (Colo. App. 2010).

A social guest of a tenant is a licensee absent a showing that the guest entered the premises to transact business with the landlord or that the landlord represented that the guest was expected to enter or remain. Wilson v. Marchiondo, 124 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2005).

Plaintiff was a licensee. Grazing permit granted by the United States forest service provides sufficient basis to infer that, by accepting the permit, the permit holders impliedly consented to entry onto the property by those who had the forest service's consent. Legro v. Robinson, 2015 COA 183, 369 P.3d 785.

Contractor with legal responsibility for the condition of the premises owes an employee of a lessor of the premises a duty of care which this section imposes upon a landowner with respect to an invitee. Henderson v. Master Klean Janitorial, Inc., 70 P.3d 612 (Colo. App. 2003).

The liability of a landowner to a licensee under this section is to be limited to situations in which the landowner possesses an active awareness of the dangerous condition. Wright v. Vail Run Resort Cmty. Ass'n, 917 P.2d 364 (Colo. App. 1996); Grizzell v. Hartman Enters., Inc., 68 P.3d 551 (Colo. App. 2003).

A person walking on a public sidewalk adjacent to private property is not an "invitee", "licensee", or "trespasser" on the adjacent property for purposes of this section. Andrade v. Johnson, 2016 COA 147, 409 P.3d 582.

Attractive nuisance doctrine applies to all children, regardless of their classification within the trespasser-licensee-invitee trichotomy. S.W. v. Towers Boat Club, Inc., 2013 CO 72, 315 P.3d 1257.

Summary judgment in favor of landlord proper in absence of any evidence concerning landlord's knowledge of alleged defect. Casey v. Christie Lodge Owners Ass'n, 923 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1996); Giblin v. Sliemers, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D. Colo. 2015).

Section covers claims for negligent supervision and retention when a claim relates to the condition of property. Casey v. Christie Lodge Owners Ass'n, 923 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1996).

Section does not abrogate claims that also arise under dog bite statute. Plaintiff bitten by defendant's dogs on property where defendant qualified as a "landowner" could bring a claim under this section. Legro v. Robinson, 2012 COA 182, 328 P.3d 238, aff'd on other grounds, 2014 CO 40, 325 P.3d 1053.

The term "consent" includes both express and implied consent. The fact that the term "express or implied" is used with respect to an "invitee" but not with respect to a "licensee" or a "trespasser" does not preclude implied consent from being sufficient to make one entering property a "licensee" and not a "trespasser". Corder v. Folds, 2012 COA 174, 292 P.3d 1177.

In and of itself, a "For Sale" sign on a property does not create an implied representation to strangers to enter the private property of another. Nor does it impose the status of "invitee" on a stranger entering the private property. Rucker v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 2016 COA 114, 410 P.3d 675.