COCODE

13-21-101. Interest on damages.

Statute text

(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or by willful intent of the other person, corporation, association, or partnership and whether the injury has resulted fatally or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged from the date the suit is filed; and, on and after July 1, 1979, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages claimed from the date the action accrued. When such interest is claimed, it is the duty of the court in entering judgment for the plaintiff in the action to add to the amount of damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on the amount calculated at the rate of nine percent per annum on actions filed on or after July 1, 1975, and at the legal rate on actions filed prior to such date, and calculated from the date the suit was filed to the date of satisfying the judgment and to include the same in the judgment. On actions filed on or after July 1, 1979, the calculation must include compounding of interest annually from the date the suit was filed. On and after January 1, 1983, if a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment interest must be calculated on the sum at the rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment and must include compounding of interest annually.

(2) (a) If a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is affirmed, postjudgment interest, as set out in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, is payable from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment.

(b) If a judgment for money in an action to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial court, postjudgment interest, as set out in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, is payable from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment. This postjudgment interest is payable on the amount of the final judgment.

(3) The rate of postjudgment interest must be certified on each January 1 by the secretary of state to be two percentage points above the discount rate, which discount rate must be the rate of interest a commercial bank pays to the federal reserve bank of Kansas City using a government bond or other eligible paper as security, and rounded to the nearest full percent. Such annual rate of interest must be established as of December 31, 1982, to become effective January 1, 1983. Thereafter, as of December 31 of each year, the annual rate of interest must be established in the same manner, effective on January 1 of the following year.

(4) The rate at which postjudgment interest accrues during each year is the rate which the secretary of state has certified as the annual interest rate pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.

History

Source: L. 11: p. 296, 1. C.L. 6306. CSA: C. 50, 5. CRS 53: 41-2-1. C.R.S. 1963: 41-2-1. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 569, 1, effective July 1. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 316, 3, effective July 1. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 227, 3, effective January 1, 1983. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (SB 18-098), ch. 99, p. 772, 2, effective August 8.

Annotations

Cross references: (1) For rate of interest authorized upon a judgment for damages, see 5-12-102; for general provisions on interest, see article 12 of title 5.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-098, see section 1 of chapter 99, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

Annotations

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Analysis

I. General Consideration.
II. Request in Complaint.
III. Inapplicable Actions.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For note, "Interest as Damages in Colorado", see 16 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 162 (1944). For note, "Interest as Damages in Colorado", see 28 Dicta 285 (1951). For note, "Notes and Comments: What is a Life Worth", see 34 Dicta 41 (1957). For note, "Colorado Interest Law", see 34 Dicta 398 (1957). For case note, "Pre-Judgment Interest as an Element of Damages", see 49 U. Colo. L. Rev. 335 (1978). For article, "Rates of Interest on State and Federal Court Judgments: An Update", see 12 Colo. Law. 446 (1983). For article, "Collecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest in Colorado: A Primer", see 15 Colo. Law. 753 (1986). For article, "An Update of Appendices from Collecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest in Colorado," see 15 Colo. Law. 990 (1986). For article, "Recovery of Interest: Parts I and II", see 18 Colo. Law. 1063 and 1307 (1989). For article, "Immunities from Liability for Colorado Nonprofit Organization," see 25 Colo. Law. 37 (May 1996).

Plain language of section requires a nine-percent interest rate for personal injury money judgments that the judgment debtor does not appeal and a market-determined interest rate for both pre- and post-judgment interest for judgments that the judgment debtor does appeal. Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).

The receipt of interest is not a fundamental right and this section does not affect or create a suspect class. Therefore disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals will be upheld if it has a "rational basis." Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).

For prejudgment interest, there is no rational basis in fact to distinguish between judgment creditors and debtors depending on whether judgment debtors later appeal. Therefore, section is unconstitutional to the extent that it changes the rate of interest on prejudgment interest if the judgment debtor appeals. Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).

This section does not result in a deprivation of due process when the trial court based its award of prejudgment interest on future damages on this section. This section does not distinguish between past and future damage awards to calculate prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest is to compensate the injured party for loss of use of money and to encourage settlement. Therefore, there is a rational basis for awarding prejudgment interest on future damages. Scott v. Matlack, Inc., 1 P.3d 185 (Colo. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 39 P.3d 1160 (Colo. 2002).

There is a rational basis for treating postjudgment interest differently depending on whether the judgment debtor appeals. The elimination of financial incentives or disincentives to appeal is a reasonable legislative purpose. Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).

There is a rational basis for the difference in treatment between this section and 5-12-102. Colwell v. Mentzer Invs, Inc., 973 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1998).

Exception in subsection (2) only applies if the judgment debtor, normally the defendant, appeals the money judgment. The rate in subsection (1) applies when the judgment creditor, normally the plaintiff, appeals. Averyt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013 COA 10, 302 P.3d 321.

Where plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest and the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, plaintiff is entitled to an award of postjudgment interest calculated from the date judgment was entered to the date of satisfaction, and not from the date upon which the action accrued. Sperry v. Field, 133 P.3d 141 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 205 P.3d 365 (Colo. 2009).

Interest in Colorado is a creature of statute and regulated thereby. Denver Horse Importing Co. v. Schafer, 58 Colo. 376, 147 P. 367 (1915); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo. 25, 252 P.2d 1067 (1953).

Section must be strictly construed. "Interest statutes, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed". City of Boulder v. Stewardson, 67 Colo. 582, 189 P. 1 (1920); Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 784 (1947); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo. 25, 252 P.2d 1067 (1953).

This provision imparts no discretion to the trial court; it must be applied to any judgment resulting from an action for personal injuries. Stemple v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 430 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1970); Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 645 F. Supp. 909 (D. Colo. 1986); Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1999).

A judgment may be composed of both principal and interest. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Houser, 191 Colo. 189, 552 P.2d 308 (1976).

Court may correct judgment when requested interest is omitted. It is mandatory on a trial court to include interest pursuant thereto when properly claimed upon entering judgment, and it is not error for a court to correct a judgment by including interest when the omission is called to its attention. Crosby v. Kroeger, 138 Colo. 55, 330 P.2d 958 (1958).

Under C.R.C.P. 60(a), a failure to include interest when entering judgment is an oversight or omission within the terms of the rule. Crosby v. Kroeger, 138 Colo. 55, 330 P.2d 958 (1958).

Since the statute required an award of prejudgment interest and failure to include such interest was merely a ministerial oversight, passage of five years since entry of the award would not prevent the addition of prejudgment interest, even though the original amount of the award had been satisfied. Brooks v. Jackson, 813 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1991).

Interest may be assessed in tort action under Governmental Immunity Act. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).

Interest recoverable in action for death caused by injuries. Under the provisions of this section, a party seeking damages for the death of his wife alleged to have been occasioned by the tort of another, is entitled to interest on any amount he may recover, the section being sufficiently comprehensive to include all actions of tort founded on injuries to the person, whether nonfatal or fatal. Am. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 103 Colo. 461, 87 P.2d 260 (1939).

When injury is personal. An injury is personal when it impairs the well-being or the mental or physical health of the victim. Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo. App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977); McCafferty v. Musat, 817 P.2d 1039 (Colo. App. 1990); Herod v. Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 928 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1996).

Interest is awarded from filing of first complaint when there are two trials. Where judgment in favor of a person who had suffered personal injuries was reversed and a second docket fee had been paid and a second trial had resulted in a verdict for the injured party, he might recover interest from the time the complaint was filed for the first trial, interest having been asked for from the date of the filing of the suit. Am. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 103 Colo. 461, 87 P.2d 260 (1939); Parrish v. Smith, 109 Colo. 132, 123 P.2d 406 (1942).

Subsection (1) requires interest to be calculated from date action accrued and to be compounded annually from date suit is filed. Smith v. JBJ Ltd., 694 P.2d 352 (Colo. App. 1984).

Simple interest from accrual of cause of action until filing of complaint must be included in initial base amount on which annual compounding is calculated. To do otherwise is to deprive the plaintiff of one year's worth of compounding. Francis v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171 (Colo. App. 2005).

Interest on an award for annoyance and discomfort is recoverable from the date of the filing of the complaint. Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo. App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977) (decided prior to 1979 amendment).

Prejudgment interest is in the nature of another item of damages. Houser v. Eckhardt, 35 Colo. App. 155, 532 P.2d 54 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Houser, 191 Colo. 189, 552 P.2d 308 (1976); Heid v. Destefano, 41 Colo. App. 436, 586 P.2d 246 (1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1990).

The legislative purpose behind awarding interest under this section is to compensate the plaintiff for the time value of the amount of his or her judgment. An award of any additional interest above the amount of the final judgment is thus inconsistent with the compensatory purpose of the statute. Morris v. Goodwin, 185 P.3d 777 (Colo. 2008).

This section must be interpreted to provide interest on the amount awarded by the final judgment, regardless of the jury's determination. Morris v. Goodwin, 185 P.3d 777 (Colo. 2008).

Interest payable only to extent of insurer's liability. This section does not obligate an insurer to pay prejudgment interest on the judgment where it would increase the liability of the insurer to an amount over that for which it had contracted. Houser v. Eckhardt, 35 Colo. App. 155, 532 P.2d 54 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Houser, 191 Colo. 189, 552 P.2d 308 (1976); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1990); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Ross, 180 P.3d 427 (Colo. 2008).

This section applies to actions which accrue before the effective date of this section but which are filed after such effective date. Briggs v. Cornwell, 676 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1983); Martinez v. Jesik, 703 P.2d 638 (Colo. App. 1985); McCafferty v. Musat, 817 P.2d 1039 (Colo. App. 1990).

An injury is not personal when inflicted on property. Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo. App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977).

Injuries properly determined as "personal" and not "property" in case where toxic contamination to property caused homeowners inconvenience and loss of peace of mind based on their fear that contaminants could be present in portions of their homes and the perceived stigma attached to homes in the neighborhood. Therefore, the trial court was correct in awarding prejudgment interest on damages at the rate allowed for cases involving "personal injuries". Antolovich v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2007).

Plaintiff entitled to prejudgment interest on awarded damages in economic losses or injuries for negligent misrepresentation claim. Plaintiff brought suit seeking damages for a misrepresentation made to her, not for any damage to property personal or real. Nothing in this section's terms seems to require an inquiry into the particular type of compensatory damages (economic or noneconomic) the jury eventually awards. David v. Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc., 779 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2015).

Statute applies to claims accruing before the effective date of statute. Briggs v. Cornwell, 676 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1983).

Plaintiff entitled to interest on damages from date of accident even though it occurred prior to July 1, 1979. Application of the 1979 amendments does not violate the constitutional ban on retroactive laws. Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984).

Interest on damages were properly found to begin accruing from the date defendant discovered that contamination had crossed its property boundary and not from the date plaintiff learned of the contamination. The court found that a holding to the contrary would only encourage wrongdoers to stall or hide important information in order to avoid prejudgment interest. Antolovich v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2007).

The award of prejudgment interest serves not only the purpose of compensating a party for the loss of use of money but is also used to encourage the settlement of cases both pre- and post-trial. Stevens v. Humana of Del., Inc., 832 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1992).

Statute applies to action for strict liability in tort. Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 645 F. Supp. 909 (D. Colo. 1986).

Subsection (1) does not distinguish for the purpose of awarding interest between future and past damage awards. Because the statute itself does not distinguish between future and past damage awards, the general assembly did not intend that these concepts be applied. Stevens v. Humana of Del., Inc., 832 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1992); Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).

The fact that past and future damages awards are based on separate findings under 13-64-204 does not affect the plain language of subsection (1), which requires the court to add prejudgment interest to any personal injury verdict. Mumford v. Hughes, 852 P.2d 1289 (Colo. App. 1992).

Subsection (1) does not differentiate for the purpose of awarding interest between an award of past and future damages. The language of subsection (1) requires the court to add nine percent interest to any personal injury verdict. Stevens v. Humana of Del., Inc., 832 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1992).

Since the interest statute does not distinguish between future and past damage awards, and damages for past and future losses were routinely awarded at the time of its enactment, it must be assumed that the general assembly intended to award prejudgment interest in all cases in which a jury verdict award was made. Stevens v. Humana of Del., Inc., 832 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1992); Mumford v. Hughes, 852 P.2d 1289 (Colo. App. 1992).

Award of prejudgment interest on wrongful death damages from time of death is appropriate. Combined Com. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893 (Colo. App. 1993).

Subsection (1) does not apply to damages resulting from a breach of contract. Shannon v. Colo. Sch. of Mines, 847 P.2d 210 (Colo. App. 1992).

Even though an underinsured motorist policy is a contract and therefore would not fall under this section, the claim under that policy may be premised upon a tort claim for bodily injury and therefore accrue interest at the nine percent interest rate dictated by this section. Here, plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim was for damages resulting from the tort of another person, even though it also involved the contract with his insurer; therefore, he was entitled to the higher interest rate set in this section rather than that for contractual claims under 5-12-102. Parker v. USAA, 216 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).

Section applies to judgments based on claims for underinsured motorist benefits resulting from personal injuries. Parker v. USAA, 216 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).

This section unambiguously requires recalculation of interest at the variable rate set under subsections (3) and (4) if the verdict is appealed, even though the variable rate may be less than the nine percent statutory rate. Ackerman v. Power Equip. Co., 881 P.2d 451 (Colo. App. 1994).

This section, as amended, is clear and unambiguous in its requirement that personal injury judgment interest is to be recalculated at the variable interest rate set by the secretary of state in the event of an appeal. Ackerman v. Power Equip. Co., 881 P.2d 451 (Colo. App. 1994); Rodriguez v. Schutt, 896 P.2d 881 (Colo. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).

The award of prejudgment interest serves not only the purpose of compensating a party for the loss of use of money but is also used to encourage the settlement of cases both pre- and post-trial. Stevens v. Humana of Del., Inc., 832 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1992).

Prejudgment interest is an element of damages compensating the personal injury plaintiff for all injuries caused by defendant's tortious conduct, including the lost time value of his damages award. It is not "interest" as that term is defined and generally understood. Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiffs gave up their right to interest against tortfeasor when they voluntarily settled with that tortfeasor and thereby avoided a double award of interest. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990); Gutierrez v. Bussey, 837 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1992).

"Willful intent" standard of subsection (1) is met upon a showing of "wanton" conduct, as specified in 13-21-102, entitling the plaintiff to prejudgment interest on exemplary damages. Bradley v. Guess, 797 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 817 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1991).

Court erred in denying motion for prejudgment interest as of date of accident where plaintiff's underlying injury was personal in nature and plaintiff would have been entitled to prejudgment interest absent attorney's malpractice. McCafferty v. Musat, 817 P.2d 1039 (Colo. App. 1990).

Defamation is a personal injury and not an injury to property; therefore prejudgment interest shall be automatically added to an award of damages for defamation. Brooks v. Jackson, 813 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1991).

This section authorizes interest to be compounded only on an annual basis. Combined Com. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893 (Colo. App. 1993).

Interest on a damage award shall be calculated at a nine percent fixed rate per annum until the judgment is satisfied except in cases of an appeal in which case subsections (3) and (4) provide for a variable rate of interest. Evinger v. Greeley Gas Co., 902 P.2d 941 (Colo. App. 1995).

When court enters an order on the amount of a judgment following a jury verdict, the court should enter the order nunc pro tunc to the date of the jury verdict. Scholle v. Ehrichs, 2022 COA 87M, 519 P.3d 1093.

When a defendant appeals a judgment following a jury verdict, prejudgment interest is accrued at the rate of nine percent through the date of the jury verdict, not the date that an order is signed. Scholle v. Ehrichs, 2022 COA 87M, 519 P.3d 1093.

Under subsection (1), when a judgment debtor appeals a judgment and the judgment is reversed, postjudgment interest on a later judgment accrues from the date of the first judgment at the rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4) rather than at the statutory rate of nine percent. Ford Motor Co. v. Walker, 2022 CO 32, 517 P.3d 653.

Costs not award of damages within the meaning of this section. Steele v. Law, 78 P.3d 1124 (Colo. App. 2003).

Applied in DeLong v. City & County of Denver, 195 Colo. 27, 576 P.2d 537 (1978); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Kluver, 199 Colo. 511, 611 P.2d 971 (Colo. App. 1980); Martin v. Porak, 638 P.2d 853 (Colo. App. 1981); Jackson v. Marsh, 551 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Colo. 1982); Teran v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 2020 COA 151, 477 P.3d 799.

II. REQUEST IN COMPLAINT.

Interest will be awarded from filing of complaint if requested. This section expressly provides for the awarding of interest from the date of the filing of the complaint in a personal injury action if requested in the complaint. Callaham v. Slavsky, 153 Colo. 291, 385 P.2d 674 (1963).

If not requested in the complaint interest is waived. Plaintiffs not having demanded interest prior to the entry of judgment, waived this demand which the section provides must be made in the complaint. Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo. 25, 252 P.2d 1067 (1953).

It is sufficient to demand interest in the prayer for relief. A prayer is a necessary part of a claim for relief under C.R.C.P. 8 and where the prayer is for "interest and costs of suit", it is sufficient to meet the requirements of this section entitling a plaintiff to interest on the verdict from the date of filing a complaint. Jacobson v. Doan, 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957).

To permit an amendment of the complaint to add interest more than 10 days after the judgment had been entered was error. Green v. Hoffman, 126 Colo. 104, 251 P.2d 933 (1952); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo. 25, 252 P.2d 1067 (1953).

To permit amendment of the complaint after the verdict but before judgment was entered was error. Clark v. Buhring, 761 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1988).

This section does not dictate the date to which future losses must be discounted. Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turboneca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1992).

III. INAPPLICABLE ACTIONS.

This section does not apply to property or contractual damage. The Colorado statute distinguishes between damages arising from personal injury and contractual or property damages. Interest is not permitted from the date of filing of the complaint where property damages are involved. Stemple v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 430 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1970).

Under the plain language of this section, prejudgment interest can be awarded only after a judgment, based upon a damage award determined by a trier of fact, has been entered. An uninsured motorist is not entitled to prejudgment interest in a settlement reached with the motorist's insurance carrier prior to litigation. Munoz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 COA 25, 428 P.3d 599, aff'd, 2018 CO 68, 425 P.3d 1128.

Court may not add prejudgment interest to accepted offer of judgment. When, in a personal injury action, a plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment, the court is precluded from adding prejudgment interest to the amount agreed upon by the parties. Heid v. Destefano, 41 Colo. App. 436, 586 P.2d 246 (1978).

When a party accepts a settlement, trial court is precluded from adding prejudgment interest to the amount agreed upon by the parties. Parker v. USAA, 216 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).

Interest is not recoverable in an action for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit. Moreland v. Austin, 138 Colo. 78, 330 P.2d 136 (1958); Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 157 Colo. 347, 402 P.2d 628 (1965).

Nor in action for breach of warranty. Interest is only recoverable in the absence of contract, in the cases enumerated in this section. An action in damage for a breach of warranty is not one of the enumerated cases. Denver Horse Importing Co. v. Schafer, 58 Colo. 376, 147 P. 367 (1915).

Nor in an action for false representations. Interest is a creature of statute, and this section makes no provision for interest on unliquidated damages which may be awarded in actions for false representations. Moreland v. Austin, 138 Colo. 78, 330 P.2d 136 (1958).

Interest will not be awarded against a municipal corporation. The word "corporation" as used in this section does not include a municipal corporation. City of Boulder v. Stewardson, 67 Colo. 582, 189 P. 1 (1920).

For inapplicability to nonresident injured in his own state with Colorado merely as forum, see Stemple v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 430 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1970).

This section does not apply to punitive (exemplary) component of damage award, but only to such damages as are properly deemed compensatory. Seward Const. Co., Inc. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1991); Burgess v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 325 (Colo. App. 1992).

A limited exception to the interest formula determining the accumulation of prefiling and prejudgment interest on an award, which formula is created in this section, can be found in 13-64-302 (2) and applies to certain rulings under the Colorado Health Care Availability Act. Ochoa v. Vered, 212 P.3d 963 (Colo. App. 2009).