10-7-109. Suicide no defense for nonpayment.
Statute text
The suicide of a policyholder after the first policy year of any life insurance policy issued by any life insurance company doing business in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said policyholder was sane or insane. Nothing in this section is intended or shall be construed to apply to any accident insurance policy insuring against accidental death or death by accidental means or to those parts or provisions of any life insurance policy insuring specifically against accidental death or death by accidental means.
History
Source: L. 13: p. 358, 59. C.L. 2532. L. 35: p. 573, 1. CSA: C. 87, 76. CRS 53: 72-3-23. C.R.S. 1963: 72-3-23.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Analysis
I. General Consideration.
II. Suicide as a Defense.
A. To Suit on Life Policy.
B. To Suit on Accident Policy.
C. Conflict of Laws.
Law reviews. For note, "Is an Accident Policy a Life Insurance Policy?", see 1 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 49 (1928). For article, "Suicide, Sane or Insane", see 12 Dicta 32 (1934). For note, "Suicide While Insane as a Defense to Life and Accident Policies", see 8 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 216 (1936). For article, "Life Insurance and Suicide History and the Colorado Statute", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 51 (1964).
Purpose of this section is to protect an insurance company against fraud on the part of the insured. Ownbey v. Gen. United Life Ins. Co., 34 Colo. App. 33, 524 P.2d 636 (1974).
Assumption made by general assembly in enacting section. The general assembly in enacting this section assumed that after one whole year had elapsed from the time the insured made application for the policy it should be conclusively presumed that he did not contemplate suicide when he made the application, and consequently that he did not contemplate defrauding the company by taking his own life. Ownbey v. Gen. United Life Ins. Co., 34 Colo. App. 33, 524 P.2d 636 (1974).
This section expresses a public policy which cannot be nullified by any scheme or device. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. West, 102 Colo. 591, 82 P.2d 754 (1938).
This section is constitutional. This section, which provides that the suicide of a policyholder after the first policy year shall not be a defense against payment of the policy, is not in conflict with the constitution, and any provision in an accident or life insurance policy attempting to relieve the insurer from liability in case of suicide is a nullity. Mass. Protective Ass'n v. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469, 288 P. 888 (1930).
Furthermore, it is not merely procedural; it is substantive. McCowan v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 116 Colo. 78, 179 P.2d 275 (1947).
When one-year period in phrase "first policy year of any life insurance policy" begins. By the terms of this section, the one-year period in the phrase "first policy year of any life insurance policy" begins as of the date of the initial coverage of the instrument of indebtedness and not as of the date of extension or renewal of such indebtedness. Ownbey v. Gen. United Life Ins. Co., 34 Colo. App. 33, 524 P.2d 636 (1974).
Effect of reinstatement of policy. Where the policyholder is reinstated by the payment of an overdue premium it does not create a new contract but in effect restores the old, therefore not giving the insurance company the defense of suicide within the first policy year. Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am. v. Scott, 17 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1927).
Section does not apply to fraternal benefit societies. This section so far as life insurance is concerned, directs its provisions to the policies of "any life insurance company". However, neither the "suicide" provision, nor any sections of this title, designate its application to fraternal benefit societies. Neighbors of Woodcraft v. Westover, 99 Colo. 231, 61 P.2d 585 (1936).
Annotator's note. A case relevant to 10-7-109 decided prior to its earliest source, L. 13, p. 358, 59, has been included in the annotations to this section.
This section eliminates from consideration any defense upon the ground of suicide, which otherwise might have been asserted. It is constitutional and insurance companies doing business in this state are subject to its provisions. Weber v. Head Camp, Pac. Jurisdiction, Woodmen of the World, 60 Colo. 529, 154 P. 728 (1916).
This section applies to an action on a life policy. It is directed against suicide as a defense to an action on a life policy in all cases, without regard to the character or class of the insurer. Head Camp Woodmen of the World v. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, 112 P. 49 (1910).
Whether issued by a life or accident company. This section applies to life insurance policies, whether issued by a life insurance company or by an accident insurance company. Mass. Protective Ass'n v. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469, 288 P. 888 (1930).
An accident insurance company which writes policies providing for death benefits is a life insurance company as that term is used in this section. Officer v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 74 Colo. 217, 220 P. 499 (1923), distinguishing Midland Cas. Co. v. Frame, 67 Colo. 179, 185 P. 656 (1919); Union Health & Accident Co. v. Welch, 71 Colo. 374, 206 P. 790 (1922).
There is no exception for any kind of company. The statute is clear and specific, and is capable of but one rational construction, namely, that it was the intent and purpose of the general assembly to prevent all companies, of whatsoever kind or character, issuing life insurance contracts, from escaping payment thereon in the event of death, simply on the ground that the insured committed suicide. There is no exception in behalf of any particular kind of company, either expressed or implied, and manifestly none was intended. Head Camp Woodmen of the World v. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, 112 P. 49 (1910).
This section applies to group life insurance policies. Auwae v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 1188 (D. Colo. 2020).
This section becomes a constituent part of the contract, and, after the prescribed lapse of time, the defense of suicide is denied. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Braukman, 70 F.2d 647 (10th Cir 1934).
This section cannot be waived or abrogated or set aside by agreement of the parties. Under the provisions of this section, suicide of the insured is no defense against the payment of a life policy, and the statute can neither be waived nor abrogated by any plan or device whatsoever; neither can it be set aside by private agreement of the parties. Officer v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 74 Colo. 217, 220 P. 499 (1923); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Officer, 78 441, 242 P. 989 (1925); Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Di Iullo, 98 Colo. 116, 53 P.2d 1183 (1935).
B. To Suit on Accident Policy.
In suit on accident insurance, insured must still show death is an accident. While this section makes absolutely void all stipulations exempting liability on account of suicide and all defenses bottomed on the fact of suicide, yet it nowhere relieves the plaintiff in an action upon a policy of accident insurance from making proof that the death of the assured was cause by an accident. Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Di Iullo, 98 Colo. 116, 53 P.2d 1183 (1935).
Where a person commits suicide while insane, the death is an accident. Mass. Protective Ass'n v. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469, 288 P. 888 (1930); Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Baldridge, 70 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1934); Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Di Iullo, 98 Colo. 116, 53 P.2d 1183 (1935).
The mental derangement which, in the case of one charged with crime, supports the defense of insanity, if found to exist in the insured in an accident policy covering death, will, when the insured has taken his own life while so deranged, make the suicide an accident under this section and decisions. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Officer, 78 Colo. 441, 242 P. 989 (1925).
Suicide by the insured while sane is not an accident. Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Di Iullo, 98 Colo. 116, 53 P.2d 1183 (1935).
In such case this section does not apply. It is held that this section does not apply where a policy provides for the payment of money upon the accidental death of the insured and the insured commits suicide while sane. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 98 Colo. 126, 53 P.2d 1180 (1935).
General assembly cannot prevent insurance companies from limiting accident risks. The general assembly has no power to, and courts cannot, compel an insurance company to write a policy or prevent it from limiting a policy to any specific accident or class of accidents. It may cover or exclude death by any means. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. West, 102 Colo. 591, 82 P.2d 754 (1938); Vann v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1944).
The 1935 amendment, exempting from the application of this section policies insuring against accidental death, is not retroactive. The section as it formerly stood having become a part of policies issued while it was in force, if the general assembly in passing the 1935 act intended it to apply to policies already issued, the act would violate both the state and the federal constitutions, which prohibit legislation impairing the obligation of contracts. McCowan v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 116 Colo. 78, 179 P.2d 275 (1947).
Beneficiary must prove accident when suicide is alleged by insurer. When death by accident is challenged and suicide is alleged, the beneficiary has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the death was the result of accident rather than suicide. Lockwood v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 Colo. 103, 498 P.2d 947 (1972).
Burden of proof. Where the insurance company is not defending on the basis of a policy exclusion but on the basis that there was no accidental death so that there can be no double recovery, it is not enough for plaintiff to prove death; she must prove accidental death to the exclusion of suicide by a preponderance of the evidence. Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Roth, 191 Colo. 289, 553 P.2d 390 (1976).
Resolution of issue is for jury if suicide not conclusively established. When the evidence, taken as a whole and fairly construed, does not conclusively establish suicide, the resolution of the issue is properly for the jury. Lockwood v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 Colo. 103, 498 P.2d 947 (1972).
The validity of insurance policies are based on the place of making. Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090 (1959).
Unless intent of parties to have it performed elsewhere existed at creation. Where an accident contract containing an exemption clause as to suicide was entered into in Wyoming, where such clause was valid, in the event of suicide by the insured while insane, the beneficiary in Colorado cannot bar the defense of suicide by the insurer under this section unless the intent of the parties to the contract to have it performed in Colorado existed at the time the contract was made. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Baldridge, 70 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1934).
Two-year suicide exclusion in an insurance policy issued in accordance with a standard of the interstate insurance product regulatory commission but in violation of this section is unenforceable. The general assembly may not delegate to an interstate administrative agency the authority to adopt regulations that effectively override state statutory law. Amica Life Ins. Co. v. Wertz, 2020 CO 29, 462 P.3d 51.